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1 INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear power plants constitute a major source of electricity worldwide. There 
were 417 nuclear power plants being operated worldwide in 1988 [1]. The amount 
of electricity generated by nuclear power plants was 308 GWe. In the U.S.A. 108 
operating nuclear power plants generated 95 GWe during 1988. During the same 
year only 6 new units began operation in the U.S.A. [1]. Yet, among other things, 
increasing and unpredictable costs and time to construct and operate nuclear power 
plants as well as concerns about safety have slowed the growth of the share of 
nuclear energy despite its apparent advantages and immense potential as a future 
energy source. In response to this situation the nuclear community is responding 
by proposing safer, smaller and more economical reactor designs. This study is part 
of such an effort. 
The concept is a liquid sodium cooled fast breeder reactor concept. It is called 
the Trench Reactor (TR). In particular, this study deals with the thermal-hydraulic 
behavior of the main components and preliminary safety assessment of the reactor 
concept. The purpose is to assess an alternative reactor concept with regards to 
its thermal hydraulic behavior and safety. The core physics, economic assessment 
and fuel management aspects of the TR can be found in references 12,3,4]. Previous 
work on the thermal hydraulic behavior and safety of the TR can be found in [5]. 
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1.1 Concept 
The concept can be summarized as a simple and an inherently safe fast power 
reactor for a wide range of operating conditions. The requirement that the reactor 
should be simple implies simplicity in construction and operation. One of the most 
direct ways to achieve simplicity in construction and operation is designing for 
units producing relatively small amounts of power with relaxed requirements on 
the components in a simple geometry. The requirement for inherently safe behavior 
means that the reactor should be able to compensate for any major disturbance 
in the balance of the plant in the absence of any action from the plant control 
and protection system. This requirement can be met by isolating the reactor core 
from the rest of the plant as much as possible and providing passive responses 
to malfunctioning components. The economic competitiveness of this concept is 
expected to be a result of these two characteristics. 
The major disadvantage of a nuclear power plant with small electric output is 
its high specific cost [6] and high operation and maintenance costs 7]. However, 
the small absolute power of the reactor offers several advantages in terms of both 
economic competitiveness and safety. Table 1.1 clearly indicates the effect of smaller 
electric output on the availability of the nuclear plants operating in the US. The 
same trend is also observed in the world; 14 of the best performing 20 nuclear 
reactors were rated below 600MWe and only one had a rating greater than 800 
MWe [8]. 
Besides ease of operability, the smaller rated power plants allow more of the 
components to be manufactured in factories rather than on the site of the nuclear 
plant. This allows for quality assurance to be performed easily resulting in shorter 
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Table 1.1: Nuclear power plant performance during 1971-1980 [8,page:108j 
Size Number Cumulative Equivalent Equivalent 
Category (MW) of Units Capacity(%) Availability {%) F.O.R" 
400-599 11 72.3 79.6 8.0 
600-799 8 68.1 71.0 11.5 
800-999 30 56.1 63.1 22.4 
1000 and over 13 56.2 64.9 23.3 
"The forced outage rate represents the total time the unit was unavailable 
due to the unanticipated equipment failure. 
construction times. It is also easier to standardize smaller reactors which will make 
the licensing process faster. In order to obtain higher electrical power ratings several 
small reactor modules can be grouped together to achieve the desired power rating. 
The passive mechanisms of safety, which are not as important in large power plant 
as they are in small power plants, offer a large potential for reductions in the costs 
associated with the safety related systems of the power plant by eliminating or at 
least reducing the necessity for fast acting systems. 
Although the concept described in this study is not proposed to be used in the 
near future, the results of a survey indicate that, if new nuclear power plants are 
ordered in the US by the electric utilities in the near future, their electrical power 
will be in the small to medium power range [7]. This has also been expected for 
developing countries who are planing to introduce or expand nuclear power plants 
(91. 
Designing components for tasks less than it is possible to achieve allows for 
longer operating times due to low demands on the components and there is consid­
erable margin to complete failure in an abnormal operating condition. The penalty 
paid for not utilizing the full potential of the materials may be compensated by 
4 
increasing the overall lifetime of the components. In terms of plant protection, 
this implies that there are fewer events that can lead to the complete failure of a 
component, hence, the requirements on the plant protection system are relaxed. 
The safety of a nuclear power plant is one of the most important aspects of its 
design and operation. Most nuclear reactors have been designed with a defense in 
depth approach; first to avoid the accidents from occurring, and if this step fails, to 
prevent accidents from causing plant failure. A third level of protection is included 
to avoid damage to the public should an accident in which the first two levels of 
defense have failed occur. The first level of defense includes designing stable re­
actors for all operating ranges, assuring the quality of components and operating 
and maintenance practices. The second level of defense includes redundant pro­
tection and reactor shutdown systems and decay heat removal systems. The third 
level of defense includes all the measures taken to avoid radioactive release to the 
environment, most importantly the containment buildings. 
Nuclear power plants are composed of thousands of components and any one 
or a group of these components may fail completely or malfunction resulting in an 
accident. Also, as with both the Three Mile Island [101 and Chernobyl [11] accidents 
operator error can cause accidents. Environmental effects such as earthquakes and 
tornadoes may also act as accident initiators. Designing a safety system that can 
assure public safety under foreseeable possible and credible circumstances results in 
extremely complex systems. 
Another approach to reactor safety is to design a reactor that can protect itself 
from a wide variety of accident initiators without the action of safety systems. Such 
a reactor is inherently safe for a wide range of operating conditions. Basically, one 
can then neglect the role of the plant control and protection systems in the second 
level of safety. This has several advantages. Since plant control and protection 
systems are not required for a wide range of accidents they do not need to be as 
complex as they usually are. Less complex systems will increase the understanding 
of the how the system works and the reliability of the system. 
The results of a survey in which the management, operating and maintenance 
employees of the utilities operating nuclear power plants in the US were asked to 
state their concerns related to the safety and operability of nuclear power plants, 
indicate how this safety approach can be achieved [8]. Some of the major concerns of 
the persons interviewed were: that additions of safety related equipment required 
by NRC reduces operability, maintainability and availability; that present plants 
respond too rapidly to transients; and that nuclear plants should be less sensitive 
to events in secondary systems. A reactor design that decouples the primary system 
from the rest of the plant, that does not require rapid responses from the operating 
system, and that assures adequate heat removal from the reactor core and the 
primary system under all conditions can satisfy these criteria. 
An example of this safety approach is the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II 
(EBR-II). EBR-II is a liquid sodium cooled fast reactor using uranium metal based 
fuel elements. Loss of flow and loss of heat sink tests were conducted from full 
power without scramming the reactor [12]. The reactor was able to shut itself down 
safely without the use of control systems. These two events, which are two of the 
most severe reactor accidents that can lead to core damage, were shown to be of 
minor significance in EBR-II. The response of the rector was due to a large thermal 
inertia in the form of the sodium pool, to the characteristics of the metal fuel used 
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and to the availability of natural circulation cooling after pumping power was lost. 
The TR concept as well as the other current US fast reactor concepts follow the 
example of EBR-II. 
Although the liquid metal cooled fast reactors (LMFR) have only recently 
begun to be used as commercial power plants in Europe, there is a vast amount 
of experience gained through several experimental facilities worldwide [131. It is 
generally agreed that the risks from the fast breeder reactors to the public are 
considerably less than the risks from the light water reactors [14,15]. Besides their 
advantage in terms of safety, the LMFRs, by producing new fissile material by 
breeding, offer a large potential for supplying future electricity demands [141. 
The use of sodium as the coolant and the pool configuration are the current 
design tendencies for LMFRs with the exception of the MONJU reactor which is 
a loop type reactor designed in Japan [16]. The concepts developed in the US 
advocate using metal fuel as the reactor fuel whereas the European and Japanese 
designs employ oxide fuels. 
The current reactor designs give more emphasis to passive systems as a means 
of assuring plant safety than previous reactor designs. In order to achieve this, 
plants are designed for small electrical outputs. The US concepts such as Power 
Reactor Inherently Safe Module (PRISM) [17] and Sodium Advanced Fast Reactor 
(SAFR) [18] are modular reactors with small electrical power outputs of 135MWe 
and 330M We per module, respectively. Emphasis is put on shop fabrication of 
components and minimization of the construction work on site. There is a major 
effort to limit the nuclear safety grade components to the primary system and 
employ conventional construction practices for the rest of the plant. These reactor 
7 
concepts can withstand a wide range of accidents including loss of flow, reactivity-
insertion and loss of heat sink accidents without control system action [17,18], 
In summary, several features of the TR concept, simplicity and inherent safety, 
also characterize the current LMFR design practices. Yet, the TR concept is quite 
different from the current reactor design concepts. 
1.2 Description of the Trench Reactor 
The TR is a liquid sodium cooled fast power reactor. Basic design data are 
given in Table 1.2. Figure 1.1 shows the basic configuration of the reactor. The 
reactor core is fueled with U-Pu-Zr metal fuel and generates 800MW of thermal 
power. The core is located in a sodium pool which is contained in a rectangular 
vessel. Control rods are located above and to the side of the core. Also located 
in the pool are the two intermediate heat exchangers and the two primary pumps. 
The liquid sodium exits the core at 485°C and is pumped through the intermediate 
heat exchangers where it is cooled to 343^C and enters the core through an inlet 
plenum. The reactor building atmosphere is nitrogen which circulates through the 
guard tank and reactor vessel. The secondary sodium enters the intermediate heat 
exchangers at 294°C and exits at 465®C. It is then used to generate superheated 
steam at 425®C and 15MPa in the steam generators. The electric power output of 
the plant is SOOMWe. 
The geometry of the primary system of the reactor, a slab reactor core lo­
cated in a thin rectangular prism, reduces the problems associated with the design 
of the primary system components and operational difficulties that would arise in 
other geometries. The shape of the reactor also makes the control of the reactor 
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easier by allowing control rods in the reflector rather than inside the core. The 
low power density of the reactor system resulting in lower operating temperatures 
allows considerable margin to failure during transients and normal operation. The 
large sodium pool, with its high thermal capacity, serves as a heat sink in case of 
an accident that results in a loss of heat removal capacity from the intermediate 
heat exchangers. The low thermal capacity of the inlet plenum due to the elimi­
nation of the cold pool from the reactor inlet, causes the reactor inlet temperature 
to respond to changes or disturbances more rapidly than the currently practiced 
design concepts. The pool temperature, by limiting the increase in the core inlet 
temperature, avoids any undesirable increase in the core temperatures. The large 
surface area of the reactor vessel enables the cooling of the reactor vessel by natural 
circulation of the building atmosphere. The primary pumps with their coastdown 
characteristics supply the necessary coolant flow through the reactor core in case 
of a loss of electrical power accident. The difference between the elevations of ther­
mal centers of the intermediate heat exchangers and the reactor core helps natural 
circulation which can remove the decay heat generated in the core. 
The properties of the metal fuel material are essential to the inherently safe 
behavior of the reactor. The basic characteristics of the metal fuel are high thermal 
conductivity, small heat capacity, high expansion coefficients, and low strength at 
high temperatures. The high thermal conductivity and the small amount of heat 
stored in the fuel elements cause the fuel temperature to follow the coolant tempera­
ture closely resulting in an increase in the negative feedback mechanisms associated 
with the fuel. The expansion characteristics of the metal fuel from an increase in 
temperature on short time scales are augmented by fission gas pressure buildup to 
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Table 1.2: Basic design parameters of the Trench Reactor 
Thermal Power (MW) 800 
Electrical Power (MW) 300 
Power Density (MW/m^) 155.2 
Core Inlet Temperature (°C) 343 
Core Exit Temperature (°C) 485 
Core Flow Rate (kg/s) 4400 
Core Pressure Drop (kPa) 836 
Number of Secondary Loops 2 
IHX Inlet Temperature (°C) 293 
IHX Outlet Temperature (°C) 465 
Secondary Flow Rate (kg/s) 1800 
Steam Temperature (°C) 425 
Steam Pressure (MPa) 15 
Feed water Temperature (°C) 237 
Feed water Flowrate (kg/s) 172 
Fuel Material Composition U-lOPu-lOZr 
Cladding Material HT-9 
Fuel Pin Radius (mm) 6.0 
Pitch (mm) 13.0 
Number of Fuel Pins 23450 
Fuel Reactivity Coefficient (10~^$/°C) -0.281 
Coolant Reactivity Coefficient (10~^S/°C) -0.129 
Power Reactivity Coefficient (10"^$/°C) -40.5 
introduce more negative feedback reactivity during transients. The decrease in the 
strength of the fuel material with increasing temperature reduces the mechanical 
stresses on the cladding material thereby reducing the chance of a cladding failure. 
In terms of normal operation of the plant, less reactivity is required to change the 
reactor power which results in a reactor which is more easily controlled than would 
be possible otherwise. 
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1 Core boxes 
2 Core shield 
3 Fuel storage 
4 Core table 
5 Reactor vessel 
6 Nitrogen 
7 Guard vessel 13 Top shield 
8 Primary inlet 14 Cover gas plenum 
9 IHX 15 Sodium pool 
10 Secondary outlet 16 Control blade 
11 Secondary inlet drive mechanism 
12 Pump 17 Shut down blades 
Figure 1.1: Cross section view of the TRENCH reactor 
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1.3 Scope and Limitations 
As mentioned earlier the main purpose of this study is to assess the the thermal-
hydraulic behavior and safety of the TR concept. Only the main components of the 
reactor system will be considered. The main components of the reactor system that 
will be considered are the reactor core, intermediate heat exchangers, pumps and 
steam generators. The detailed engineering design of any one of these components 
is an enormous task; this study does not attempt to reach such a final design. 
The main limitation of this study results from the level of detail employed in 
the calculations. Most of the calculations were done with simple one dimensional 
models. This required an attempt to be on the conservative side when making 
certain predictions rather than to attempt to model the physical phenomenon in 
more detail with possibly more accuracy. 
The safety of the TR concept is assessed based on its response to unprotected 
accidents. These unprotected accidents are expected to cover the upper bound 
of all the credible possible transient operating modes. The modeling used in this 
evaluation was based on lumped parameter models for most of the components. 
The level of complexity employed in these calculations was, in part, determined by 
the length of the computation time. 
In Chapter 2, the important safety considerations will be summarized. This 
includes the behavior of metal fuel, a short summary of the difficulties arising due to 
use of sodium as the coolant and a discussion of the anticipated transients and their 
implications on the reactor configuration. The basic design of the main components 
are described in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the response of the TR to unprotected 
accidents will be discussed. Some the control and protection system concepts that 
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are applicable to the TR are described in Chapter 5. The conclusions and the 
suggestions for future work are given in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, respectively. In 
order to help the reproducibility of the numerical results that will be presented, a 
list of the various correlations and material properties used in the calculations and 
a listing of the input of the DSNP program are included in the Appendix. 
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2 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 
2.1 Materials Considerations 
The properties of the materials used in building the various components in the 
primary and secondary heat transport systems of a liquid sodium cooled fast reactor 
determine the steady state and transient operating limits. The components of the 
primary system are affected by irradiation. They have to work at high temperatures 
for long periods of time and they have to withstand the undesirable effects of varying 
temperatures and of contact with flowing sodium. The components of the secondary 
system have to be able to mitigate the consequences of a possible sodium-water 
reaction in the steam generator. Therefore, a knowledge of the behavior of materials 
used in the design is important in deciding on the conditions which may cause a 
failure in any particular component. 
In the following discussion the behavior of the metal fuel and its interactions 
with the cladding materials will be reviewed, based on EBR-II and IFR experimental 
results. The effects of sodium and high operating temperatures will be summarized. 
2.1.1 Fuel Element Behavior 
One of the most important components of the reactor is the reactor core com­
prised of the fuel pins and the core boxes which contain these pins. A viable fuel 
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element must be able to [19] 
• perform to high burnup with this performance not being very sensitive to fuel 
element fabrication, 
• be able to be fabricated by simple manufacturing processes, 
• be able to be reprocessed in a simple and safe manner, 
• respond to transients in an inherently safe manner. 
For a fuel element to have a high burnup potential, the cladding material has to 
stand not only the pressure due the fission gas buildup and fuel element swelling 
but the thermal stresses as well. The effects of irradiation and high operating 
temperatures on the cladding mechanical properties are important. The wastage 
of the inner cladding surface by chemical interactions with the fuel material and 
the wastage of the outer surface of the cladding by sodium reduce the level of the 
stresses the cladding can stand. Another consideration is the differential thermal 
expansion between the fuel material and the cladding. The behavior and strength 
of the fuel material with increasing burnup determines the loads on the cladding. 
Failure, that is the breach of the cladding of one or a group of fuel pins, may have 
a major impact on the safety of the reactor. 
The fuel material used in the TR is a ternary metallic alloy composed of U-9Pu-
lOZr where the numbers denote the approximate weight fractions of the components 
they precede. The material used for the cladding and for other structural compo­
nents of the reactor core is a type of ferritic steel denoted as HT9. The compositions 
of HT9 and some other cladding materials that will be referred to in this chapter 
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Table 2.1: Compositions of commonly used cladding materials 
Weight Percent 
Alloy Cr Ni Mo Ti W V Si Mn C 
HT9 
D9 
T91 
316 SS 
12.0 0.5 1.0 - 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.20 
13.5 15.5 1.5 0.2 - - 0.6 2.0 0.04 
9.2 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.01 0.21 0.3 0.5 0.10 
18.0 11.2 2.1 - - - 0.6 1.8 0.04 
are given in Table 2.1. Metallic fuels with stainless steel cladding had been used in 
early fast reactor designs such as EBR-II and DFR [20]. After a shift to oxide and 
carbide fuels, metallic fuels are now being used in fast reactor design concepts such 
as PRISM, and IFR [19,20]. Most of the data available on the behavior of metallic 
fuels come from the experience gained through the operation of EBR-II. EBR-II 
uses a U-Fs fuel element. The cladding materials used were 304 and 316 stainless 
steels. Fs, which is an abbreviation for fissium, is an equilibrium concentration of 
non-gaseous and non-volatile fission products [21;. Although the fuel materials are 
different most of the information obtained on the behavior of metallic fuel elements 
is applicable to the U-Pu-Zr fuel because in both fuel element types the continuous 
phase is uranium. Recent data from irradiation experiments from the IFR project 
using U-Pu-Zr fuel elements with HT9 cladding support this conclusion. 
2.1.1.1 Normal Operation One of the reasons for a shift to fuel types 
other than metallic fuels was the low burnup potential of the metallic fuel element. 
The reason for this was the fast rate of expansion of the fuel element due primarily 
to fission gas induced swelling. The Mark-1 fuel element of the EBR-II was capable 
of achieving 1.2 at.% burnup whereas the Mark-II fuel element achieved burnups 
in excess of 10 at.% [20]. The differences between the Mark-II design and M ark-1 
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design are a lower smear density, a larger fission gas plenum and a thicker cladding 
which are attempts to strengthen the cladding or reduce the stresses on the cladding 
by reducing the pressure buildup and swelling due to the fission products [20]. 
It has been experimentally observed that if large amounts of fission gas can 
be released to the plenum before fuel and cladding contact occurs then the contact 
pressure on the cladding will be reduced greatly. However, in this case the plenum 
volume must be large enough to eliminate high pressure buildup. The gaseous 
fission products, which are basically Xe and Kr, tend to accumulate in the pores 
or form bubbles in the solid fuel matrix [20]. The reason for this can be related to 
the fact that both of these gases are noble gases eliminating the possibility for their 
chemical interaction with other elements present. The formed bubbles occupy more 
space than the more dense elements hence causing an increase in the fuel volume. 
If there were no mechanism for releasing these gases the cladding would have to 
accommodate for the increasing volume of the fuel and eventually would have to 
breach. However, as the fuel swells the gaseous fission products tend to combine 
and be released to the gas plenum associated with the fuel pin. The pressure of the 
gas collected in the bubbles and the pores is higher than the pressure in the plenum 
which forces the fission gas in the fuel to the fission gas plenum. 
Although fuel swelling is a widely varying function of the fuel burnup and 
operating temperature history, the fission gas release for metal fuels is a function 
of fuel swelling and does not depend on the metal fuel type significantly. It has 
experimentally been observed that after a 25% increase in the fuel volume the 
fission gas release increases rapidly [191. The fuel swelling is not isotropic; the fuel 
swells in the radial direction more than it does in the axial direction until fuel and 
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cladding contact occurs [22]. Fission gas is generated approximately at a rate of 
3.5 STP cc gas per cc fuel per a/o burnup and this gas is retained in the fuel up 
to 2% burnup [23]. At low operating temperatures the retained fraction of the 
fission gas is almost independent of the burnup level of the fuel [24,25]. However, 
at operating temperatures higher than %450®C the retained fission gas fraction is 
relatively independent of the burnup level. This would indicate that in the lower 
regions of the fuel pin where operating temperatures are lower more gas will be 
retained than the upper regions of the fuel. The fission gas plenum pressure was 
observed to increase linearly with burnup [22,26]. 
The fission products that are not in gaseous form also contribute to the fuel 
swelling. It has been observed that the liquid fission products, basically cesium, 
are distributed between the fuel and the bond sodium. The solid fission products 
remain in the solid fuel matrix either in solid solution or as intermetallic compound 
precipitates. Their contribution to fuel swelling (% 2vol% per atomic burnup) is 
important only in high smear density fuels [20]. However, if one considers the EBR-
II fuel element, which is an alloy of solid fission products with uranium, it may be 
concluded that under certain conditions the solid fission products may reduce fuel 
swelling [19,27]. 
During irradiation the U-Pu-Zr fuel shows a three layered structure [19,28,29]. 
The zirconium in the fuel element migrates towards the center and the cladding 
resulting in higher zirconium fractions in these regions. Uranium migrates to the 
middle zone and fission products migrate to the center and outer zones. This 
results in higher solidus temperatures in the zirconium rich regions. Also the heat 
generation rate in each region changes according to the concentration of uranium 
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Table 2.2: Radial fuel composition of U-8Pu-10Zr at 
1.9% burnup [28] 
Zone Radial position" 
^clad 
Alloy Composition 
Inner 
Middle 
Outer 
0.00 to 0.25 
0.25 to 0.70 
0.70 to 0.86 
78.27U-7.66Pu-14.07Zr 
83.29U-7.65Pu- 9.06Zr 
81.59U-7.39Pu-11.02Zr 
*Clad inner radius rcw=0.584 cm. 
and plutonium in each region. It is believed that this restructuring of the fuel 
takes places shortly after irradiation and does not affect the fuel behavior in a 
negative way [30,19]. Table 2.2 shows the concentrations of uranium, plutonium 
and zirconium after irradiation [28,29]. This restructuring is also believed to be the 
cause of the cracks that appear on the outer surface of the fuel 130]. 
The postirradiation examination of metallic fuels with different Pu concen­
trations (0, 8, 19 % weight fraction) after 1.9% and 3.0% burnup shows that fuel 
cracking is not very important in low plutonium content fuel elements i28,29]. Since 
fuel element cracking also reduces the amount of fission gas retained in the fuel, the 
U-8Pu-10Zr element had more fission gas retained than the U-19Pu-10Zr element 
[28,29]. 
The mechanical interaction between the swelling fuel element and the cladding 
was not found to be very important [26,27]. The strength of the fuel material as 
a function of temperature and porosity fraction decreases rapidly with increasing 
temperature and porosity fraction [311. The cladding material has a high strength 
at elevated temperatures [32]; therefore, the differential thermal expansion between 
the fuel material and the cladding material is not a significant source of stress on 
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the inner cladding surface after the fuel and the cladding touch each other. 
Radiation caused creep and swelling were the major sources of cladding defor­
mation for the regions of cladding in contact with the fuel in EBR-II [26,27]. The 
swelling of cladding was not uniform but showed ovalities due to the effect of the 
wire wraps used. However, ferritic steels like HT9 have much lower swelling rates 
from void formation than do austenitic steels [29,33]. At irradiation temperatures 
between 400 and 650^C HT9 did not exhibit swelling at a fluence of 1.4 x lO^^n/cm^ 
for neutron energies greater than O.lMeV [33]. Examination of HT9 cladding with 
uranium based metal fuels after 2.9% burnup showed that the measured cladding 
diameter changes did not exceed the manufacturing tolerances of ±0.2% ,29]. 
Chemical interaction between the fuel and cladding materials is also an im­
portant consideration. Two basic interaction mechanisms are diffusion of materials 
from the cladding at normal operating temperatures and, at higher temperatures 
formation of low melting point alloys, or eutectics, between the cladding and fuel. 
Both of these mechanisms contribute to the wastage of the cladding and, therefore, 
can lead to early breach of the cladding. 
In EBR-II with 316 SS cladding nickel diffusion from the cladding to the fuel 
was observed [27]; however, the HT9 cladding contains very small amounts of nickel 
(0.5% weight) which should limit this problem. Nickel transport is important be­
cause it accelerates the formation of U^Ni — UfNig eutectics [19]. Also another 
important component of the cladding is the carbon. Loss of carbon results in re­
duced strength properties at high temperatures. Loss of carbon from the HT9 
cladding was investigated and it was found that below 700°C carbon transfer was 
minimal [34]. 
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The eutectic formation temperature is the lowest temperature limit in terms 
of metal fuel element steady state operation. If the reactor is operated above the 
eutectic formation temperature for long periods of time, then the cladding will 
breach due to eutectic penetration into the cladding. The EBR-II experiments 
indicate the basic characteristics and effects of eutectic formation on fuel element 
lifetime. 
The U-Fs alloy has a eutectic temperature of 715°C and the eutectic compo­
sition is U-34wt%Fe. In order to determine how long the EBR-II fuel elements can 
endure temperatures higher than the eutectic temperature before they fail, exper­
iments were done on unirradiated fuel elements in a furnace [19]. Therefore, the 
fuel element failure mechanism is due to eutectic formation. It was observed.that 
the eutectic penetration was very slow for temperatures slightly higher than the 
eutectic temperature and for temperatures higher than 900°C the failure times was 
very short. 
The experiments performed with EBR-II Mark-II core were in agreement with 
the above observations. In these experiments, it has been observed that the two 
most important failure mechanisms were stress rupture of the cladding for high 
burnup elements and eutectic wastage of the cladding for low burnup elements. It 
is argued that the fuel cladding mechanical interaction is not important. The failure 
mechanisms are explained as [35]: 
"When the cladding temperature is above the eutectic temperature, the 
stress rupture breach will occur sooner then the measured eutectic pene­
tration rates would predict. Element breach will ultimately be the result 
of thinning of the cladding by eutectic penetration to the point where 
stress rupture can occur. Consequently, the stress rupture mechanism 
will control element lifetime of medium or high-burnup elements while 
eutectic penetration will control the lifetime of low-burnup elements." 
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When the operating temperature is high enough to cause eutectic formation in a 
low-burnup element the eutectic liquid is able to flow downward and solidify since 
the fuel and cladding are not in contact. However, in a high-burnup element the 
eutectic liquid causes the fission gas bubbles to coalesce and avoids further eutectic 
formation by absorbing some of the eutectic liquid in the pores. The observed 
eutectic penetration distances were 33% of the cladding for fresh fuel operating 
at 54®C above the eutectic temperature. For a high-bumup fuel element (7.69%) 
the penetration was 4.2% for an operating temperature of 78°C above the eutectic 
temperature. Also two fuel assemblies were operated slightly above the eutectic 
temperature for 12 hours without failure j35j. For EBR-II fuel elements, the time 
to cladding breach due to eutectic formation only was correlated as |35] 
where is the breach time in seconds for the penetration of the cladding whose 
thickness is 0.305mm and T is the operation temperature in K. These results were 
obtained by measuring the penetration rates in an eutectic bath. Since there are 
several mechanisms that inhibit eutectic penetration in fuel elements the above 
equation was found to be conservative [35]. 
The eutectic temperature of ternary fuels is not known as precisely as the 
eutectic temperature of the EBR-II fuel element. Earlier references [19,21,36] list 
the eutectic temperature for ternary fuels as 825^0 and attribute this increase to 
the addition of zirconium whereas a recent reference [37] gives 72G®C for the eutectic 
temperature. There are not enough studies done with ferritic cladding materials to 
precisely define the eutectic temperature. Table 2.3 lists the recent experimental 
data for U-Pu-Zr fuels with various types of cladding [38]. 
44574 (2.1) 
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Table 2.3: Eutectic temperatures of U-Pu-Zr fuel with several cladding 
materials [38] 
Fuel Cladding Temperature (°C) Time (h) Condition ! 
U-8Pu-10Zr HT9 731 300 NEF" I 
U-8Pu-10Zr HT9 757 300 NEF 
U-8Pu-10Zr T91^ 706 300 NEF ; 
U-8Pu-10Zr T91 731 300 EF= ' 
U-8Pu-10Zr T91 757 300 EF 1 
U-8Pu-10Zr 304 SS 758 700 NEF ; 
U-8Pu-10Zr 316 SS 777 150 NEF 1 
U-8Pu-10Zr 316 SS 802 150 EF i 
U-8Pu-10Zr 09^^ 758 700 EF 1 
U-8Pu-10Zr D9 777 150 EF 1 
U-8Pu-10Zr D9 802 150 EF i 
U-19Pu-10Zr HT9 731 300 EF ! 
U-19Pu-10Zr HT9 757 300 EF ! 
U-lQPu-lOZr T91 731 300 EF ! 
U-19Pu-10Zr D9 758 300 EF ' 
U-15Pu-llZr HT9 656 724 NEF 1 
U-15Pu-llZr T91 757 300 NEF i 
U-15Pu-llZr D9 802 150 NEF i 
U-15Pu-llZr 316 SS 802 150 NEF 1 
U-15Pu-llZr 304 SS 802 150 NEF 1 
"NEF: No eutectic formation. 
^TQ,1: jCr-lMo ferritjc stainless steel. 
°EF: Eutectic formation. 
D9: 14Cr -15Ni-lMo austenitic stainless steel. 
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Based on the temperatures listed in Table 2.3, a higher zirconium concentra­
tion of the fuel element results in a remarkably high eutectic temperature for all 
the cladding alloys. The high plutonium content elements have consistently lower 
eutectic temperatures. Also a comparison of the eutectic temperatures for U-8Pu-
lOZr fuel with HT9 and T91 cladding alloys shows that the chromium content of 
the cladding alloy is another important consideration. Since the fuel configuration 
of the TR is very similar to the U-8Pu-10Zr fuel with HT9 cladding, 750^C will 
be used for the eutectic formation temperature. This is a rather conservative tem­
perature since the restructuring of the fuel element will produce high zirconium 
concentrations near the cladding resulting in a higher eutectic formation tempera­
ture. 
2.1.1.2 Failure Mechanisms and Prediction The failure mechanisms 
of the fuel elements during transient conditions can be due to eutectic penetration, 
fission gas pressure, high pressure caused by vaporization of the bond sodium or 
differential thermal expansion of fuel and cladding. The mechanism that causes the 
failure can be any one or any combination of these mechanisms depending on the 
transient and the previous operating conditions. The severity of the transient in 
terms of the maximum temperatures and the duration of the elevated temperature 
or the rate of increase in the power are also important. Typically the eutectic 
temperature may be considered to be the lowest temperature limit in terms of 
transient operation, and it depends on the alloy in consideration. However, in order 
to predict whether a cladding breach will occur during a particular transient one 
has to be able to predict the thinning of the cladding due to eutectic penetration 
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throughout the transient. The evaporation temperature of the bond sodium is 
approximately 1150°C which also corresponds to the melting temperature of the 
fuel. The cladding melting point is even higher (%1400°C). 
During normal operation the basic mechanism of failure for the Mark-II core in 
EBR-II was cracks that occurred outside the cladding surface. It is argued that the 
increase in the plenum pressure coupled with radiation induced swelling and creep 
caused the crack to penetrate into the inside surface of the cladding. Most of the 
cladding breaches occurred at a location where a stress concentration was high. It 
is stated that [35] 
"Continued operation after a breach of this type is not a safety issue 
and, in EBR-II, breached driver fuel elements are allowed to remain in 
the reactor until the next scheduled shutdown." 
Another important result is that, although negligible below 10% burnup, cladding 
breach events increased rapidly thereafter [26]. 
Transients such as loss of flow or overpower accidents result in higher operating 
temperatures. Higher operating temperatures will result in an increase in the fission 
gas pressure in the fission gas plenum and in the fuel. If the transient temperatures 
are higher than the eutectic formation temperature the eutectic compound will cause 
thinning of the cladding. If the eutectic penetration rate is high enough to cause 
cladding breach, depending on the location of the breach either fuel and sodium or 
fission gases and sodium will come into contact. In the first case the compatibility 
of fuel and sodium and in the second case the sodium voiding effect caused by the 
fission gases are important parameters that influence the outcome of the accident. 
Both steady state and transient operation failure predictions will be based on 
the cumulative damage fraction (CDF) approach. In this approach the cladding is 
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assumed to fail if the cumulative damage fraction which is defined as [39] 
0 tr{(rQ,T) (2.2) 
is equal to unity. In Eq. (2.2) tr is the time to rupture which is a function of 
time in consideration. Cladding hoop stress contains contributions from fission gas 
pressure and thermal stresses. 
In order to predict the rate of eutectic penetration into the cladding Eq. (2.1) 
will be used. It is realized that this equation is for the U-Fs and 316 SS combination. 
However, due to lack of better information on the eutectic penetration rates in U-
Pu-Zr fuels and HT9 cladding and the similarity between the fuel types this seems 
to be the best choice. Rearranging Eq. (2.1) so that it gives the penetration rate 
into the cladding for temperatures greater than the eutectic temperature 
where x is the penetration rate into the cladding in m/s and T is the cladding inner 
surface temperature in K. 
The amount of fission gas in the plenum and fuel depend on the burnup level 
of the core. The maximum pressure can be obtained for a high burnup fuel due 
to increased amount of released fission gas and also decreased plenum volume due 
to axial fuel swelling. If the fission gas in the plenum is assumed to be an ideal 
gas then the pressure in the fission gas plenum can be calculated by using ideal 
gas relationships. The prediction of fission gas pressure in the fission gas plenum 
at a given burnup level and operating temperature will be made based on the 
approximate model described in reference [23] and mentioned in Section 2.1.1.1. 
cladding midwall hoop stress {(tq) and cladding temperature (T), and Zyis the final 
44574 (2.3) 
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Until 2% atomic burnup the plenum is assumed to be at atmospheric pressure. For 
burnups greater than 2% the fission gas pressure in units of MPa is computed by 
where T is the fission gas plenum temperature in K, Vj: and Vp are the fuel and 
fission gas volumes and BU is the atomic burnup in percent. Since the main source 
of loading on the cladding is fission gas pressure, in Eq. (2.4) all the fission gas is 
assumed to be released to the plenum resulting in a conservative prediction for the 
plenum pressure. 
An interesting property of the metal fuels is to exhibit rapid, large-scale sweUing 
when subject to overheating because of the reduction in the strength of the fuel ma­
terial at high temperatures i23]. As mentioned earlier, the retained fission gas frac­
tion is relatively independent of the burnup level at high operating temperatures. 
For burnup levels higher than 2% the fission gas retained would be seven times the 
fuel volume if this gas were expanded to standard temperature and pressure [20,23]. 
The retained gas volume will increase in volume due to overheating and will try to 
expand. Since the fuel strength diminishes with increasing temperature, the fission 
gas can expend freely. This expansion has important effects in terms of introducing 
negative reactivity feedback at high temperatures. The reactivity feedback associ­
ated with this rapid expansion was estimated to be an order of magnitude larger, 
a few cents per [23] than the other reactivity feedback mechanisms which are 
typically a few tenths of a cent per °C. In reference 40], it is argued that this 
expansion is not significant if the fuel and cladding are assumed to be locked to 
each other. However, for temperatures higher than the eutectic formation temper­
ature the eutectic fluid between the fuel and cladding interface will allow relative 
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motion of fuel with respect to cladding. The analysis of reference [25] shows that 
the measured axial elongation of the fuel in overheating cases is twice the amount 
that will be computed if the fuel and clad are assumed to be locked to each other at 
temperatures above the eutectic temperature. For rapid increases in temperature, 
the main mechanism of this swelling is attributed to the growth of bubbles on the 
existing grain boundaries by diffusion [25,41]. The time scales associated with the 
expansion precludes other expansion mechanisms from being important. 
When a cladding breach occurs, depending on the location of the breach either 
the fission gas or the fuel will come into contact with the flowing sodium. For a 
high burnup fuel element the difference between the fission gas pressure and the 
sodium pressure will cause the fission gas to expand and void the channel in which 
the fuel element is located. If the breach occurs at the top of the fuel column where 
the fission gas plenum is located, the positive reactivity effect due to the resulting 
void in the sodium will be small. Also EBR-II experience indicates that this kind of 
breach will not affect the surrounding fuel pins. If the breach occurs at a location 
below the fission gas plenum, then the fuel will come into contact with the sodium. 
Since the sodium and fuel material is compatible no dangerous reactions will occur. 
2.1.2 Effects of Sodium 
Sodium is the most commonly used fast reactor coolant. Low fast neutron 
absorption cross section, high thermal conductivity, low pumping power, compati­
bility with fuel materials, low cost and high boiling point at atmospheric pressure 
are among the advantages of sodium as a fast reactor coolant. The high boiling 
point of sodium allows the primary system to be at atmospheric pressure. 
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The main disadvantage of sodium is its high chemical activity. Materials ex­
posed to operating in a sodium environment at high operating temperatures may 
be subject to several forms of corrosion. The basic corrosion mechanism is by mass 
transfer [42,43]. There is a net movement of material from one part of the loop to 
another due to composition and temperature differences. In a reactor environment, 
the materials transported from the hot parts will be deposited in the cold parts. 
A form of this mass transfer occurs as carbon transfer from high carbon con­
tent components to low carbon content components. Carbon transfer should be of 
minor importance in the TR, because the core structural and cladding material, 
HT9, forms stable carbides, hence reducing the carbon transfer potential [34]. The 
solubility of oxygen in sodium is high at the operating temperatures around 500°C 
[44]. Sodium and oxygen react to form sodium oxide which is not very soluble 
in sodium. This compound is then deposited in the cold parts of the sodium cir­
cuit which may result in plugging of narrow passages. Sodium oxide can react with 
chromium to form a sodium-chromium dioxide which will contribute to the cladding 
wastage. Since the fuel element configuration in TR uses a tight lattice with pitch 
to diameter ratio around 1.13, the oxygen concentration in the primary circuit must 
be kept below 5 ppm [42]. Typically this is done by using cold traps [42] in the 
cold parts of the circuit. The thinning of cladding surface due to operating in the 
sodium environment at steady state is be correlated by [39] 
= 2.20 X lO^erp (2-3) 
where ty is the exposure time in years and T is the operating temperature in K. In 
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Eq. (2.5), B and C are given by 
0 T < 844if 
B = (2.6) 
0.17T - 143.41 T > 844 
0 T < 873ff C = (2.7) 
0.22r - 192.06 T > 9>nK 
Sodium ignites in air around 200^C. In order to avoid a sodium fire the con­
tainment building must be sealed to avoid air leakage. The reaction of sodium with 
water releases hydrogen which in the case of a fire will burn. Therefore, contact of 
sodium with air, and water and hydrogen must be avoided. In the TR concept this 
is accomplished by using argon as the cover gas on the pool and nitrogen as the 
containment atmosphere. The sodium water reaction is of major concern in steam 
generator design. 
Sodium upon absorbing a neutron becomes highly radioactive. The resulting 
nucleus, ^'^Na, decays by emitting gammas and has a half life of 14.8 hours. This 
requires gamma shielding around the primary system. 
The experience obtained with operating fast reactors using sodium as a coolant 
shows that sodium technology is well developed and the the above operational 
problems can be avoided or limited. 
The major safety safety concern due to the using sodium as coolant is due to the 
positive feedback of sodium boiling. If sodium boiling occurs during a transient a 
large amount of positive feedback, several dollars, will be inserted due to the voiding 
of the core which may result on a complete failure of the core. The time it takes 
to void the whole core after boiling starts depends on the core inlet temperature. 
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the pressure drop characteristics of the channels, and the temperature difference 
between the surrounding channels; and may be as short as a second. The resulting 
reactivity insertion in such a short time will result in a very rapid increase in the 
power generated and dryout of the cladding. Therefore, sodium boiling must be 
avoided during normal operation and transients. 
2.2 Anticipated Transients 
Nuclear power plants might conceivably be subject to a large number of ac­
cidents during their lifetime. The severity of these accidents ranges from minor 
operational faults with minor consequences to catastrophic events posing a threat 
to public. The main safety goal is to reduce the probability of large consequence 
event occurrence as much as possible and avoid permanent damage to the reactor 
components during more frequently occurring accidents. The accidents are very 
commonly a result of imbalances in the production and removal of the power and 
result from malfunctioning components or from external sources. The first cate­
gory includes accidents resulting from positive reactivity insertion, decrease in heat 
removal due to loss of flow or loss of heat sink. The plant control and protection 
system is normally expected to terminate the accidents in a safe manner, which 
typically will result in reactor scram should the accident be severe enough. Af­
ter a reactor scram, adequate cooling must be available to remove the decay heat 
generated. The accident sequences during which the plant control and protection 
systems fail to respond might have more severe consequences. 
Positive reactivity insertion may be due to a withdrawal of the control element, 
overcooling of the primary system, sodium voiding resulting from either whole core 
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sodium boiling or release of entrained gases in the sodium. Decrease of heat removal 
may be due to loss of power to the pumps, pump mechanical failure, blockage of the 
associated coolant channel of a fuel pin, loss of secondary sodium flow, intermedi­
ate heat exchanger failure, or loss of feed water supply to the steam generator. The 
second category of accidents may be caused by external sources, for example earth­
quakes, tornadoes, missiles, etc., or may occur during normal plant maintenance 
such as refueling or repairing. 
Some of these accidents may occur every year whereas some may not occur 
during the lifetime of the reactor. For example, for light water reactors, events such 
as control rod withdrawal, feedwater flow rate increase, and feedwater temperature 
decrease are expected to occur every calendar year [45]. Primary pump mechanical 
failure and loss of forced flow in the primary circuit are among the accidents that 
are expected to occur once during the plant lifetime. In general, an accident during 
which the plant protection system functions, or a protected accident, will result in 
a reactor scram and is expected not to cause a reduction in plant lifetime. However, 
an unprotected accident may result in a complete loss of the plant and release of 
radioactive materials to the atmosphere. Such accidents are referred to as core 
disruptive accidents (CDA) and have received a lot of attention [461. Until recently 
CDAs were considered as the design basis accidents (DBA) [47,48] and thus as the 
limiting fault conditions. The reactor must be designed so that for frequent events 
permanent damage is to be avoided and for limiting fault conditions a coolable 
geometry should be maintained so that potential danger to the public is avoided. 
Since there are a number of accident initiators resulting from failure or mal­
function of various components, the design and construction of the plant protection 
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and control system is subject to stringent requirements in terms of quality assurance 
and control. It is desirable to have the smallest number of safety related compo­
nents without comprising the safety of the reactor. A reduction in the components 
which, if malfunctions occur, would lead to a major accident will help to reduce the 
number of safety related components. 
The configuration and the selection of the basic design characteristics of the 
TR concept reflect such a concern. Although a probabilistic failure analysis has not 
been performed to quantify the reduction in failure rates compared to other reactor 
concepts, basic characteristics of the TR concept indicate such a reduction. These 
are reduction of the magnitude and frequency of uncontrolled positive reactivity 
insertions, provisions for natural circulation cooling and passive decay heat removal 
from the primary system. Only the last two items will described in the following 
chapters; a short summary of the first item will be given here. More detailed 
discussion of these can be found in the references cited. 
The most common mode of positive reactivity insertion is from control rod 
withdrawal. The small power produced and the narrow, thin configuration of the 
reactor core makes it possible to locate the control elements outside the core boxes 
[2]. This eliminates the use of separate control assemblies in the reactor core. The 
adopted fuel managment scheme in which refueling is done every ten years reduces 
the probability of an accident occurring during refueling periods [4]. Also a metal 
fueled core, by not causing a large reactivity swing, reduces the amount of control 
rod reactivity required in the core. The reactor vessel is suspended on cables in 
order to reduce the possibility of reactivity insertion due to seismic events [3]. 
Apart from a reduction in the accident initiators, a reactor that can survive 
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a wide range of accidents without relying on the plant control system or operator 
action would permit major savings, both by limiting the consequences of accidents 
and by direct economy. The major parameters that influence such behavior are the 
initial margins to failure, the feedback reactivity coefficients and the thermal hy­
draulic behavior of primary system components. The reason that only the primary 
system components are included in this list is due to the decoupling of the primary 
and secondary systems that results from the large heat capacity of the pool. The 
unprotected accidents are described in Chapter 4. 
The use of sodium as the primary coolant enables using self actuating shutdown 
devices [18,49]. Such devices are based on the principle that certain materials lose 
their magnetic properties at high temperatures. Such a plant protection system will 
be described in Chapter 5. 
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3 DESCRIPTION OF MAIN COMPONENTS 
3.1 Core 
The thermal-hydraulic behavior of the core of the TR is important from both 
the safety and operational points of view. In general it is desirable to have a reactor 
core that can be fabricated and controlled easily. In order to achieve inherent safety, 
the configuration of the core must produce reactivity feedbacks that mitigate the 
consequences of an upset in the operating conditions. Since sodium voiding is the 
only way to initiate a CDA this requires reduction of the sodium volume fraction in 
the core which can for example, be achieved by using a smaller pitch between the 
pins in the reactor core [50]. In order to have large margins to sodium boiling and 
eutectic formation the core outlet temperature should be reduced which implies a 
larger sodium flowrate through the reactor core. In order to assure the adequate, 
cooling of the reactor when the pumping power is lost requires a low pressure drop 
in the core to help natural circulation. Therefore, there are several competing 
arguments with regard to the layout of the reactor core and the final layout is a 
compromise between these competing effects. 
The core of the TR is composed of five rectangular boxes containing the fuel and 
blanket pins. The fuel material is U-Pu-Zr metallic alloy. The pins are separated 
from each other by the use of helically wrapped wires along their length. The core 
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boxes are located on a table on the inlet plenum. The control element guides are 
located at the sides of the core boxes. The important geometrical dimensions of the 
core are given in Table 3.1. The major differences of the layout of the TR core from 
the currently employed core concepts are; 
• The prismatic shape of the core enabling reactor control by the control rods 
outside the reactor core, 
• The elimination of subassemblies resulting in a simple structure and a more 
uniform core exit temperature due to mixing, 
• Closely packed large diameter fuel pins which can be manufactured easily and 
enables the amount of sodium in the core to be reduced, 
• A large fission gas plenum reducing the fission gas induced stresses on the 
cladding. 
The first and the third point in the above list are direct consequences of the small 
power and power density of the reactor. The main disadvantage of the configuration 
of the reactor is the high pressure drop due the small pitch between the fuel pins. 
However, the increase in the pressure drop in the core can be compensated by 
changes through the other parts of the primary circuit or by decreasing the length 
of the fission gas plenum. In Section 4.9, it will be shown that with the current 
dimensions of the fission gas plenum cladding failure due to fission gas pressure does 
not occur even during unprotected accidents. 
Figure 3.1 shows the axial variations of the coolant, cladding inner surface 
and fuel centerline temperatures for the average core conditions. The margin to 
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Table 3.1: Trench Reactor core design pa­
rameters 
Parameter Value 
Number of Boxes 5 
Box width (m) 0.52 
Box Length (m) 1.30 
Core Area (m^) 3.432 
Core Volume (m^) 5.148 
Number of fuel pins per box 4690 
Clad outer diameter (cm) 1.20 
Clad inner thickness (cm) 0.057 
Fuel Diameter (cm) 0.968 
Wire wrap diameter (cm) 0.05 
Wire wrap pitch (cm) 50.0 
Fuel pin pitch (cm) 1.30 
Active fuel length (m) 1.50 
Lower axial blanket length (m) 0.10 
Upper axial blanket length (m) 0.10 
Fission gas plenum length (m) 2.00 
Average Reynolds Number 70516 
Average Peclet Number 316 
Average Sodium Velocity (m/s) 6.84 
Core exit temperature (°C) 485 
Core inlet temperature (°C) 343 
Core flow rate (kg/s) 4400 
Core pressure drop (kPa) 876 
Max. fuel temperature (°C) 590 
Max. clad inner temperature (°C) 493 
Fuel time constant (s) 0.35 
Coolant transit time (s) 0.22 
Transport time lag of coolant (s) 2.06 
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Figure 3.1: Axial temperature variation for fuel, clad and coolant 
sodium boiling is approximately 400^C and the margin to eutectic formation is 
250°C. The core pressure drop is 876kPa. Figure 3.2 shows the radial variation of 
the temperature at selected axial locations for an average fuel pin. The effect of 
the high thermal conductivity of the fuel and the cladding as well as the high heat 
transfer coefficients that can be achieved by using a metallic coolant can be seen 
from the low temperature drop between the fuel centerline and the coolant bulk 
temperatures. 
It should be noted that almost all the correlations developed for rod bundles 
are based on data obtained from sodium experiments conducted on hexagonal as­
semblies containing at most 217 pins; these show a more pronounced effect of the 
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Figure 3.2: Radial temperature distribution in and average fuel pin (fuel pin radius 
6mm.) 
corner and wall subchannel hydraulic characteristics than should be applicable to 
the TR concept. 
The variation of the cladding and the fuel temperatures with the burnup is also 
an important consideration. It was mentioned that the fuel element will swell and 
touch the cladding at approximately 2% atomic burnup. This will result in a change 
in the effective thermal conductivity between the fuel and the cladding. Also the 
restructuring of the fuel element due to irradiation will result in different regions 
with different heat generation rates and different thermal properties due to different 
porosity and material distribution along the radius of the fuel pin. At steady state, 
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such structural changes in the fuel element will not influence the coolant sodium 
axial temperature variation. 
Two cases were calculated to see the effects of irradiation on the fuel element 
thermal behavior. In the first case, it was assumed that the fuel element had 
swollen and touched the cladding but the effect of restructuring was neglected. The 
second case accounted for the effects of the restructuring as well as the change 
in the fuel radius. The radial variation of the temperature across the fuel pin 
is given in Figure 3.3. The decrease in thermal conductivity results in a higher 
temperature gradient across the fuel pin; however there is still considerable margin 
left to the failure limits. Since it is indicated that the restructuring may take placé 
shortly after the irradiation starts [30], this case was also investigated by using 
the original dimensions of the fuel pin; however, temperature gradients across the 
fuel pin showed only small variations of the order of few degrees. Since the power 
density will decrease with increasing burnup, as the fuel column gets longer, the 
above conditions should set an upper bound on the fuel and cladding operating 
temperatures for the average core conditions. 
In order to estimate the maximum cladding and coolant temperatures due to 
uncertainties and power peaking factors, the uncertainty factors listed in Table 3.2 
were used [39]. Originally, these factors were computed in detail for CRBR cores 
[51,52] and have been modified for metal fueled cores in an "overly conservative 
fashion" [39]. The overall hot spot factor for the channel in consideration is obtained 
by a combination of the direct factors and statistical factors. The statistical hot 
spot factors arise from the fact that the contributing mechanism to the increase 
in the temperature from the nominal conditions has a normal distribution [51,52]. 
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Figure 3.3: Radial temperature distribution in a fuel pin at 2% burnup (axial 
location: 1.1m, fuel pin radius: 6mm) 
An example will be the variation of geometrical parameters due to manufacturing 
tolerances. The statistical hot spot factors show the magnitude of the deviation 
from the normal value which is found by applying the direct hot spot factors to 
the corresponding temperature drop. The details of these procedures are well-
documented in references [51,52]. 
These hot spot factors were applied to the fuel element with the highest peaking 
factor. The numerical results obtained for the coolant exit, cladding inner surface 
and fuel centerline are given in Table 3.3. Although the margins to failure are 
reduced especially for the the swollen fuel elements, there is still considerable margin 
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Table 3.2: Hot spot factors used in the calculation of peak temperatures [39] 
Direct subfactors 
Coolant Film Clad Bond Fuel 
Inlet flow maldistribution 1.050 1.012 
Flow modelling 1.140 1.035 
Wire wrap peaking 2.000 
Fuel pin eccentricity 1.010 1.010 1.010 1.010 
Physics modelling 1.020 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 
Control rod banking 1.020 1.020 1.020 1.020 1.020 
Combination of direct subfactors 1.245 2.374 1.133 1.133 1.133 
3<t subfactors 
Reactor AT and inlet temp. 1.143 
Inlet flow maldistribution 1.059 1.016 
Loop temperature imbalance 1.010 
Subchannel flow area 1.011 
Heat transfer coefficient 1.266 
Fuel pin eccentricity 1.010 1.010 1.010 1.010 
Clad thickness and conductivity 1.120 1.017 1.100 
Coolant properties 1.017 
Flow distribution 1.058 1.005 
Power distribution 1.060 1.065 1.065 1.065 1.065 
Power level 1.079 1.079 1.079 1.079 1.079 
Fuel maldistribution 1.075 1.075 1.075 1.075 1.075 
Combination of 3a subfactors 1.208 1.295 1.175 1.128 1.162 
both for the eutectic and fuel element melting temperatures. These temperatures 
should be regarded as the upper bounds for all the fuel elements. No credit was 
taken for the flow mixing due to the wire wrap and large cross sectional area of the 
core box. The hot spot factor for the cladding circumferential temperature variation 
due to the wrap was also included in the fuel element centerline calculation. Due 
to the high thermal conductivity of the fuel this effect should be mitigated around 
the fuel surface resulting in lower fuel centerline temperatures [39]. 
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Table 3.3: Nominal and peak coolant, clad inner surface and fuel tempera­
tures 
Nominal 3(7 
Fuel Clad Inner Coolant Fuel Clad Inner Coolant 
Fresh fuel 590 494 485 802 643 557 
Swollen fuel*^ 683 494 485 901 643 557 
Restructured'' 660 494 485 878 643 557 
"Fuel and cladding are touching and 25% uniformly distributed porosity. 
''Fuel and cladding are touching and three region fuel. Region properties 
are; region boundaries ri/r,.: =0.25,0.7,1.0, zirconium weight per cent=14,9,11 
and porosity percent =0.50,0.02,0.23. 
3.2 Intermediate Heat Exchangers 
The fundamental function of the intermediate heat exchangers (IHX) is to 
remove heat from the primary sodium to the secondary sodium. Since the IHX 
is the boundary between the radioactive primary system and the non-radioactive 
secondary system, it must be designed to avoid leakage of the primary sodium to 
the secondary sodium. This can achieved by having the secondary sodium at a 
higher pressure than the primary pressure. On the other hand, the IHX must be 
strong enough to endure the pressure pulses resulting from a possible sodium-water 
reaction in the steam generator should the systems in the secondary system fail to 
mitigate the consequences of such a reaction. In order to help the natural circulation 
cooling of the primary system, the pressure drop on the primary side of the IHX 
should be low. 
IHX are typically counterflow shell and tube type heat exchangers. There are 
two basic IHX design concepts depending on the flow arrangement. In the first one 
the primary sodium flows in the shell side whereas in the second one the primary 
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sodium flows in the tube side. The first concept offers advantages in terms of having 
the higher pressure secondary sodium in the tubes thereby reducing the stresses in 
the shell; the tubes can be designed to be thick enough to endure the pressure 
pulses from the sodium water reaction in the steam generator. However, primary in 
the shell concept is disadvantageous when one considers the higher pressure drops 
associated with the shell side. The second concept, primary sodium in the tube 
side, has the main advantage of a low pressure drop on the primary side but needs 
a thicker shell since the secondary sodium is contained in the shell. The thermal 
conductivity of the sodium is higher than that of stainless steels which implies 
that most of the resistance to heat transfer will be across the tube wall. Since the 
primary sodium in the tubes concept allows a thinner tube wall thickness than the 
primary sodium in the shell concept, the overall heat transfer coefficient will be 
larger resulting in a smaller IHX; however, the shell of the IHX needs to be thicker. 
The IHX concept selected for the TR is based on a CE design concept [53] 
with the primary sodium in the tube side. The tube bundle is straight. The reactor 
vessel head is the main support for the IHX. The basic parameters of the IHX are 
given in Table 3.4. Figure 3.4 gives the axial temperature distribution in the IHX 
for the primary sodium, tube wall and the secondary sodium at design conditions. 
In this design, the primary sodium enters from the top of the IHX and flows 
through the tubes downward where it is collected in an exit header and discharged 
into the lower plenum. The secondary sodium also enters the IHX from the top 
and then is directed to the bottom of the IHX from where it is distributed into the 
shell side. After reaching the top of the IHX, the secondary sodium is send to the 
secondary cooling circuits by the outlet piping. Use of straight tubes contributes 
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Table 3.4; Basic parameters of intermediate heat 
exchangers 
Parameter •1 Value 
Thermal Rating (MW) 395 
Primary inlet temperature ("C) :| 485 
Primary exit temperature (°C) i  343 
Secondary inlet temperature (°C) ! 293 
Secondary exit temperature (°C) i 464 
Logarithmic temperature difference (°C) I  33.4 
Primary flow rate (kg/s) 2200 
Secondary flow rate (kg/s) ; 1800 
Number of tubes 3500 
Tube outer diameter (cm) i  1.27 
Tube inner diameter (cm) ;; 1.17 
Pitch (cm) i  1.78 
Active tube length (m) i  7.5 
Total length (m) ' 14 
AXIAL TEMPERATURE DISTRIBUTION 
© = Secondary Side 
i  • = Primary Side 
! 0 = Tube Wall 
I I I I I 
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Figure 3.4: Primary, tube and secondary temperatures for the IHX 
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to the the low pressure drop on the primary side. Also, the construction and 
maintenance of the straight tube concept is easier than for other tube configurations 
such as bent tubes. 
Since the IHXs are the only heat transfer mechanisms between the primary 
and the secondary systems, their performance during steady-state and transient 
operation are important to the safety of the reactor. The influence of the secondary 
conditions on the primary system is felt through the change in the IHX exit tem­
perature on the primary side for all the transients and, in addition to this, the 
development of the natural convection head during transients which involve loss of 
forced flow in the primary system. 
3.3 Primary Pumps 
The primary pumps are used to circulate the primary sodium through the IHXs 
and the core. With the exception of the PRISM [54] concept, the primary pumps 
used in LMRs are vertically mounted centrifugal pumps. This is the type of pump 
selected for the TR. Table 3.5 summarizes the main parameters of the primary 
pumps for TR. 
The important parameters that influence the safety of the plant are the margin 
to cavitation and the coastdown characteristics. Cavitation may reduce the lifetime 
of the pump and the noise generated by the cavitation may interfere with the 
measurements done by the plant control system. The coastdown characteristics of 
the primary pumps are important during transients involving a loss of electric power 
to the pump motors and reactor scrams. A longer pump coastdown is desirable in 
the first case because it reduces the rate at which the flow decreases and reduces the 
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Table 3.5: Basic parameters of the pri­
mary pumps 
j Parameter Value 
1 Rated Head (m) 
Rated flow (m®/s) 
Angular speed (rpm) 
Operating temperature ("C) 
I Net positive suction head (m) 
j Impeller diameter (m) 
142 
2.6 
890 
485 
12.5 
1.09 
peak temperatures obtained during such a transient. A shorter pump coast down 
time is desirable in order to avoid a rapid overcooling of the core after a rapid reactor 
scram. Also, since a large coastdown time implies a large inertia of the pump, the 
pump speed control can be achieved more rapidly with a short coastdown time 
since the pump will respond to the changes in the motor torque more rapidly due 
to its lower inertia. However, since the transient response of the reactor during an 
unprotected accident involving loss of power to the primary pumps is more limiting, 
a longer pump coastdown time, and hence, a large inertia of the primary pumps is 
better in terms of achieving inherent safety. 
Basically there are two pumping concepts employed in LMRs. A schematic of 
these concepts along with the concept employed in TR is given in Figure 3.5. The 
most common pumping concept is to have the pump suction in a cold sodium plenum 
where the primary sodium exiting from the IHX enters and the pump discharge 
is connected to the core inlet. This concept eliminates a need for the connection 
between the primary pumping and the IHXs but usually requires two separate pools, 
one containing the hot sodium that exits from the core and the other containing 
the cold sodium that exits from the IHXs. An example of this concept is the SAFR 
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plant ,55]. The concept employed in EBR-II is a variation of this concept in which 
the sodium that exits the core is connected to the IHX thereby eliminating the need 
for a hot pool. 
The concept employed in the TR is to have the pump suction in the hot pool and 
the pump discharge into the IHX. This requires connections between the pumps and 
the IHX inlet and the IHX exit and the core inlet. This arrangement is very similar 
to the the arrangement of a loop type plant. This concept can be considered as a loop 
type plant flow configuration while keeping all the main advantages of a pool type 
plant such as high margin to cavitation, containment of all radioactive components 
in the primary system, elimination of the consequences of a pipe break accident, 
assurance of natural circulation and large heat sink. Besides these advantages the 
concept employed in the TR helps the core inlet feedback reactivity to be felt early in 
the transients. The location of the pumps in the hot pool above the core eliminates 
the need for long shafts. The high operating temperature that the pumps must 
endure during their lifetime seems to be the only disadvantage. However, the tests 
conducted on the CRBR pumps show that the high operating temperature does not 
pose any unsolvable problems [56j. 
3.4 Steam Generators 
The steam generators (SG) are used to transfer the heat from the secondary 
sodium to the feedwater to produce steam. The use of sodium and water in the 
same heat exchanger forces most of the design considerations towards eliminating 
a sodium water reaction. The effect of the SG on the reactor primary system is 
felt through its effect on the inlet temperature of the IHX at the secondary side 
POOL TYPE LOOP TYPE 
TRENCH REACTOR EBR-II 
1: Core 
2: Pump 
3: IHX 
4: Hot pool 
5: Cold pool 
LEGEND 
Figure 3.5: Pumping concepts employed in LMRs 
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and possible transportation of reaction products or pressure pulses to the shell side 
of the IHX. The second effect should be a minor effect due the ease of limiting 
the results of a sodium-water reaction in the secondary loop. Therefore, the SG 
units do not have significant effects on the safety of the primary system. They are 
conventional heat exchanger units having the necessary precautions taken to avoid 
a sodium-water reaction. 
There are currently several SG concepts employed in LMRs. Table 3.6 gives a 
summary of these concepts along with some examples. For higher thermal efficiency 
superheated steam conditions are desirable. The superheat conditions can be ob­
tained by using either once-through (OT) or recirculating evaporation modes. Thé 
first has the disadvantage of having certain parts of the SG unit working in the boil­
ing heat transfer region related to departure from the nucleate boiling, whereas, the 
second has the disadvantage of having a large amount of water inventory which may 
be dangerous during a large sodium water reaction. The current tendency in the US 
is towards OT operation mode [37,57] or recirculation operation mode with small 
recirculation ratios i58|. In order to avoid the sodium water reaction, the tubes 
in which the water fiows are covered with another tube. This concept is employed 
in EBR-II and has been observed to avoid the sodium-water reaction resulting in 
a high availability of the SG units. However, using double-walled tubes requires 
approximately twice the amount of tubes that will be necessary in a single tube SG 
unit [57] and increases the cost of the SG units considerably. Another design option 
is to have an integral unit, or to have the evaporators and superheaters as separate 
modules. Integral units have the advantage of simplicity whereas modular SG can 
be more efficient. 
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Table 3.6: Currently employed steam generator concepts [58,59,60,61] 
Parameter Concept Examples 
Evaporation type Once-through evaporation 
Recirculating evaporation 
Phenix, Fermi 
CRBR, CDFR 
Steam conditions Superheated steam 
Saturated steam 
EBR-II, Phenix 
CRBR 
Reheat Type Sodium Reheat 
Steam Reheat 
No Reheat 
Phenix, PFR 
SuperPhenix, SNR 300 
CRBR 
Tube type Straight tubes 
Helically coiled tubes 
Hockey-stick configuration 
SAFR ,EBR-II 
Phenix 
CRBR 
Tube wall type Single wall 
Double wall 
Phenix 
EBR-II 
Module type Integral module 
Separate evaporator and 
superheater 
SuperPhenix 
EBR-II, CRBR 
Number of units One S G per IHX 
Several S G per IHX 
SuperPhenix 
Phenix(12 modules) 
CRBR (2 modules) 
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Table 3.7: Basic design parameters of the steam gen­
erator units 
Parameter Value 
Sodium superheater inlet temperature (°C) 465 
Sodium superheater exit temperature (°C) 425 
Sodium evaporator exit temperature (°C) 293 
Feedwater inlet temperature (°C) 237 
Feedwater inlet pressure (MPa) 16 
Steam evaporator exit temperature (°C) 342 
Steam superheater exit temperature (°C) 425 
Steam superheater exit pressure (MPa) 15 
Sodium flow rate per evaporator (kg/s) 900 
Feedwater flow rate per evaporator (kg/s) 87 
Evaporator thermal power (MW) 72 
Superheater thermal power (MW) 80 
Number of evaporators per IHX 2 
Number of superheaters per IHX 1 
Number of steam generator units per IHX 1 
The basic design parameters for the SG concept employed in the TR is given 
in Table 3.7. The evaporation mode is OT. The amount of superheat required is 
approximately half of the amount of heat required for evaporation. This makes the 
use of two evaporator modules working in parallel and a superheater module possi­
ble. With this arrangement the superheaters and the evaporators can be identical 
units resulting in manufacturing and operational ease. 
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4 INHERENT SAFETY OF THE TRENCH REACTOR CONCEPT 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will examine the concept of an inherently safe reactor as applied to 
the Trench Reactor (TR). The TR is a metal fueled, pool type, low power density, 
liquid sodium cooled fast reactor. These three features of the TR which, with the 
exception of low power density, characterize the recent tendencies in Liquid Metal 
cooled fast Reactor (LMR) designs, are essential to the inherently safe behavior. 
The term inherently safe implies that the reactor is able to reach a stable, safe 
condition after a major change in the balance between the heat production in the 
reactor core and removal of the produced heat through various mechanisms; and in 
doing so in the absence of any action from plant control and protective systems the 
temperatures of various components are not high enough to cause sodium boiling 
or unacceptable damage to the reactor primary system components. The major 
disturbances in plant balance can be due to a loss of or increase in heat removal 
through the intermediate heat exchangers (IHX), or due to a reduction in the coolant 
flow rate through the reactor core and IHX, or due to an increase in the power 
production resulting from a positive reactivity insertion. For the rest of this report 
the acronyms LOHS and LOF will be used for the loss of heat sink and the reduction 
in coolant flow rate, respectively. The case of positive reactivity insertion which 
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would most probably result from accidental removal of control elements from the 
reactor core will be abbreviated as TOP standing for transient overpower accidents. 
The accidents that result in chilling of the core due to increased heat removal from 
the IHX will be denoted as overcooling (OCL) accidents. 
The severity of these accidents ranges from mild to severe with consequences 
ranging from a reduced component lifetime to a complete loss of the primary sys­
tem. The expected rates at which these accidents occur range from frequent to 
infrequent. Also, although very small, there exists a probability that a combination 
of these accidents may occur simultaneously. The frequency of LOHS and LOF ac­
cidents were estimated to be approximately 0.2/reactor-year and for TOP resulting 
from a single control rod withdrawal to be 0.01/reactor-year [62]. These accidents 
will normally trigger the plant protection system and will result in a reactor scram. 
Based on light water reactor data the failure to scram upon demand was estimated 
to be 3xl0~^ per demand [62]. Then, the probability of the unprotected accidents 
occurring is at the order of 10~®. The probability that a combination of these acci­
dents will occur simultaneously will be even smaller. These combined accidents are 
thus characterized as appears that the l ikelihoods of these combination scenarios 
are so remote that their contribution to risk is negligible...''^ [621. 
There are two different time scales for the unprotected transients; one charac­
terizes the rapidly developing initial phase of the transient the other characterizes 
the quasi-steady termination phase of the transient. The acceptable temperature 
levels and damage levels are different for each of these phases. The limiting tem­
peratures are selected so that the core and vessel integrity is not challenged. The 
nominal temperatures obtained from the simulation program and the temperatures 
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with 3cr hot spot factors applied will be considered. Table 4.1 lists the limiting tem­
peratures for accidents. For the rapidly developing initial phase of the transient, 
which is typically less than half an hour, the sodium boiling temperature becomes 
the limiting temperature. Although the eutectic formation temperature is lower 
than the sodium boiling temperature, cladding failure due to eutectic formation re­
quires a considerably longer time at operating temperatures slightly above eutectic 
temperature. The thinning of the cladding due to eutectic formation is rapid for 
temperatures close to and higher than the sodium boiling temperature. The cumu­
lative damage fraction method of Section 2.1.1.2 will be used to estimate the damage 
fraction accumulated by the cladding during the accident. A cumulative damage 
fraction of 1.0 will indicate that the cladding has failed. During the termination 
phase of the transient, which can be as long as days, the eutectic formation tem­
perature and the creep rupture of the structural components of the primary system 
become the important limiting temperatures. Therefore, the core exit temperature 
limit is in the short term the sodium boiling temperature and in the long term the 
eutectic formation temperature. The pool temperature is limited by the tempera­
ture at which the creeps of the structural components are accelerated. Other than 
the upper temperature limits on various components, due to the rapidly changing 
temperatures thermal shock may be a problem in the initial stages of the transient 
[37;. 
The consequences of a coupled accident such as a combined TOP-LOF accident 
will be greater than the above accidents. Although it is possible to modify the basic 
plant parameters so that a combined unprotected accident will not result in severe 
damage to the primary system components, the small probability that these events 
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Table 4.1: Limiting temperatures in un­
protected accidents 
Limit Temperature (°C) 
Fuel Melting 1200 
Sodium Boiling 902 
Eutectic formation 750 
Vessel Integrity 676 
will occur makes such modification unlikely to be economical or reasonable. Instead 
it will be required that the consequences of the accident be contained in the primary 
system and that release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere should not occur. 
4.2 Nuclear Kinetics Parameters 
Important kinetics parameters are the delayed neutron spectra and the reactiv­
ity feedback coefficients. The delayed neutron yield, prompt neutron lifetime and 
reactivity coefficients were evaluated by Mr. R. Schmidt [2] and Dr. J. Sankoorikal 
'501. The 6 group delayed neutron yields are given in Table 4.2. The decay con­
stants for each delayed neutron group were taken from the corresponding ^^®Pu 
data 163]. Total delayed neutron yield is ,8=0.00311. Prompt neutron lifetime is 
0.1004 10~® seconds. 
Reactivity feedback mechanisms considered were Doppler, fuel axial expansion, 
sodium density change, and structure expansion [2,50]. Doppler and fuel axial ex­
pansion coefficients are associated with fuel temperature changes whereas sodium 
density and structure expansion effects are associated with average sodium tem­
perature changes in the core. A change in fuel temperature will result in a longer 
fuel pin hence a reduced number density. The radial expansion of the fuel pin will 
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Table 4.2: Delayed neutron fractions and decay constants 
Group No 
i 
Delayed Neutron Fraction 
& 
Decay Constant 
Af (s) 
1 0.000118 0,0129 
2 0.000870 0.0311 
3 0.000671 0.1340 
4 0.001019 0.3310 
5 0.000320 1.2600 
6 0.000109 3.2100 
force the gap sodium out and therefore will reduce the sodium number density. 
The doppler effect is due the effect of temperature on the capture and fission cross 
sections in the resonance region. The effect of an increase in the temperature of the 
sodium will reduce the number density of the sodium hence increasing the number 
of neutrons at higher energies and neutron leakage. Also the structural components 
of the reactor core, such as upper and lower grid plates, cladding and core boxes 
will expand. This will result in a larger core so that the fuel pins will be separated 
from each other hence introducing a negative reactivity. In reality an increase in 
the sodium temperature at core inlet will effect the lower grid plate whereas an 
increase in the core exit temperature will affect the upper grid plate. The cladding 
and core box expansion will be related to the average sodium temperature in the 
core. Also a time delay will exist depending on the heat capacity of the structural 
component. However, as a first approximation the different time scales and tem­
peratures of the components were neglected and the average sodium temperature in 
the core was used to determine the effects of the structural expansion effects [2,50]. 
The reactivity feedback coefficients used are given in Table 4.3. 
The coefficients in Table 4.3 relate the changes in the fuel temperature and 
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Table 4.3: Reactivity feedback coefficients 
Mechanism Reactivity Coefficient 
10-2S/°C" 
Doppler'' -0.165 
Fuel axial expansion -0.116 
Sodium expansion +0.206 
Structure expansion -0.335 
"Based on /3=0.00311. See Table 4.2. 
''Average assuming ^ for tem­
perature in the range of 450-600°C. 
average sodium temperature to feedback reactivity as 
P f d  = +  + { a ^ ^ + a s ) S T ^ ^  (4.1) 
where is the feedback reactivity a^, «g, as are the Doppler, fuel expan­
sion, sodium density and structure expansion reactivity coefficients, respectively. 
ST^ and represent the changes in average fuel and sodium temperatures. 
This equation does not provide any information about the effects of changes 
in core inlet temperature, power produced and core flow rate. In order to estimate 
the effects of a change in core inlet temperature, power and power to flow ratio, 
one needs to relate these variables to the average fuel and sodium temperatures. 
Since the heat capacity effects associated with the core are small compared to the 
amount of power produced, an approximate model of the heat transfer in the core 
based on quasi-steady-state relationships can be used. 
If the quasistatic temperatures are expressed in terms of normalized power, 
power to flow ratio and core inlet temperature, after elimination of average fuel 
and average core temperatures the following equation for the feedback reactivity is 
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obtained [64j; 
P f d  =  -r OLpSp (4.2) 
where aj-. is the reactivity coefficient for the inlet temperature, a r is the re-
'• in 
activity coefficient for the normalized power to flow ratio and ap is the reactivity 
coefficient for the normalized power. The normalized power, flow and power to flow 
ratio are given by 
PW = ^ (4.3) 
(''•4) 
respectively. The subscript 'q' has been used to indicate the initial values. The 
explicit expressions for the reactivity coefficients of inlet temperature, normalized 
power and normalized power to flow ratio are 
^ ae ^ ^ «a (4.6) 
^jpf ~ + 0!e + OijVa ^^ )^ o^re,0 
respectively. Q is the difference between the core exit and core inlet tem­
peratures at steady-state conditions. is the temperature drop in the fuel 
at steady state conditions. In Table 4.4 a comparison of the numerical values for 
these coefficients for the TR and some other fast reactors is given. 
The power coefficient can be considered as the positive reactivity resulting 
from a unit decrease in the power. The difference between the power coefficients of 
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Table 4.4: Core inlet temperature, power, and power to flow ratio reactivity co­
efficients 
Mechanism Reactivity coefficient 
TRENCH IFR-Oxide" IFR-Metal" ! EBR-IP 
Inlet temperature, 10~^$/°C -0.41 -0.4 -0.3 -0.22 
Power to flow ratio, 10~^$ -28.70 -40.0 -30.0 -27.30 
Power, 10"^$ -11.80 -170.0 -15.0 -2.73 
*900 MW(thermal) power [64]. 
^900 MW(thermal) power [64]. 
°65 MW(thermal) power and metal fuel [65]. 
metal fueled reactors and oxide fueled reactors is very large. This arises from the 
ATfugi 0 dependence of the power coefficient. Since the temperature drop across 
a fuel pin, is proportional to the ratio of the total power to the thermal 
conductivity of the fuel or in terms of linear power density Pi (PF/m) 
For the same linear power density, a higher fuel thermal conductivity will result in 
a lower temperature drop across the fuel element. For an oxide fuel element the 
thermal conductivity is %:2 W/m^C whereas for a metal fuel element the thermal 
conductivity is %20 W/m"'C resulting in an order of magnitude difference in the 
temperature drop across the fuel element and the power coefficient. Also for a low 
linear power density, a lower power coefficient results. 
The sum of ap and is the amount of reactivity that is required to bring the 
reactor to full power from zero power at nominal inlet temperature and flow rate. 
In order to shut the reactor at constant core inlet temperature and constant core 
flow rate the amount of reactivity required for the TR is 40.5 cents. In general, with 
metal fueled cores less reactivity is required to change the power level. Therefore, 
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the amount of negative reactivity inserted in the core by the control rods can be 
reduced a great deal in order to decrease the possibility of high positive reactivity 
insertion accidents. 
The effect of core flow rate on reactivity is reflected through the power to flow 
ratio term. An increase in the core flow rate will result in a greater than unity. 
This will introduce positive reactivity. This effect has to be compensated by the 
changes in the core inlet and power. The change in the core exit temperature can 
be related to the change in the core inlet temperature and the power to flow ratio 
by 
STex = STjn -h Q (4.10) 
The reactivity coefficient of the core inlet temperature is the only term through 
which the effects of the secondary systems can be transmitted to the primary system. 
An increase in the heat removal rate by the secondary systems will reduce the 
core inlet temperature resulting in a higher power level while increasing core inlet 
temperature due to decreasing heat removal rate will cause the power to decrease. 
The reactivity feedback mechanisms mentioned above do not include some of 
the feedback mechanisms which were shown to be significant in similar reactor 
concepts. The control rod drive expansion due to the an increase in the core exit 
temperature will cause the control rods to be inserted more into the core. This 
mechanism was found to contribute more than 50 cents of negative reactivity during 
unprotected loss of flow accident in both PRISM and Westinghouse concepts [17,49i. 
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4.3 Conditions of Inherent Safety 
The basic requirement for inherent safety is the ability of the reactor to adjust 
the power produced so that it matches the amount of heat removed based on only the 
reactivity feedback mechanisms. The operating conditions during such a transient 
should be within safe limits. If the heat removal from the primary system is reduced 
then the reactor power should decrease. For a complete loss of heat removal from the 
primary system, this condition implies a neutronic shutdown by reactivity feedback 
mechanisms. In this case the decay heat removal from the reactor core and from 
the primary system by inherent means should also be sufficiently high to keep the 
system within safety limits. If the amount of power produced increases then the 
reactivity feedback mechanisms should cause the reactor power to decrease to match 
the amount of heat removal available. 
The amount of heat removal by the secondary systems and the core flow rate 
are the major parameters that can cause considerably large deviations in the heat 
removal rate from the primary system and the reactor core. Assuming a constant 
core flow rate, the effect of a change in the heat removed from the primary system 
will be a change in the core inlet temperature. The change in core inlet temperature 
at the time when the reactor becomes critical can be expressed by using Eq. (4.2) 
and the corresponding change in the average core outlet temperature is given by 
as [64,66] 
in 
(4.11) 
(4.12) 
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where p is the final normalized power which is equal to the heat removed from the 
primary system. 
For a decrease in the heat removal rate Eq. (4.11) shows that the core inlet 
temperature will increase and reduce the power level. If no heat is being removed 
by the secondary systems resulting in a loss of heat sink accident, the amount of 
power will drop to decay heat levels. In this case the mismatch between the decay 
heat removal and production will cause changes in the core inlet temperature. The 
maximum increase in the core inlet temperature is limited by the pool temperature. 
Once this limit is reached, the large heat capacity of the pool and the mismatch 
between the decay heat removal and production will determine the rate at which 
the core inlet temperature changes. The increase in the core inlet temperature and 
consequently the core exit temperature will be reduced for a reactor having a small 
power reactivity decrement (ap + a„j) and a large inlet temperature coefficient. 
On the other hand, if the heat removal rate increases then the core inlet tem­
perature will decrease resulting in a higher power level. This sequence is called 
overcooling accident. For a given change in core inlet temperature, the final power 
level can be approximated by using Eq. (4.2) as [66] 
In order to reduce the increase in the core exit temperature a large power reactivity 
decrement and a small inlet temperature coefficient are desirable. The maximum 
(4.13) 
and the change in core exit temperature will be 
^Tj„'^^core,0 (4.14) 
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decrease in the core inlet temperature is limited by the secondary sodium temper­
ature which can not go below sodium freezing temperature [661. 
If the change in the heat removal rate results from changing core flow rate then 
the power level reached can be approximated as 
1 + in 
1 + ^ , 
r «p/y 
and then the change in the core exit temperature is given by 
/ \ 
(4,13) 
ST, ex 
(Xp  
+ 1 _ 
(1 w)i\T^Qj,çQ 
\ 
1 w 
ST, m (4.16) 
If the flow rate increases at constant core inlet temperature then the core exit 
temperature decreases. An increase in core flow rate will also result in an increase 
in the core inlet temperature if the secondary sodium conditions are assumed to 
be constant. Therefore, this accident sequence will result in reduced temperatures. 
The maximum flow rate obtainable is limited by the pump capacity and is typically 
15 to 20% higher than the nominal flow rate. 
If the core flow rate decreases, then the power will decrease and the core exit 
temperature will increase. The decrease in the power level will be more if the core 
inlet temperature also increases and less if the core inlet temperature decreases. 
The minimum flow rate that can be achieved is limited by the natural circulation 
flow. Assuming a constant core inlet temperature and small final power level and 
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flow rate (p % w % 0) the change in the core exit temperature will be 66i 
^Tex — ^ ^^core,0 (4.17) 
^Pf 
This indicates that the power coefficient of reactivity should be small and the power 
to flow ratio coefficient of reactivity should be large. 
In the short term, the rate of decrease in the core flow rate is governed by the 
time constant of the pump (tp). However, the decrease in the power is controlled by 
the delayed neutron decay constant (A) which is larger than the pump time constant. 
Therefore, the power decrease is slow compared to the flow rate decrease resulting 
in a peak in the power to flow ratio and consequently in core exit temperature. The 
peak in the core exit temperature during such a transient can be reduced if [66] 
fpA ^1 + ^ ^ j iOpy i IS (4.18) 
Thus, in order to reduce the peak during such a transient a large reactivity coefficient 
of power to flow ratio and a large pump time constant is desirable. 
If the amount of power produced increases as a consequence of positive reactiv­
ity insertion then assuming that the core inlet temperature and the core flow rate 
are at their initial value, the increase in the power can be expressed as [66] 
p = l — (4.19) 
a p  4- a p f  
and the corresponding change in the core exit temperature is given by 
pe 
xp + apj; 
where pe is the amount of externally introduced positive reactivity. In order to 
reduce the increase in the core exit temperature the external positive reactivity 
source should be small and the power reactivity decrement should be large. 
-  " a p + a  r'^^core,0 (4-20) 
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The increase in the power level will eventually cause an increase in the core 
inlet temperature since the heat removed from the primary system is less than the 
power produced. The increase in the core inlet temperature will cause the power to 
return to its initial value, the change in the core inlet and core exit temperatures 
In order to reduce the final temperature levels the inlet temperature reactivity 
coefficient should be large and the externally introduced reactivity should be small. 
The increase in the core temperature will be slow since the the pool temperature 
must increase first. 
In summary, in order to achieve an inherent shutdown the following conditions 
must be met [66]: 
• Negative power, power to flow ratio and inlet temperature coefficients. 
• Small aplapj: coefficient in order to limit the long term temperature increase 
in the loss of flow accidents. 
• °^T^^^^core,o/'^pf should lie between 1 and 2 in order to achieve a safe 
condition during accidents involving loss of heat sink and overcooling of the 
for this case can be expressed as [66] 
= — 
in 
(4.21) 
core. 
• pe/{ap + oipf) should be less than 1 in order to limit the consequences of a 
positive reactivity accident. 
ZpA(l 4- ap/apj:)^\apj:\  should be large relative to a dollar of reactivity in 
order to reduce the peak in a loss of flow accident. 
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4.4 Transient Model 
The simulation of the TR was performed by using Dynamic Simulator for 
Nuclear Power plants (DSNP) Revision 3.4 [67] code on a Z-248 personal computer. 
The trade off between describing the reactor components in detail and long running 
times dictated the complexity of the simulation program. A simulation program 
which had an execution time of more than 6 hours for 1000 seconds of plant time 
was considered to have an unreasonably long execution time. 
The simulation program can be described as a lumped-parameter model of 
the primary system. A somewhat more detailed description of the model is given 
in the Appendix, The thermodynamic and hydrodynamic simulation flow charts 
are given in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The reactor core was represented by two core 
assemblies, one representing the 3 central boxes and the other representing the 2 
edge boxes. For each assembly the fuel, cladding, sodium and structure energy 
equations were solved. Any interaction of these assemblies with each other was 
neglected. The power generation in the core was modelled with 6-group point 
kinetics equations for the fission power and a 4-group model for the decay heat. The 
reactivity feedback mechanisms considered were Doppler, fuel expansion, sodium 
expansion and structure expansion. The net reactivity feedback was computed as a 
weighted sum of the individual feedback reactivities of assemblies. The fission gas 
plenum model associated with each assembly was approximated as sodium flowing 
in an insulated pipe. The energy equations for the temperatures of sodium and the 
pipe wall were solved. The pool model was based on the assumption that the hot 
sodium that exits the core will be fully mixed in the pool. The vessel cooling by 
natural convection was assumed to be a linear function of the pool temperature, thus 
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neglecting any time delay due the heat capacity of the vessel and temperature drop 
between the pool and vessel temperature. The IHX was simulated by a straight shell 
and tube counterflow heat exchanger model. The pipes to and from the IHX were 
simulated by using an insulated pipe model containing a metal node representing 
the structural components and a fluid node representing the coolant. 
The simulation of the hydrodynamics of the primary system was also based 
on a lumped parameter model. The model was based on the assumption that flow 
reversal will not occur. The pool was represented by an open tank subject to at­
mospheric pressure at the top, with inlets at the bottom and exits at the top. The 
IHX and core assemblies were represented by equivalent channels. In calculating 
the pressure drops, the acceleration pressure drop was included in the total loss 
coefficient for each channel. The bouyancy terms were based on the average tem­
peratures in each channel. The time rate of change of IHX and core assemblies' flow 
rates were solved. The pump was modeled by using the homologous pump char­
acteristics covering the possible operating regions expressed in polynomial form as 
reported in reference i68]. 
The major deficiencies of the simulation model are the crude representation of 
the core thermal processes and the assumption of fully mixed pool. The lumped 
parameter core model does not allow computation of some of the important pa­
rameters such as maximum cladding temperature and maximum fuel temperature; 
these temperatures must be estimated from the core exit temperature and the power 
produced in the assembly. The decision to use a lumped parameter core model was 
based on the execution time of the simulation program. The FUELP2 module of 
the DSNP with 15 axial nodes took approximately 9 minutes for a second of plant 
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time. The second major deficiency of the model, namely the assumption of a fully 
mixed pool, can be justified in terms of good heat transfer characteristics of sodium. 
The fact that the secondary loop components were not included explicitly in 
the simulation program can be justified in terms of the loose coupling between the 
primary and secondary loop. The secondary loop conditions effect the transient 
behavior of the plant through their effect on the core inlet temperature. Consider 
a transient introduced by a malfunction of a component in the secondary loop such 
as a decrease in heat transfer to water-steam in the steam generator or loss of 
secondary flow. The temperature and the mass flow rate at the secondary side of 
the IHX will be affected with a certain time delay. This will change the rate at 
which the heat is removed from the primary system which will in turn affect the 
core inlet temperature. Therefore, a detailed knowledge of the transient behavior of 
the secondary loop is not of major significance to transient behavior of the primary 
loop as long as the enveloping inlet temperatures at the inlet to the secondary side 
of the IHX are considered and the delay in the secondary loop is accounted for. 
4.5 Loss of Heat Sink Accident 
In the loss of heat sink accident (LOHS), it is assumed that the heat removed 
by the secondary sodium in the intermediate heat exchanger is zero. This implies 
that the power generated in the reactor core is retained within the primary system 
boundary except a small portion (%2% of full power) that is removed from the vessel 
by natural circulation of the containment atmosphere. Therefore the temperatures 
within the primary system are expected to rise until the rate of heat produced in 
the reactor core matches the rate of the heat removal by the vessel cooling system 
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(VCS). 
Numerically, this accident was simulated by reducing the secondary sodium 
flow rate to 10"^ of its initial value at the beginning of the transient. This reduced 
the rate of heat removal by the secondary sodium to ~45kW compared to =s395MW 
at steady state. The primary pump speeds were kept constant at their steady state 
value. Only one of the two loops was simulated. The other loop was assumed to be­
have exactly the same as the simulated loop. As a limiting case, another simulation 
was performed excluding the IHX. In this case the primary side exit temperature 
from the IHX was equated to the primary side sodium inlet temperature to the 
IHX. 
A simple description of the transient and the significance of the large heat 
capacity of the pool can be obtained by considering the pool energy equation and 
Eq. (4.2). If the heat stored in the reactor core is neglected compared to the large 
heat capacity of the pool, the energy equation for pool can be expressed as 
dT 
MCp-^ = P{ t )  -  Q v c s i * )  -  QiH. xW 
and the variation of core inlet temperature can be approximated by 
TinW = (4-23) 
where has been used to approximate various time delays between the pool tem­
perature and the core inlet temperature. Since the primary pumps are assumed to 
be working at their initial speed, the core flow rate is essentially constant implying 
that the normalized power to flow ratio is equal to the normalized power. The heat 
removed from the primary through the IHX {Qjjj x) vanishes rapidly causing the 
core inlet temperature to rise rapidly, causing negative reactivity insertion which 
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can be approximated by (see Eq. (4.2)) 
P f d  =  +  ( « p /  +  -  t p w )  (4.24) 
where another time delay { t p w )  between the variation of core inlet temperature 
and variation of power has been introduced. As negative reactivity is introduced 
the power decreases. Since in the TR the heat capacity effects associated with the 
inlet plenum are small the time delay between the pool inlet temperature and the 
core inlet temperature is basically the transport time of the sodium from the IHX 
inlet to the core inlet. Had there been a large heat capacity associated with the 
lower plenum in the form of a cold pool, such as in EBR-II or SAFR designs, the 
increase in core inlet temperature will take considerably longer times. If the relative 
terms in Eq. (4.22) are considered the significance of the large heat capacity of the 
pool is apparent. Even without any heat removal through the IHX and VCS and 
neglecting the reactivity feedbacks so that the power is at its initial value the pool 
temperature will increase by 0.5®C/s. If we consider the heat removed by the VCS 
as 
and neglect the small amount of heat removed through the IHX the pool tempera­
ture can be approximated as 
The numerical values for a and b are 0.04MW/°C and -5.5MW respectively [69]. 
The pool heat capacity (MCp) is approximately 1600MJ/°C giving a very small 
number for the exponential term. Since the core inlet temperature will follow the 
Q V C S  = «^poo/ ^ 6 (4.25) 
^pooli^) '^pooli^) Jq 
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pool temperature, the large heat capacity of pool by makes its temperature change 
very slow and avoids a rapid increase in the core inlet temperature. The importance 
of a passive VCS can also be inferred from Eq. (4.26). The magnitudes of a and 
b are insignificant for initial phases of the transient, however; for large times the 
exponential term will dominate and limit the increase in the pool temperature. 
Table 4.5 summarizes the results obtained. The first time value corresponds to 
the time at which the peak temperature occurs, and the second time value corre­
sponds to the final simulation time. The peak temperatures obtained in both cases 
are acceptable. At 800 seconds, which is approximately the end of the fast part of 
the transient the power produced in the reactor is due to decay heat alone. The tem­
perature rise across the core is only 3°C. The pool and the core inlet temperatures 
are the same. Hence the primary system is almost isothermal. 
The transient response of the reactor can be inferred from Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4 
and Figure 4.5. In Figure 4.4 the reactivities are grouped according to the temper­
ature change in the fuel and the coolant (see Eq. (4.1)) so that the fuel feedback 
reactivity contains the Doppler and fuel expansion coefficients and coolant feedback 
reactivity contains the contributions from sodium density and structure expansion 
effects. Figure 4.3 shows the variation of the average core exit,core inlet and pool 
temperatures. 
The transient is driven by the increase in the core inlet temperature. The core 
inlet temperature increases due to the rapid decay of heat removal from the IHX. 
Although the secondary flow rate has been reduced to 0.18kg/s which is 0.001 of its 
initial value, the temperature difference between the primary sodium and tube wall 
temperatures causes heat to be transferred from the primary sodium to the tubes 
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Table 4.5: Results of loss of heat sink accident 
CASE-A" CASE-B" 
Time (seconds) 32 800 5.5 800 
POWER (MW) 
Fission 329.6 0.14 437.8 0.01 
Decay 49.6 16.36 55.8 16.39 
Total 379.2 16.50 492.6 16.40 
REACTIVITY ($) 
Fuel -0.1988 -0.1380 -0.2562 -0.1451 
Coolant -0.1259 -0.1259 -0.1443 -0.1291 
Net -0.3247 -0.2639 -0.4005 -0.2742 
TEMPERATURE (°C) 
Core Inlet 478.3 510.5 483.2 513.0 
Core Exit ! 
Average 545.7 513.4 568.3 515.9 
Central boxes 545.7 513.4 571.3 516.0 
Edge boxes 545.6 513.4 560.3 515.9 
Pool 487.1 510.5 483.4 513.0 
"IHX is included in the simulation. 
IHX is not included, IHX exit temperature is equal to IHX 
inlet temperature. 
and other structural elements of the IHX. This process continues until the IHX 
reaches a thermal equilibrium with the primary sodium. Since almost all the power 
produced in the core is being deposited in the pool, the pool temperature starts 
to increase, however, the large heat capacity of the pool, (%1600MJ/°C) limits the 
rate of temperature increase. Increasing core inlet temperature pushes the core exit 
temperatures up causing an increase in the average core and fuel temperatures. The 
increase in the core temperature introduces negative reactivity (Figure 4.4) and a 
subsequent decrease in the fission power generated (Figure 4.5). Since the core flow 
rate is essentially constant and equal to its initial value the temperature increase 
across the core starts to decrease. The maximum core exit temperature is reached 
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about 32 seconds into the transient. Increasing average core inlet and average 
temperatures causes more negative reactivity insertion and causes the fission power 
to drop to 0.01% of its initial value at %400 seconds. Then the power from decay 
of the fission fragments becomes the only source of power production. The elevated 
temperatures introduce %-25 cents of negative reactivity causing the reactor to 
remain iii a subcritical state. The difference between the decay heat production 
rate and the heat removal rate of the VCS is the driving force for the transient 
after this stage. The mismatch between these two mechanisms which is of the 
order of a few MW will cause the pool temperature to change. The time scale of 
the subsequent changes in temperatures will be determined by the change in the 
pool temperature. Due to the large heat capacity of the pool and relatively small 
magnitude of the driving force the pool temperature will change very slowly 
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per 800 seconds). This allows more than enough time for any corrective action to 
be decided upon and implemented to terminate the accident permanently. 
The TR responds to the LOHS accident considerably faster than the other pool 
type fast reactor concepts. The elimination of the cold pool to serve as an inlet 
plenum to the core allows the core inlet temperature to follow the primary side 
IHX exit temperature closely. Therefore, the effect of the core inlet temperature 
associated feedbacks are felt early in the transient causing the power to decrease. 
The results of a comparable LOHS accident reported in reference [64] show that the 
reactivity feedbacks are not felt after ~ 80 seconds into the transient. However, in 
the TR at 80 seconds the reactor thermal power has dropped to approximately 30% 
of its initial value. It can be argued that such a rapid response may be undesirable. 
However, the temperature levels associated with the LOHS accident are not near 
the temperature limits. 
If the heat removal rate from the IHX is identically zero, then the above de­
scription of the accident is still valid with minor differences. In this case the accident 
proceeds more rapidly due to an almost instantaneous increase in the core inlet tem­
perature. Therefore the core exit temperature rises more rapidly and reaches its 
peak value at 5.5 seconds compared to 32 seconds in the previous case. This rapid 
increase causes a large negative feedback reactivity causing the power to decrease 
and core exit temperature to increase. The final pool temperature is %3^C higher 
than the previous case. 
Further insight to the initial and final stages of the transient can be obtained by 
considering Eq. (4.2) which relates the changes in core inlet temperature, power to 
flow ratio and power to the feedback reactivity. Without forgetting the approximate 
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nature of this relationship in fast transients, we can infer that the reactivity in 
the core is determined by the competition between the negative feedback effect of 
the increase in the core inlet temperature and the positive feedback effect of the 
decreasing power. Since the core flow rate is kept at its initial value, normalized 
power to flow ratio is equal to the normalized power, that is $(i) = p{t). In this 
case for the feedback reactivity to be negative the following inequality must hold; 
0!_ f + Oin 
42;,! (4.27) 
AT 
•'•in 
In other words, the increase in the core inlet temperature must be high enough to 
compensate for the positive feedback effects of a unit decrease in the power. For 
a 1% decrease in power the above equation gives a core inlet temperature increase 
of %1°C. Since the change in the core inlet temperature is the driving force for 
the transient and the power induced feedback component will lag behind the inlet 
temperature induced feedback component, the net reactivity will be negative. 
For the reactor to become critical at zero power, the inlet temperature must 
be approximately lOO^C above its steady state value. Since the pool and the core 
inlet temperature will remain approximately equal, the time when the reactor will 
become critical again will depend on the time to cool the pool from 510.5°C to 
443®C. If no heat were removed from the pool, the pool temperature will rise 
slowly and the reactor will remain subcritical all the time. 
The peak temperatures predicted and the final state that the reactor reaches 
in the LOHS accident, shows that the reactor is inherently safe in the case of a 
LOHS accident without scram. The passive VCS heat removal rate is important 
in order to limit the increasing pool temperature, but does not have any effect on 
the peak core exit temperatures. If the VCS were to fail there is ample time to 
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take corrective action to terminate the accident permanently without any damage 
to primary system components. 
4.6 Loss of Flow Accident 
In the loss of flow accident (LOF), it is assumed that the electrical power to the 
primary pumps is lost. The resulting transient is due to a gradually decreasing pri­
mary flow rate. After the primary pumps stop, the only driving force left for a flow 
to be established is bouyancy from temperature differences. During such a transient 
several assumptions can be made regarding the secondary sodium flow rate. One 
limiting case is to assume that the secondary sodium pumps are at constant speed. 
The other limiting case can obtained by assuming that the secondary sodium flow 
rate is zero, hence, resulting in a coupled LOHS-LOF accident. In general these two 
cases will envelope the possible influences of the secondary sodium flow rate. The 
inlet temperature of the secondary sodium to the IHX will be important in cases 
where the secondary flow rate is high. This parameter is also treated parametric ally. 
In numerical simulation, the transients were introduced by decreasing the pump 
speed as a function of time: 
fi(i) = (4.28) 
where fl is the pump speed and tp is the pump time constant. This equation assumes 
that the kinetic energy is proportional to and friction losses are proportional 
to [70j. Several values of pump time constant were considered. The secondary 
flow rate was either kept constant at its initial value or at 10 of its initial value. 
In the following discussion, I will use case-A to denote the transients in which the 
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secondary sodium is at zero flow and case-B to denote the transients during which 
the secondary sodium flow rate was kept constant at its initial value. In both cases 
the inlet temperature to the IHX at the secondary side was kept constant at its 
initial value. Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 summarize the results for both cases for 
various values of pump time constant. 
Figures 4.6-4.8 show how the transient develops for case-A. The decreasing 
pump speed causes the core flow rate to decrease, and the loss of heat removal from 
the IHX cause an increase in the IHX exit temperature on the primary side followed 
by an increase in the core inlet temperature. Decaying flow rate and increasing core 
inlet temperature result in an increase in the average core temperature and core 
exit temperatures. The fuel with its low heat capacity and high thermal conductiv­
ity is able to follow the increase in the core sodium temperature. Increasing core 
temperatures introduce negative feedback reactivity and start to pull the reactor 
power down. The mismatch between decreasing power and more rapidly decreasing 
flow rate and increasing core inlet temperature causes a peak in the core exit tem­
peratures. After this initial peak, core inlet temperature stabilizes and the core exit 
temperatures start to decrease. The fission power decreases faster than a LOHS 
case due to the combined negative feedback effects of power to flow ratio and core 
inlet temperature. After the fission power has dropped to small levels, the transient 
is governed by the competition between the decay heat produced and heat removed 
by the VCS. 
The long term temperature variation can be seen in Figure 4.9. The core exit 
temperatures increase because of the reduced flow rate which is due to natural cir­
culation alone. The core exit and pool temperatures reach another peak and then 
Table 4.6: Results of loss of flow accidents for case-A type transients 
Pump time constant (seconds) 
10 20 30 40 
Time (seconds) 78 1000 78 1000 70 1000 64 1000 
POWER (MW) 
Fission 103 0 123 0 152 0 175 0 
Decay 36 16 37 16 39 16 41 16 
Total 139 16 160 16 191 16 216 16 
REACTIVITY ($) 
Fuel -.342 -.261 -.289 -.257 -.259 -.242 -.243 -.227 
Coolant -.212 .183 -.185 -.181 -.168 -.173 -.158 -.167 
Net -.555 -.443 -.474 -.437 -.428 -.415 -.401 -.394 
TEMPERATURE (°C) 
Core Inlet 454 495 478 500 482 502 483 504 
Core Exit 
Average 700 616 635 607 607 594 591 581 
Central Boxes 711 620 641 612 610 599 593 586 
Edge Boxes 675 605 624 597 600 583 586 572 
Pool 492 500 493 503 493 504 493 505 
NORMALIZED 
Flow 0.101 0.023 0.182 0.026 0.275 0.030 0.360 0.036 
Power to flow ratio 1.722 0.850 1.098 0.755 0.870 0.644 0.751 0.549 
Core AT 1.732 0.854 1.112 0.757 0.882 0.642 0.763 0.547 
1 IHX AT 0.262 0.033 0.106 0.017 0.078 O.Oll 0.067 0.008 
Table 4.7; Results of loss of flow accidents for case-B type transients 
Pump time constant (seconds 
10 20 30 40 
Time (seconds) 80 1000 118 1000 160 1000 190 1000 
POWER (MW) 
Fission 207 56 233 60 237 65 253 71 
Decay 40 19 39 19 38 19 38 20 
Total 247 75 272 79 275 84 291 91 
REACTIVITY ($) 
Fuel -.159 0.041 -.087 0.040 -.053 0.038 -.036 0.036 
Coolant -.117 -.041 -.082 -.042 -.067 -.042 -0.58 -.042 
Net -.276 0.000 -.170 -.002 -.120 -.004 -.094 -.006 
TEMPERATURE ( ° C )  
Core inlet 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 
Core exit 
A verage 710 592 657 592 633 592 620 593 
Central boxes 728 610 672 611 647 612 632 612 
Edge boxes 672 555 626 553 605 554 593 554 
Pool 493 505 496 510 500 514 502 518 
NORMALIZED 
Flow 0.107 0.045 0.134 0.047 0.145 0.050 0.159 0.054 
Power to flow ratio 2.900 2.104 2.542 2.103 2.380 2.107 2.291 2.107 
Core AT 2.942 2.111 2.570 2.110 2.402 2.114 2.308 2.116 
IHX AT 1.434 1.526 1.460 1.561 1.485 1.590 1.501 1.614 
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Figure 4.8: Variation of reactivity during case-A type LOF accident 
start to decrease due to the heat removed by the VCS. The elevated temperatures, 
by introducing negative reactivity, cause the reactor to stay in a subcritical con­
dition. The rest of the transient proceeds as LOHS accident with a reduced flow 
rate. 
For case-B, the transient develops in a different manner. Figure 4.10 shows 
the variation of core exit, pool and core inlet temperature. Decreasing core flow 
rate cause the primary exit temperature from the IHX to reach the secondary inlet 
temperature to the IHX asymptotically. In this case, the negative feedback due 
to the increase in the power to flow ratio has to compensate for both the positive 
feedbacks from decreasing core inlet temperature and decreasing power. Since a 
unit increase in power to flow ratio introduces more negative reactivity than the 
combined eflFect of decreasing core inlet temperature and power, the net reactivity 
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is negative (Figure 4.11). 
The core exit temperatures reach a peak as the core inlet temperature reaches 
the secondary sodium IHX inlet temperature. As the natural circulation flow is 
established the core exit temperatures start to decrease, reducing the amount of 
negative reactivity. Since the initial stored energy in the fuel is small, the fuel 
temperature follows the power change closely, resulting in a decreased fuel temper­
ature. The fuel feedback effects start to decrease in magnitude and finally become 
positive. However the mismatch between the power and flow keeps the core coolant 
temperature at a higher level than its initial steady-state value. These two effects 
compensate for each other and the net reactivity approaches zero putting the re­
actor into a critical state at low power (Figure 4.12). Since the natural circulation 
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Figure 4.12: Variation of reactor power during case-B type LOF accident 
flow has been established and the core inlet temperature has reached its asymptotic 
value, the heat production rate in the reactor and heat removal rate through the 
IHX and VCS are in balance and the reactor will remain in this critical state unless 
another major perturbation occurs. 
Figure 4.13 compares the average core and pool temperatures for both cases. It 
can be observed that the core inlet temperature reaches its asymptotic value faster 
in case-B then it does in case-A. This is simply because the limiting temperature 
in case-B (IHX secondary inlet temperature) is closer to the initial core inlet tem­
perature than the limiting temperature in case-A (pool temperature). The peak 
in the core exit temperature occurs earUer in case-A due to the combined effect 
of increasing core inlet temperature and increasing power to flow ratio whereas in 
case-B the decreasing core inlet temperature causes this peak to occur later. The 
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Figure 4.13: Comparison of primary sodium temperatures during case-A and Case-
B type LOF accidents 
magnitude of the peak in case-B is larger than it is in case-A, because less negative 
reactivity is introduced, hence the power is higher resulting in a higher power to 
flow ratio which is basically the fundamental parameter that determines the core 
exit temperature. The core exit temperatures and the pool temperature are in­
creasing in case-A because the only heat that is being removed from the primary 
system is by the VCS. On the contrary, in case-B the IHX is removing all the heat 
that is produced in the core. Finally, at 1000 seconds the fission power, although a 
fraction of its initial value, is the major source of heat production in case-B whereas 
in case-A the power produced is due to decay heat alone. 
The pump time constant is an important parameter in the transient response 
of the reactor. Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 give the numerical results at selected values 
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for various pump time constants for both case-A and case-B. This parameter has 
different effects for case-A and case-B type transients. If case-A type transients are 
considered one can identify two limiting cases. The first limiting case corresponds to 
a very small pump time constant (fp—»0) so that core flow rate drops instantaneously 
to its asymptotic natural circulation value, assuming that flow reversal will not 
occur. The second limiting case can be obtained by assuming /p—>00 so that core 
flow rate is at its initial value. This corresponds to the LOHS accident. The 
maximum core exit temperature decreases with increasing ip and is at its minimum 
for LOHS accident. The time at which the peak temperature occurs is also earlier 
f o r  i n c r e a s i n g  t p  f o r  a l l  t h e  t p  v a l u e s  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h i s  s t u d y .  H o w e v e r ,  i f  t p — * 0  
the core exit temperature will increase almost instantaneously indicating that the 
curve, time when the peak temperature occurs versus tp, will have a peak for small 
tp and then decrease monotonically, finally reaching the LOHS value. 
For case-B type transients, increasing t p  results in reduction in the peak tem­
perature and delays the time at which the peak temperature occurs. For a four-fold 
increase in tp the peak temperature is reduced by approximately lOO^C and the 
time the peak occurs is twice as late. Since core exit temperature is basically de­
termined by the power to flow ratio, the effect of tp can be seen from Figure 4.14. 
The overshoot in the $ is less for higher tp values. Also, the slope of the curve 
is smaller indicating a milder increase in the core exit temperature. 
Figure 4.15 compares the variation of net reactivity and Figure 4.16 shows the 
variation of normalized total reactor power for various tp values for both cases. 
The effect of pump time constant on the decay of total power is more pronounced 
for case-B type transients then it is for case-A transients, causing a slower decay 
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of fission power with increasing t p .  However, its effect on the final power level (at 
1000 seconds) is small. The reason for this can be inferred from the net feedback re­
activity variation (Figure 4.15). After ~300 seconds into the transient the feedback 
reactivities are almost same for all the tp values considered. On the contrary, for 
case-A transients the feedback reactivity is almost independent of tp in the initial 
stages of the transients resulting in uniform decay of reactor thermal power causing 
it to drop to decay heat levels. 
In general, case-B transients are more severe than the case-A transients due 
primarily to the way the core inlet temperature responds to the decrease in core 
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flow rate. Since there are negligible heat capacity effects associated with the cold 
side of the primary system, the core inlet temperature can be adversely affected by 
the secondary loop conditions (decrease to introduce positive feedback reactivity). 
If the primary system and the secondary system are isolated from each other during 
a transient which was the case in LOHS and LOF-LOHS accidents the transients 
are less severe. However, in case-B type accidents the secondary loop conditions 
affected the primary system through their effect on the core inlet temperature. If 
one were to put a large heat capacity in the form of a cold sodium pool the coupling 
between the core inlet temperature and the primary sodium exit temperature from 
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the IHXs hence from the secondary loop conditions would be weakened. 
The effects of the heat capacity associated with core inlet temperature can be 
observed by using a simple model for case-B type transients. The energy equation 
for the core inlet temperature can be approximated as 
MCr (4.29) 
where is the IHX exit temperature. The core flow rate in the initial stages 
of the transient can be approximated closely by 
1 
w { t )  (4.30) 
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The point kinetics equations with feedback reactivity given by Eq. (4.2), decay 
heat equations, a quasi-steady model of the IHX, and the pool energy equation 
(Eq. (4.22)) were solved to observe the effects of cold plenum heat capacity. The 
average core exit temperature was approximated with 
T e x ( t )  =  T i J t )  +  ( 4 . 3 1 )  
Although the temperatures computed with this model are not as accurate as those 
from the more detailed simulation program the trends are predicted fairly well. 
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Figure 4.17 shows the average core exit peak temperatures as a function of the 
cold pool heat capacity for case-B type LOF accidents. The hot pool capacity was 
kept at its nominal value. The peak temperatures are reduced greatly if the amount 
of heat capacity associated with the core inlet temperature is increased. The large 
time constant associated with a large heat capacity avoids or delays the possible 
reduction in the core inlet temperature hence eliminating the positive reactivity 
feedback of a decrease in the core inlet temperature. In the case of a large cold 
pool, both case-A and case-B transients will be similar, at least at the initial stages 
of the transient, because the core inlet temperature will remain relatively constant 
for long periods. However, from Figure 4.17 one can observe that the pump time 
constant has a more pronounced effect than the heat capacity of the core inlet. 
Increasing the pump time constant by two-fold is more effective than increasing 
the cold plenum heat capacity by a factor of thousand. For the TR the pool heat 
capacity is roughly a thousand times the cold plenum heat capacity, that is the 
primary vessel needs to be doubled in size to include a cold plenum that has a 
heat capacity as much as the pool has. A large vessel will probably introduce more 
problems than it will help to solve. Since the primary pumps can be designed to 
have the desired pump coastdown characteristics, it is more desirable to require a 
long pump coastdown time than to require a larger vessel. 
If the pump coastdown is not smooth but changes abruptly then the transition 
to natural circulation will reflect the sudden change in the pump speed. In order 
to simulate such a situation the pump speed was assumed to drop to zero instan­
taneously after it has dropped to 7% of its initial value. The result of this sudden 
change is another peak in core exit temperatures for both case-A (Figure 4.18) and 
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Figure 4.18: Variation of primary sodium temperatures during case-A type LOF 
with abrupt transition to natural circulation 
case-B (Figure 4.19) because of the increase in power to flow ratio. For case-B the 
magnitude of the peak is larger and occurs earlier than case-A. The increase in 
temperature is followed by an increase in the magnitude of the negative feedback 
reactivity introduced. For case-B (Figure 4.20) the variation of reactivity due to 
the rapid change in the flow is more pronounced. Since the fission power still con­
stitutes a major fraction of the total reactor thermal power, the rapid insertion of 
negative reactivity causes the power to drop more rapidly (Figure 4.21). On the 
other hand for case-A, at the time when the flow perturbation occurs the fission 
power has dropped to a small fraction of the total power, therefore, the eff'ect of 
the sudden increase in negative feedback reactivity is not significant on total power 
(Figure 4.21). 
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Table 4.8: Results of loss of flow accident with tp = 20s and 
abrupt transition to natural circulation 
CASE-A" CASE-B" 
Time (seconds) 330.0 1000.0 285.0 1000.0 
POWER (MW) 
Fission 4.02 0.00 75.29 53.50 
Decay 21.00 15.66 27.32 18.65 
Total 25.02 15.66 102.64 72.14 
REACTIVITY ($) 
Fuel -.3290 -.2821 -.1092 0.0421 
Coolant -.2143 -.1926 -.1062 -.0413 
Net -.5433 -.4748 -.2154 0.0008 
TEMPERATURE (°C) 
Core Inlet 489.7 497.1 292.9 292.8 
Core Exit; 
Average 668.2 628.8 689.6 592.2 
Central boxes 677.4 633.1 715.4 609.5 
Edge boxes 647.4 619.2 637.3 557.2 
Pool 501.1 502.4 503.8 508.3 
NORMALIZED^ 
Flow 0.0247 0.0214 0.0451 0.0428 
Power to flow ratio 1.2650 0.9171 2,8460 2.1060 
Core AT 1.2600 0.9290 2,7990 2.1130 
IHX AT 0.0762 0.0354 1.5140 1.5460 
"Secondary flow rate is 0.18kg/s. 
''Secondary flow rate is constant at 1800kg/s. 
•^Normalized with respect to initial value. 
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For case-B type transients, the secondary inlet temperature to the IHX is an im­
portant parameter because of its effect on the core inlet temperature. As mentioned 
earlier the secondary inlet temperature to the IHX is the limiting temperature for 
the core inlet temperature. The decrease in the core inlet temperature introduces 
positive feedback, hence is not desirable. The case-B transients so far have assumed 
that the secondary inlet temperature was constant at its initial value and the sec­
ondary flow rate was constant. The limiting secondary inlet temperatures are hard 
to establish. If heat removal from the secondary loop is neglected completely then 
the pool temperature is an upper bound for the secondary sodium inlet tempera­
ture. However, in this case the time delay in the secondary loop must be accounted 
for; otherwise the secondary sodium will heat the primary sodium. As a lower limit 
one can consider the feedwater temperature which is 237°C. This limiting case is 
0  = Smooth  Trans i t ion ;  CASE-A 
#  = Abrup t  Trans i t ion :  CASE-A 
C  =  Smooth  Trans i t ion ;  CASE-B 
•  = Abrup t  Trans i t ion ;  CASE B 
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extremely unlikely since the secondary flow rate is assumed to be at its initial value 
so that the steam generator units will have to remove more than their designed 
capacity at a lower temperature difference between the sodium and water sides. 
If we consider the long term outcome of these accidents the effect of the final 
state of the core inlet temperature can be observed from Eq. (4.2). It can be shown 
that the asymptotic natural circulation rate can be related to the power produced 
in the core by [71] 
For the reactor to become critical again the sum of the feedback reactivities has to 
be zero. Combining Eq. (4.2) and Eq. (4.32) one gets 
For a known change in core inlet temperature Eq. (4.33) can be solved for the 
normalized power p. Figure 4.22 shows the variation of the asymptotic value of 
the core power as a function of a change in the core inlet temperature. It should 
be noted that this figure does not give any information about the initial stages 
of the transient. We see that the core inlet temperature determines basically the 
final power level. If the secondary sodium loop conditions are such that the core 
inlet temperature is lower than its initial value of 343°C the resulting power level 
is higher than if the core inlet temperature were to approach the pool temperature 
as in case-A type transients. Since the secondary inlet temperature to the IHX 
is important only through its effect on the core inlet temperature and primary 
pump time constant is basically the design controllable variable that limits the peak 
temperatures during a LOF transient, Figure 4.22 shows that the reactor will reach 
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Figure 4.22: Asymptotic power level as a function of change in core inlet temper­
ature for LOF accident 
a low power critical condition for the ranges of core inlet temperature considered. 
The above discussion indicates that the reactor will respond to the LOF ac­
cident in two substantially different manners. The first one which is the coupled 
LOF-LOHS accident (case-A) results in a suhcritical state in which the long term 
response of the reactor is governed by the changes in decay heat generated in the 
core and the heat removed from the vessel by the VCS. The second one which is a 
coupled LOF and overcooling accident (case-B) results in a low power critical state 
in which the power generated in the core and the heat removal from the IHX are 
in balance. The time duration of the initial phase of the transient (transition to 
natural circulation in the primary system) for both cases is governed by the pump 
time constant. Coupled LOF-LOHS accident and LOHS accident results indicate 
that the primary system when decoupled from the secondary system behaves in an 
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inherently safe manner. From the results of coupled LOF and overcooling accidents, 
it has been shown that although the fission power will not die away the inherent 
reactivity feedback effects will bring the reactor into a critical stable state. The 
conditions that sustain this state develop inherently and will exist unless another 
disturbance in the balance of the reactor is introduced. Therefore, we can conclude 
that with regards to the final state of the reactor case-B transients also give an in-
herently safe behavior. In terms of the damage to the primary system components, 
the hydraulic profile of the primary system allows the pump coastdown character­
istics to be selected so that the damage to the primary system components can be 
avoided. From the above results a pump time constant higher than 30 seconds is 
necessary. 
The more limiting type of the LOF accident was based on the assumption that 
the secondary pumps were working at their initial speed when the primary pumps 
were coasting down. A very simple and effective method of avoiding such an accident 
is to make sure that the the secondary pumps also start to coast down after the 
power to primary pumps is lost. This scenario is more likely to happen in real life 
if the cause of the LOF accident is loss of electrical power. In this case the accident 
will be less severe, since the inlet temperature to the core will eventually increase 
and introduce negative feedback reactivity and will cause the power to decrease. 
4.7 Transient Overpower Accident 
In the transient overpower accident (TOP), it is assumed that positive reac­
tivity is inserted into the core and the plant protection and control systems fail to 
respond. TOP accidents are different from the LOHS or LOF accidents in the sense 
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that an external disturbance is not only required to initiate the accident but to 
keep the accident going on whereas, in a LOHS or LOF accident, once the accident 
is initiated it develops without requiring the existence of any external source. The 
source of the positive reactivity that will be inserted accidentally comes from the 
control elements in the reactor core. 
Numerically this accident was simulated as step reactivity insertion. Reactivity 
insertions of 0.25 and 0.50 dollars were considered. Table 4.9 gives the numerical 
results for the peak temperatures and temperatures at the final simulation time 
for step reactivity reaction alone and coupled with LOHS and LOF accidents. The 
primary pump speed, secondary loop IHX inlet temperature and flow rate were kept 
at their initial values. 
Variation of average temperatures, total thermal power and reactivities for the 
0.5$ case are shown in Figure 4.23, Figure 4.24 and Figure 4.25, respectively. The 
0.25$ step reactivity insertion case behaves in a similar manner but the magnitudes 
of the variables are less. After a jump to approximately twice its value the power 
starts to decrease due to the effect of negative feedback reactivities, first from the 
fuel temperature associated component then from the coolant temperature associ­
ated component. The net reactivity for this case becomes zero at approximately 
140 seconds. The increase in power causes the core exit, pool and core inlet tem­
peratures to increase. The final stage is steady operation at a higher power level 
with increased temperatures. The variations in the fiow level are due to the change 
in the density of sodium with increased temperatures. 
Although highly improbable, a reactivity insertion accident may occur with 
other types of accidents such LOHS or LOF. These accidents should be considered 
Table 4.9; Results of transient overpower accidents for step reactivity insertion 
TOP TOP-LOHS TOP LOF 
/p=30 seconds 
CASE-A CASE B 
Pext ($) 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Time (seconds) 
220 500 180 500 31 500 94 500 170 500 
POWER (MW) 
Fission 1107 1052 1514 1376 795 51 263 17 391 184 
Decay 73 72 90 90 62 23 43 20 47 29 
Total 1180 1124 1604 1466 857 74 306 37 438 213 
REACTIVITY ($) 
Fuel -.193 -.190 -.383 -.376 -.394 -.378 -.475 -.369 -.389 -.322 
Coolant -.059 -.062 -.119 -.127 
CO 00 
-.234 -.264 -.232 -.211 -.196 
Net -.002 -.002 -.003 -.002 -.077 -.112 .239 -.101 -.100 -.018 
TEMPERATURE (°(7) 
Core Inlet 354 361 362 379 479 589 491 525 293 293 
Core Exit 
Average 566 563 652 646 633 603 745 660 855 830 
Central Boxes 565 563 651 645 633 603 751 669 876 854 
Edge Boxes 566 564 654 648 634 603 729 643 809 780 
Pool 528 551 566 625 498 590 514 539 537 571 
NORMALIZED 
Flow 0.996 0.993 0.991 0.984 0.998 0.985 0.218 0.050 0.140 0.071 
Power to How ratio 1.481 1.416 2.024 1.862 1.073 0.094 1.756 0.929 3.897 3.737 
Core A2' 1.490 1.425 2.046 1.883 1.084 0.096 1.788 0.956 3.967 3.794 
IHX A7' 1.249 1.364 1.466 1.764 0.126 0.007 0.164 0.095 1.756 1.998 
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as two infrequent events occurring at the same time. In a combined LOHS and 
TOP accident the reactor response is very similar to the LOHS accident. The 
temperatures and power levels are higher due to the additional reactivity introduced. 
Table 4.9 gives the results of this accident for a step reactivity insertion of 0.5 
dollars. Figure 4.26, Figure 4.27 and Figure 4.28 show the variation of temperatures, 
power and reactivity components for this accident. The increase in power due to 
reactivity insertion causes the fuel temperature and fuel temperature associated 
negative feedbacks to increase. The loss of heat removal from the IHX results in 
higher core inlet temperatures introducing more negative feedback reactivity. Even 
though the core exit temperature is higher, introducing hotter sodium into the 
pool, the pool temperature rises slowly compared to the core inlet temperature. 
Therefore, the peak temperatures occur at a time similar to that would happen 
on a LOHS accident alone. However, the peak temperature is higher due to the 
increased power level. The peak core exit temperatures are approximately lOO^C 
higher than a LOHS accident whereas the core inlet temperatures are the same 
for both cases. The negative feedbacks compensate for the inserted reactivity and 
cause the reactor to remain in a subcritical condition. 
The combination of LOF and TOP accident is clearly the worst accident that 
can be considered. Since in LOF accidents the secondary loop conditions influence 
the outcome of the accident through their effect on the core inlet temperature the 
two limiting cases that were considered in Section 4.6 were considered. Table 4.9 lists 
the results of this accident for pump time constant of 30 seconds and 0.5 dollars step 
reactivity insertion. The response of the reactor to the coupled TOP-LOF accident 
and to LOF accident alone are very similar. Again the accident proceeds as it would 
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Figure 4.28: Variation, of reactivity during TOP-LOHS accident 
be in the case of a LOF accident; however, the severity of the accident has increased 
due the the increased power level as a result of the reactivity insertion. At the time 
at which the peak temperature occurs the core inlet temperatures for the coupled 
TOP-LOF and LOF accident are very close to each other; however, the core exit 
temperatures differ by approximately 150°C. This indicates that the dynamics of 
the accident is governed by the LOF accident dynamics and the effect of reactivity 
insertion is merely to increase the power and temperature levels as was observed in 
the coupled TOP-LOHS accident case. This behavior of the reactor is due to the 
large heat capacity hence, the large time constant of the pool. The pool dampens 
the rapid increase in the core exit temperature. The case in which the secondary 
loop flow rate is assumed to be in its initial flow rate and temperature (case-B) is 
more limiting than the other case in which the secondary loop flow rate is reduced 
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to 0.001 of its initial value. The same arguments that were presented in Section 4.6 
apply to the coupled TOP-LOF accident as far as the qualitative characteristics of 
the effects of pump time constant, transition to natural circulation and secondary 
sodium inlet temperature to the IHX. 
The average core and pool temperatures resulting from a TOP accident alone 
or coupled with a LOHS accident are within the accepted safety limits. The coupled 
TOP-LOF accident with the secondary sodium assumed to be in its initial conditions 
which can be considered as a coupled TOP-LOF-OCL accident for average central 
boxes exit temperature gives only 5®C margin to sodium boiling which implies that 
this accident, under postulated conditions, will cause sodium boiling for much of 
the core and, if allowed to continue, will cause severe damage to core. In this 
case the pool temperature is well below the safety limits eliminating a short term 
vessel failure. In the case of step reactivity insertion alone, the exit temperatures 
are within the limits and no widespread damage to the core will occur. However, 
the primary system which is designed for 800MW is now working at higher levels 
with the excess power being deposited in to the pool resulting in increasing pool 
temperature. Since the vessel is not pressurized, the stress levels on the vessel are 
small, and the time to failure of the vessel is of the order of hours. Hence TOP 
is the most severe accident threatening the primary vessel integrity. The coupled 
TOP and LOF or LOHS accidents threaten the sodium boiling limit in the short 
term, however, the vessel integrity is not challenged. 
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4.8 Overcooling Accident 
In the overcooling accident (OCL), the effects of a decrease in the reactor inlet 
temperature are of concern. Such an accident will most probably be caused by an 
increase in heat removal in the steam generator (SG). If the amount of feedwater 
that is being pumped into the SG increases or the pressure at which evaporation 
takes place decreases the outlet temperature of the secondary sodium in the SG will 
decrease. Since a once through steam generator concept is being used in the TR, a 
decrease in the evaporation pressure will result in a dry-out in the steam generator 
due to the small amount of liquid inventory causing the accident to become a partial 
loss of heat sink. Other events that may cause an OCL accident are an increase in 
the primary or secondary sodium flow rate. 
Numerically this accident was simulated as a ramp change in the secondary 
inlet temperature to the IHX. The secondary inlet temperature was reduced to the 
feedwater temperature which is 237° C. The numerical results are summarized in 
Table 4.10. As can be seen this accident is very minor in terms of the temperature 
levels achieved. The increase in the reactor power level is due to the positive feed­
back reactivity introduced by the decrease in the core inlet temperature which is 
then compensated by the feedback reactivity from the fuel temperature associated 
feedbacks. Figure 4.29, Figure 4.30 and Figure 4.31 show the variation of average 
primary system temperature, reactor thermal power and reactivity components. 
The overcooling accident can be considered as a small positive reactivity input due 
to the chilling of the core. 
Since overcooling events that originate from the steam side of the steam gen­
erator transform into overheating events for a once-through steam generator type 
I l l  
Table 4,10: Results of overcooling accident 
CASE-A" CASE-B» OCL-LOHS 
Time (seconds) 375 1000.0 390.0 1000.0 130.0 1000.0 
POWER (MW) 
Fission 1023 1013 1023 1013 421 0 
Decay 70 70 70 71 56 16 
Total 1093 1083 1093 1084 477 16 
REACTIVITY ($) 
Fuel -.017 -.016 -.017 -.016 -.193 -.150 
Coolant 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 -.116 -.131 
Net -.000 -.000 -.000 0.000 -.309 -.282 
TEMPERATURE (°C) 
Core Inlet 305 306 305 306 462 515 
Core Exit: 
Average 498 497 498 497 547 518 
Central boxes 498 498 498 497 547 518 
Edge boxes 498 497 498 497 547 518 
Pool 491 495 491 495 489 515 
NORMALIZED'^ 
Flow 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.995 
Power to flow ratio 1.367 1.354 1.366 1.355 0.597 0.020 
Core AT 1.363 1.352 1.363 1.352 0.599 0.020 
IHX AT 1.337 1.356 1.337 1.356 0.192 0.000 
"Secondary loop inlet temperature to IHX drops to 237°C in 33s. 
''Secondary loop inlet temperature to IHX drops to 237"C in 56s. 
•^Normalized with respect to initial value 
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Figure 4.31: Variation of reactivity during OCL accident 
in a short time, the secondary sodium temperature will start to increase after de­
creasing. To simulate such an accident, the secondary sodium inlet temperature at 
the IHX was first reduced to 23T°C then increased to the exit temperature from 
the secondary side of IHX. This assumption implies that there is no heat transfer 
to water-steam in the steam generator and therefore that all the heat transferred to 
the secondary sodium loops remains in the secondary sodium loops. The variations 
of average primary loop temperatures, power and reactivity components are shown 
in Figure 4.32, Figure 4.33 and Figure 4.34. This accident can be considered as an 
OCL accident followed by a LOHS accident. As can be seen from Figure 4.32 the 
peak temperatures are acceptable. The increasing secondary inlet temperature to 
the IHX by causing the the core inlet temperature to increase results in an increase 
in the core exit temperature. The power rapidly drops to decay heat levels due to 
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Figure 4.32: Variation of primary sodium temperatures during OCL-LOHS acci­
dent 
the increased negative feedback. Again the large heat capacity of the pool and the 
low heat capacity of the inlet plenum has important effects on the transient. The 
core inlet temperature increases rapidly up to pool temperature causing the core 
exit temperatures to increase and consequently introducing more negative feedback 
reactivity, yet the pool limits the increase in the core inlet temperature avoiding 
damage to the core. 
Neither of the two variations of this accident is challenging either to the short 
term or long term safety limits. Had there been a large cold pool associated with 
the reactor the OCL accident would have acted on a longer time scale determined 
primarily by the time constant of the cold plenum. Since the driving force for 
the accident is the core inlet temperature change the magnitudes of the peak exit 
temperatures are determined primarily by the changes in the inlet temperature. 
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For the same resulting inlet temperature change, the resulting conditions at the 
termination phase of the accident will be approximately the same. 
4.9 Cladding Damage Estimates 
In order to estimate the damage to the cladding the cumulative damage frac­
tion method was used as described in Section 2.1.1.2. The results of the estimates 
are given in Table 4.11. The failure mechanisms considered are eutectic penetration 
of the cladding, fission gas pressure loading and thermal stresses. The cladding is 
assumed to fail if either the cumulative damage fraction is greater than 1.0 or if the 
equivalent stress is greater than the yield stress of the cladding. The beginning of 
life fuel properties was used in the analysis. Although the fuel thermal conductivity 
decreases with increasing burnup resulting in higher fuel centerline temperatures 
the power density also decreases; hence the beginning of life conditions are limiting. 
The hot spot factors of Table 3.2 were used to compute the peak temperatures 
with 3<t uncertainty factors. The hot spot factor for the temperature increase in 
the cladding due to wire wrap was also used to compute the fuel centerline and 
surface temperatures; hence the fuel centerline predictions are highly conservative. 
The instantaneous core inlet, core flow rate, central boxes core exit, and power were 
obtained from the results of the transient simulation program. Since the peak fuel 
temperatures do not occur at the top of the fuel pin 34 axial nodes was used to 
predict the peak fuel temperatures. In the radial direction three nodes in the fuel, 
one bond in the node, two nodes in the cladding and one node in the coolant were 
used. The flow redistribution in a core boxes among the fuel pins was neglected to 
be conservative. Although the cladding and coolant temperatures peak at approxi­
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mately the same time, the time at which the fuel temperature peaks is earlier. The 
core box design in the TR allows a uniform temperature distribution in each core 
box by not dividing the fuel pins in subassemblies. For the transients considered 
in this section flow redistribution due to buoyancy effects is not significant at the 
time when the peak temperatures occurs; however, neglecting this effect results in 
higher cumulative damage fractions for the hottest pin due to the application of un­
certainty factors to temperature increases that are higher than the nominal. This 
assumption had to be made partially due to the lack of analytical tools to estimate 
the flow distribution among the various coolant subchannels associated with fuel 
pins having different power fractions. 
An investigation of Table 4.11 shows that the LOHS and OCL accidents are of 
minor importance in terms of damage to the cladding. In fact, these two accidents 
need not be considered as accidents but merely as operational transients. The case-
A type LOF accidents with a pump time constant greater than 20 seconds are also 
acceptable. The case-B type LOF accidents result in permanent damage to the 
cladding of the hottest fuel pin for all the pump time constants considered. The 
damage mechanism is due to eutectic formation and as the pump time constant 
is increased the time spent above the eutectic temperature increases. However, 
for eutectic penetration, the important factor is the time spent at a temperature. 
Since increasing pump time constant results in lower temperature levels the damage 
fractions decrease with increasing pump time constants. Figure 4.35 shows the 
cladding thinning for the cases considered in case-B type LOF transients. 
The 25 cent step reactivity insertion does not result in cladding failure or 
damage. However, step reactivity insertion of 50 cents results in violation of fuel 
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Table 4.11: Transient cumulative damage fractions for the unprotected accidents 
Temperature (°C) Cumulative 
Accident Fuel Clad Coolant Damage Violation 
Centerline Inner Surface Core Exit Fraction 
LOHS 722 548 547 2.0 10-9 None 
(923)" (611) (585) 1.4 10-f None 
LOF, Case-A 730 711 711 3.7 10-® None 
tp=10s (853) (834) (834) 3.6 10-3 Et 
LOF, Case-A 725 642 641 4.2 10-f None 
tn O
 
( M II (827) (721) (719) 9.5 10-® None 
LOF, Case-A 724 610 610 1.6 10-r None 
tp=30s (824) (677) (673) 1.8 10-® None 
LOF, Case-A 723 595 595 8.1 10-® None 
tp=40s (822) (853) (648) 6.9 10-7 None 
LOF, Case-B 739 728 728 3.1 10-® None 
tp=10s (947) (920) (920) 1.1 10-2 E and B° 
LOF, Case-B 723 672 672 6.2 10-7 None 
tp=20s (878) (841) (841) 8.8 10-4 E 
LOF, Case-B 722 647 647 3.5 10-® None 
tp=30s (855) (806) (806) 4.5 10-3 E 
LOF, Case-B 721 633 633 2.6 10-® None 
Ul o
 
II (846) (786) (786) 3.1 10-4 E 
TOP 677 581 586 2.3 10-® None 
25 cents (1021) (698) (675) 1.8 10-s None 
TOP 1030 673 652 6.0 10-® None 
50 cents (1223) (834) (801) 3.6 10-3 pd 
TOP -LOHS 991 646 635 8.7 10-7 None 
50 cents (1174) (693) (762) 1.9 10-s None 
OCL 803 512 499 1.4 10-9 None 
(935) (617) (597) 7.4 10-7 None 
"Numbers in parantheses are Sa temperatures. 
''Eutpctic forpiation 
Sodium boihng 
''Fuel melting 
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Figure 4.35; Eutectic penetration into the cladding for case-B type LOF accidents 
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melting for approximately 200 seconds and considerable damage to the cladding 
due to eutectic formation for the 3<r temperatures. Since the molten fuel cladding 
interaction was not modelled in these calculations the cladding damage fraction is 
underestimated. However, since the fuel centerline temperature is computed overly 
conservatively due to the inclusion of the hot spot factor from the wire wrap, and the 
peak fuel temperature is only 23°C over the nominal fuel melting temperature fuel 
melting may not occur at all. Also, in calculating the fuel centerline temperature 
no credit was taken for the increase in the fuel melting due to restructuring of the 
fuel. The TOP accident with 50 cent reactivity insertion and combined with LOF 
accident results in complete failure due to sodium boiling initiation first and then 
cladding and fuel failures. The core will melt upon such an accident; hence the 
combined TOP-LOF accidents pose the greatest threat to the reactor. 
4.10 Discussion 
The results of the accidents simulated in this chapter indicate that the TR 
reactor can mitigate the consequences of a wide range of accidents without causing 
damage to the plant in the absence of any favorable action from the plant control 
and protection system. The important characteristics of the TR that led to this 
favorable response were the large heat capacity associated with the hot sodium pool, 
the reactivity feedback mechanisms from the coolant temperature and the metallic 
fuel and the large initial margins to failure. Even with conservatism applied in the 
both the simulation program and in estimating the worst conditions, the results of 
most of these accidents are not damaging to either the primary system components 
or to the core. 
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The TOP accident with 50 cent or more positive reactivity insertion and its 
combination with other accidents seem the only accident sequences during which 
major damage can be expected. However, as mentioned earlier both the fuel man­
agement strategy adopted for the TR and the favorable reactivity change that can 
be achieved with the use of metal fuel makes the step insertion of 50 cents of reac­
tivity as an upper bound. The control rods employed in the TR will not contain 
this much reactivity and and most of them will not be inserted completely through­
out most of the lifetime of the reactor core eliminating the possibility of such a 
large amounts of positive reactivity insertion. As mentioned earlier, the combina­
tion accidents, for example TOP-LOF, are very low probability events so that the 
consequences of such accidents should not be of major concern. 
Two of the neglected feedback mechanisms should reduce the power and tem­
perature levels calculated in during the accidents. The first one of these is the 
relative thermal expansion of the control rods with respect to the core. This ef­
fect was found to introduce large amounts of negative feedback reactivity in the 
numerical simulations done with the current fast reactor concepts such as PRISM 
and SAFR. In particular, this effect will be effective in transients during which the 
increase in the core exit temperature is higher than the increase in the core inlet 
temperature. The other feedback mechanism which will be effective during a TOP 
accident is the rapid transient swelling of the metallic fuel elements. If this feedback 
mechanism is as high as the value estimated in reference [23] which is approximately 
2 cents per °C increase, then this effect alone will be able to compensate for the 
step positive reactivity insertion. 
It can be concluded that under the postulated accident conditions the TR 
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responds in an inherently safe manner to LOHS, LOF, OCL and TOP accidents 
with 25 cents of reactivity insertion. The characteristics that cause such inherently 
safe behavior are the properties of the materials and the configuration of the reactor 
primary system, even without any activated safety devices. 
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5 CONTROL AND PROTECTION SYSTEM CONCEPTS 
5.1 Control Modes 
The results of the last chapter have shown that the only accident sequence that 
may lead to substantial damage to the primary system components is initiated by 
introducing a large amount of positive reactivity. The most probable source of such 
large amounts of reactivity is the control rods. It is therefore desirable to limit the 
amount of reactivity contained in control rods, limit the number of control rods and 
increase the reliability of the control rod system. These can be achieved by limiting 
the use of control rod to control the power changes caused by burnup during the 
lifetime of the core. This implies a plant control system that does not use the control 
rods. The advantageous of such an approach are two-fold; the demand for the rapid 
and frequent action of the control rods is reduced resulting in high reliability and the 
cost associated with the control system is reduced due the simplifications resulting 
from the control system design. 
Under normal operating conditions, the basic function of the control system is 
to keep the plant in balance, that is to match the power produced in the core to the 
power demanded from the electricity grid. Under abnormal operating conditions, 
the control system should be able to bring the reactor to a safe condition, which in 
the extreme case is neutronic shutdown with proper decay heat removal. The op­
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erating conditions experienced during such a transient should be within acceptable 
limits; they should not result in significant damage to the components of the plant. 
The available control modes can be inferred from Eq. (4.2), repeated here with 
an additional term representing the reactivity introduced by the control rods; 
0 = + ap6p + PcomZ (5-1) 
The purpose is to adjust the variations in the core inlet temperature and flow rate 
so that a desired power level is obtained while introducing the minimum amount 
of control rod reactivity [pcont ~ 0). The two options available are controlling the 
reactor by keeping the flow rate constant and controlling the reactor by adjusting 
the flow rate so that the desired power level is reached. In the first case, inlet 
temperature control, the reactor inlet temperature is allowed to change freely in 
response to the changes in the heat removed from the IHXs by the secondary sodium 
while keeping the reactor flow rate constant. In the second case, flow rate control, 
the controlled variable is the pump speed. 
The load following characteristics of the TR for inlet temperature control can 
be inferred from the results of the unprotected LOHS and OCL accident presented 
in Chapter 4. In the LOHS case the heat removed from the reactor through the 
IHXs was almost zero and the internal feedback effects of the reactor caused the 
fission power generated in the reactor to vanish. In the OCL case the decrease in 
the secondary sodium inlet temperature resulting in an increase of the heat removed 
from the IHXs caused the reactor power to increase in order to match the increased 
demand. In both cases the primary pump speeds were kept constant. This mode 
of control is possible in the TR due the relative reactivity coefficient of the inlet 
temperature and the power reactivity decrement. Since a degree change in the 
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inlet temperature causes a percent change in the power produced, by allowing the 
secondary inlet temperature to decrease as a result of increased heat removal from 
the steam generators and consequently from the IHXs will cause the reactor power 
to match the heat removed from the steam generators. The existence of a secondary 
loop will cause a certain time delay between the time at which the steam demand 
increases and the time at which the reduction in the secondary sodium temperature 
occurs. Apart from this delay, the elimination of a large heat capacity associated 
with the core inlet temperature causes a fast response of the primary system. The 
results of various step load changes in the secondary side are shown in Figure 5.1. 
The reactor operates with basically constant hot end temperatures, these being the 
core exit and the IHX exit temperature on the secondary side, while the change in 
the cold end temperatures cause the reactor to produce the required power level. 
In order to cause a reactor shutdown, the control system has to simply cause 
a LOHS accident. The results of the LOHS accident showed that no significant 
damage occured as a result of this accident. The secondary sodium flow rate can 
be controlled to obtain a more smooth increase in the core inlet temperature. This 
will increase the time at which fission power decays, but a very reliable shutdown 
mechanism which is controlled from outside the primary system is obtained. 
The second option is to use the primary flow rate as the controlled variable 
to achieve the required power level. The control is achieved by controlling the 
pump speed. The pump inertia and the maximum torque that can be supplied by 
the pump are important factors that need to be considered. A large pump inertia 
implies a long coastdown time for the primary pumps and an increase in the torque 
that must supplied. The maximum speed at which the pump can work also limits 
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the upper limit of the control achievable with control mode. 
In order to simulate flow rate control, a proportional-integral (PI) controller 
was assumed. The pump torque was calculated by 
where Tpm is the torque supplied by the pump, W is the core flow rate and the 
is the flow rate required or the set point for the controller. K is the controller 
gain. The reason for choosing a PI controller was to eliminate the steady state error 
through the integral action. 
In this case, one has to decide on a the set point for the flow. Several options are 
available. The first one is to adjust the flow so that flow rate is changed according 
to 
which will result in changing the core flow rate so that the final power to flow ratio 
is unity. In the above equation is the power demand. The results of this control 
mode for a 10% reduction in the load are shown in Figure 5.2. The controller adjusts 
the core flow rate in proportion to the load and as steady state is reached the power 
to flow ratio approaches to unity. The increase in the primary system temperature 
is about 15®C for this case. The results indicate that the gain of the controller 
should be load dependent; that is, the gain of the controller should decrease as the 
magnitude of the reduction in the load increase. This is required in order to avoid 
a large overshoot in the core exit temperature for large changes in the load. Since 
the power approaches the demand, no control rods are required for this case. 
Other options can be achieved by controlling the primary flow rate so that the 
^ = K(Wi - W) (5.2) 
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change in either the hot or cold end of the reactor or the temperature rise across the 
core is limited. If the core flow rate is controlled so that the core inlet temperature 
is fixed at its steady state value, load following is obtained by changing the primary 
flow rate. Since a change in core inlet temperature affects the power, this mode 
of control may be used to obtain the desired change in power by a small variation 
in the core temperatures. From Eq. (5.1) it can be shown that at steady state the 
normalized flow will be given by 
w = (5.4) 
ctpp ~ (Qp 4- Opy) 
and during the transient the set point for the controller will be 
° CpiTcx - L(0)) 
where Tex and are the core inlet and core exit temperatures and Cp is the spe­
cific heat. The results of this case are shown in Figure 5.3. In this case the controller 
eventually satisfies the constant core inlet temperature setting. The magnitudes of 
the overshoot and undershoot in the change in the core inlet temperature indicate 
that the gain setting used in the calculations is too high for this case. Regardless, 
this mode of control is clearly not desirable, because of the fluctuating response 
of temperatures, power and flow. Even if by using a smaller gain setting these 
fluctuations can be avoided, the necessity to control the core inlet temperature pre­
cisely makes this mode of control disadvantageous. A better method of achieving a 
constant core inlet temperature may be obtained by controlling the secondary flow 
rate. 
The core exit temperature can be controlled by setting the controller so that 
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is satisfied. The results of this case for a 10% decrease in load are shown in Fig­
ure 5.4. At the end of the simulation the normalized value of the power is 0.89 
and the maximum increase in the core exit temperature is about 2.5°C. There is no 
need for control rods to adjust the power to match the load. The reduction in the 
power is caused by the increase in the core inlet temperature and flow rate. This 
mode of control seems to be superior to other modes of control by limiting the core 
exit temperature not only in the load following mode but in transient overpower 
accidents. Since the maximum amount of flow that can be supplied by the pump is 
limited in case of an overpower transient, if this mode of control is operational the 
controller will increase the flow until its maximum value is reached. The maximum 
flow rates that can be achieved from the pumps are typically about 15% higher than 
their design point. This will help to reduce the increase in the core exit temperature 
at the initial stages of such a transient. 
One other option is to control the flow rate so that the power to flow ratio is 
kept at unity during the transient. In this case the required core flow rate will be 
given by 
W'rf = (3-7) 
By keeping power to flow ratio at unity the temperature rise across the core is 
kept constant during the transient. The results of this case for a 10% decrease 
in the heat removed from the secondary loop are shown in Figure 5.5. Again the 
reactor power decreases to match the load and there is no need for control rod 
action. Both the core exit and inlet temperature rise by approximately 10°C, and 
the control system objective of keeping the power to flow ratio at unity and the core 
temperature increase at its initial value are satisfied during most of the transient. 
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This mode of control is suggested by reference [371. The major deficiency of this 
control mode will be in transients approaching a LOHS accident during which the 
core inlet temperature increases considerably. Since this mode will try restore the 
core temperature increase to its initial value, the core exit temperature increase 
will be greater than it would be during a LOHS with a flow rate control mode 
operational. 
Note that except for the control mode given by Eq. (5.3), the power demand is 
not used in the controller setting, but the final power level is expected to follow the 
load as a result of Eq. (5.1) and this is achieved in all the cases considered. This 
confirms the load following character of the TR reactor regardless of the control 
mode used. The time delay between the change in the load and the matching of 
the reactor power to the load is approximately 7 minutes with the controller gain 
setting used. There will be an additional delay in the secondary sodium loop of the 
order of a few minutes. Depending on the magnitude of the change in the load, 
these time delays will change. If this time delay can be tolerated, there is no need 
to use the control rods for load following purposes in the short term. However, use 
of control rods may be required to return the reactor to operation at the design 
temperature. 
5.2 Plant Protection System Concepts 
Besides the control system, the plant protection system, an independent system 
that will assure the safety of the reactor in case the control system system fails or 
malfunctions is required. The main purpose of this system is to shut down the 
reactor in a major accident situation in adverse conditions. It is desirable to have 
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such a system acting without the need for an external system or operator action. 
In the TR, such a system is required in the positive reactivity insertion accidents 
acting alone or coupled with other accidents and coupled LOF-OCL accidents. In 
both types of accidents, particularly in TOP accident, the temperatures predicted 
to occur during the transient were high enough to challenge the reactor core and 
the vessel integrity. 
A self-actuated shutdown system (SASS) has been developed by Westinghouse 
[72] and is being used in the current U.S. LMR concepts. This systems contains 
an electromagnet holding the neutron absorbers and is oriented vertically. The 
magnetic force holding the neutron absorbers is obtained by using a coil and a 
metallic alloy composed of a Ni-Fe alloy. A small fraction of the sodium, that 
exits the reactor core is guided around the absorber assembly. When the core 
exit temperature increases, the temperature of the Ni-Fe alloy also increases. The 
composition of the Ni-Fe alloy may be selected such that the temperature at which 
the material loses its magnetic properties, or curie point temperature, is close to the 
safety limits. At such a temperature the magnetic force that holds the absorbers 
will be lost and the absorbers will be released. This system does not require any 
external drives or operator action. Since its principle is based only on the material 
properties it can to a certain extent can be considered an inherent protection system. 
Such a system can be applied to the TR as a final level of defense. In the 
original application of SASS the Ni-Fe composition was selected such that the curie 
point was near 600°C. This temperature is to low for TR in view of the results 
obtained from Chapter 4. A higher temperature is desirable in order to reduce the 
number of shutdowns. 
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In order to see the effects of a shutdown system on the worst transient a coupled 
LOF-TOP was selected. A step reactivity insertion of 50 cents and a pump time 
constant of 10 seconds was assumed. The secondary flow rate was assumed to be 
at its initial value of 1800kg/s. The total amount of reactivity contained in the 
absorbers was assumed to one dollar. The temperature at which the absorbers 
were released was set to 675°C. The results are shown in Figure 5.6, Figure 5.7 
and Figure 5.8. The initial peak in the core exit temperatures cause the absorbers 
to be released. This results in a rapid reduction in the power and the core exit 
temperatures. Since the natural circulation flow has not established the flow is still 
decreasing. This results in a smaller peak after the release of the absorbers. The heat 
removed by the secondary system through the IHXs forces the core inlet temperature 
to drop. Since the power is also decreasing due to the negative reactivity inserted 
by the absorbers the core exit temperature decreases and becomes less than the 
pool temperature. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The description of the thermal-hydraulic and transient behavior of the TR 
concept presented in the previous chapters shows that the objective of achieving a 
simple and inherently safe nuclear power reactor is met by the present configuration. 
The main features of the TR that contribute to the simplicity and to the inherent 
safety of the plant are the small thermal power, the use of metal fuel and the 
configuration of the primary system. 
TR has the advantages of a small power plant. The current technology can 
be applied to build the main components of the reactor system. The operating 
conditions do not impose strict requirements on the components due to the large 
safety margins. The failure mechanisms of the metal fuel are such that the time to 
failure is long. The favorable feedback characteristics of the metal fuel and the core 
provide operational ease and safety. The large sodium pool protects the reactor 
from rapid increases in temperature. These characteristics, which are common to 
most of the current LMFR concepts in the U.S. are obtained in TR concept in a 
unique configuration. 
One of the major design changes introduced in TR is the reduction in the 
heat capacity effects associated with the cold end of the primary system. Several 
advantages of this change were observed. 
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First, it is possible to eliminate the problems associated with having a hot 
pool and a cold pool in the same vessel. Among the problems eliminated, one can 
mention, for example, assuring proper physical and thermal separation of pools and 
having some parts of the shell of the IHX in the hot pool and some in the cold pool 
which causes thermal stress problems. The result is a simplification in the primary 
system layout. 
Secondly, the response of the TR reactor to a wide range of accidents is im­
proved, resulting in a safer reactor. This improvement is a result of the elimination 
of the time delay introduced by the cold pool. The effects of changes in the core 
inlet temperature are felt early in a transient. This allows the reactor power to 
adjust to the changes in the heat removed from the primary system through the 
IHXs. 
With the elimination of the time delay from the cold part of the primary 
system it is possible to improve the load following characteristics of the TR without 
resorting to rapid control rod maneuvers. 
Finally, this change introduces a reliable and rapid reactor power control system 
based on core inlet temperature. By causing the core inlet temperature to increase, 
for example by reducing the secondary loop sodium flow rate to small values, it is 
possible to control the reactor power or even to cause a neutronic shutdow^n as was 
observed from the results of the simulated LOHS accidents. 
However, there are some disadvantages to this approach. Under normal oper­
ating conditions, the primary pumps are subject to higher operating temperatures 
than the pool type LMFRs which employ the two pool concept. This penalty is not 
expected to be a major handicap, because previous experience with sodium pumps 
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has shown that the current pump designs are capable of functioning properly at the 
temperature levels employed in the TR. 
The second disadvantage associated with this approach is observed during tran­
sients caused by loss of only the primary pumping power. During such accidents 
the core inlet temperature decreases and introduces positive reactivity resulting in 
a slower decay of fission power. The estimated peak temperatures indicate eutectic 
penetration into the cladding, but cladding failure is not predicted. The damage 
accumulated by the cladding during such a transient is small enough to permit con­
tinuation of normal reactor operation after such an accident. This disadvantage can 
be avoided in a simple and reliable manner by assuring that the secondary pumps 
are turned off whenever the primary pumps are turned off. Such a solution implies 
that the secondary pumps are also related to the safety of the primary system if 
permanent damage to cladding is to be avoided under any circumstance. Therefore, 
the goal of limiting the safety related components to the primary system is not quite 
achieved with such a solution. 
In general, the "no cold pool" concept is favorable for a wide range of operating 
conditions. The requirement that no eutectic penetration should occur seems to be 
too conservative, since the time span for eutectic penetration is short and longer pe­
riods are needed to cause a considerable reduction in the cladding lifetime. Further 
work on this matter seems to be necessary, how^ever. 
The second major design change introduced in the layout of the primary system 
is the pumping concept. The concept employed in TR reactor retains the advantages 
of both loop and pool type concepts. The elimination of the cold pool and the 
location of pumps in the upper part of the sodium pool eliminate the need for 
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long pump shafts. This concept also makes the maintenance of the primary pumps 
easier. 
Another major design change introduced in the TR is the overall shape of the 
primary vessel and the core. The trench like shape of the reactor vessel has a larger 
surface area than, for example a cylinder, providing an adequate removal of heat 
removal from the primary vessel. The heat removal from the vessel was seen to 
be high enough to remove the decay heat and avoid a large increase in the pool 
temperature following an accident that might impair all forced cooling. The height 
of the vessel is sufficient to provide the necessary separation between the thermal 
centers of the IHXs and the core so that natural circulation cooling of the core is 
possible when the primary pumping is lost. 
The shape of the core and the substitution of core boxes containing a large 
number of fuel pins for a large number of subassemblies containing a small number 
of fuel pins have several advantages. The elimination of the subassemblies enhances 
mixing to give a uniform temperature and results in a simpler core layout. Reactor 
control is possible without having control rods in the reactor core. The fuel pin 
diameters used in TR are large in diameter and should be easier to manufacture. 
The tight packing of fuel pins results in sufficiently strong feedback coefficients to 
give an inherently safe behavior. The only disadvantage of this arrangement is the 
relatively higher pressure drop. 
The simulations performed on unprotected accidents show that the most threat­
ening accident sequence is an unterminated TOP accident. TR can survive a 25 
cent step reactivity insertion, however, a 50 cent reactivity insertion, if not termi­
nated quickly can damage the vessel. During such an accident, the heat removal 
143 
from the IHXs and through the VCS cooling system is insufficient to remove the 
heat generated in the core, with the excess heat being deposited in the pool. The 
increasing pool temperature after such an accident could lead to vessel damage. 
However, the failure of the vessel due to increasing temperature is delayed for long 
time long enough to allow recovery from the accident. 
The TOP accident when accompanied with LOHS or LOF accidents is not 
threatening to the vessel integrity but it challenges the sodium boiling limit. The 
worst accident simulated was a coupled TOP-LOF accident, results of which indi­
cated that sodium boiling may occur as a consequence of such an accident. TOP 
and LOHS accidents occurring at the same time do not violate the safety criteria. 
However, the probability that TOP-LOF accidents will simultaneously occur is very 
small, and the reactor is also protected by the control and safety blade systems. 
The LOHS and OCL accidents are mild accidents with no major consequences. 
The LOF accident when coupled with LOHS accident with pump time constants 
greater than 10 seconds does not violate any of the safety criteria. The LOF accident 
with the secondary pumps on causes eutectic formation for the hottest fuel pin. 
However, the magnitude of the predicted eutectic formation was not large enough 
to cause cladding failure. 
The large amount of sodium in the form of a large hot pool, the large initial 
margins to any of the failure limits and the favorable feedback characteristics of the 
metal fuel played a major role in the accidents simulated. 
The load following characteristic of the TR indicate that there is no need for 
rapid control action in order to adjust the power. The desired change in the re­
actor power can brought about by letting the core inlet temperature respond to 
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the changes in the heat removal rate from the IHXs. The primary pumps can be 
controlled to limit the changes in the primary system temperatures. The control of 
primary pumps to obtain a constant core flow rate, a constant core exit tempera­
ture and a constant power to flow ratio does not interfere with the load following 
characteristics while achieving the control goal. Limiting the use of control rods 
to slow motions for longer term control will reduce the probability of an accidental 
reactivity insertion. 
The application of a defense in depth approach in nuclear power reactor safety 
to the TR concept offers a different interpretation of the various levels of defense. 
The first level of defense, avoiding accidents from happening, is achieved in the 
TR by the relaxed requirements on the behavior of the components, large safety 
margins to failure and simple configuration of the plant. The second level of defense, 
preventing accidents from causing large scale failure, is supplied by the properties 
of the materials used and the passive mechanisms. For a wide range of accident 
initiators, the TR does not require active safety systems to limit the consequences 
of accidents. The passive safety mechanisms are strong enough to mitigate the 
consequences of such accidents. Furthermore, the risk from the potentially most 
dangerous accident, an overpower accident caused by reactivity insertion, is reduced 
to negligible levels when the ability of the metal fuel to respond to the changes in 
the coolant temperature and the power level is taken into account. The role of 
active safety systems is in the third level of defense, preventing complete plant loss 
and avoiding radioactive release. 
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7 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
There are several areas on which further research may be beneficial. These can 
be grouped into two main categories, one involving modifications to the TR concept 
and the other involving modeling considerations. 
7.1 Modifications to the TR Concept 
The estimates of damage to the cladding during unprotected accidents showed 
that this damage is generally small. The major damage acquired by the cladding was 
caused by eutectic formation, not by the stresses caused by the fission gas pressure. 
This indicates that the length of the fission gas plenum may be reduced from its 
current dimension. Such a reduction in the length of the fission gas plenum will 
help to reduce the core pressure drop and separate the thermal centers of the IHX 
and the core resulting in an increase in the core flow rate during natural circulation 
conditions. Furthermore, this will also result in smaller primary pump diameters. 
In the TR, the heat capacity of the primary system is approximately 2 full power 
seconds per degree centigrade and almost all of this heat capacity is contained in the 
hot pool. The response of TR to loss of primary pumping power with the secondary 
pumps at their initial speeds has been the only accident sequence during which the 
reduction of the heat capacity effects associated with the core inlet temperature 
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resulted in temperatures that are higher than temperatures obtained with larger 
cold plenum volumes. In other transients considered the "no cold plenum" design 
has been favorable. The EBR-II contains a cold sodium pool whereas TR contains 
a hot pool and there are several designs containing both a hot and a cold pool. The 
response of EBR-II to the unprotected accidents has similar characteristics as in 
TR. The answer to "what is the optimum division of cold and hot plenum volumes 
given a specified amount of sodium ?" may result in another modification. The 
main difficulty in answering the above question is defining the optimum division. 
A larger cold plenum will delay the response of the TR in transients during which 
the core inlet temperature rise causes the reactor power to decrease. It will also 
slow down the load following characteristics of the TR. However, by decoupling the 
primary system from the secondary system to a greater extent or by introducing 
more time delay between the secondary system and the primary system, with a 
larger cold plenum, it may be possible to avoid eutectic formation for a wider range 
of accident scenarios. Therefore, in defining the optimum division of cold and 
hot sodium volumes in the pool, the relative merits of each division under different 
circumstances need to be compared to each other. Such criteria can be best obtained 
through probabilistic methods which in turn needs a detailed engineering design. 
The fuel management strategy adopted for the TR does not result in large 
power variations along the core. However, the power produced in blankets will 
increase due to production of new fissile material towards the end of the fuel cycle. 
The current practice in breeder reactors is to use a multiple orificing for blanket 
and fuel assemblies to be able to compensate for the changes in power produced 
in the blankets and the fuel elements through the lifetime of the reactor. In the 
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core design of the TR, the blanket elements and the fuel elements are not contained 
in different subassemblies, but are next to each other. An orificing scheme which 
takes the large power skew, hence enhanced mixing, between the fuel and blanket 
elements may result in simplifications in the core inlet design. 
7.2 Modeling 
The large number of physical processes occurring makes any list of improve­
ments to the modeling of the TR incomplete. However, some aspects that were not 
considered in this study will be mentioned below. 
A quasi-continuum or porous medium approach to the modelling of the core 
thermal-hydraulics under steady state and natural convection conditions seems to 
be more appropriate than the subchannel approach employed in this study. Such 
a method, I believe, will show the advantages of the innovative core design of the 
TR. However, a porous medium approach requires a three dimensional treatment 
of the reactor core. By making use of the rather uniform power distribution in the 
core it is possible to reduce the computational costs. 
The possible stratification that may occur in the pool also needs to be consid­
ered. Though detailed studies of this subject on several LMFRs indicate that such 
effects are small due to the high thermal conductivity of the sodium, the layout of 
the pool of the TR may cause certain stagnant regions on the opposite side of the 
IHXs resulting in an increased IHX inlet temperature. Such an increase, if the large 
margins to failure are considered, will not adversely affect the safety of the reactor 
during transients which result in an increase in the core inlet temperature but will 
be beneficial for those transients during which the core inlet temperature decreases. 
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As a starting point, a two dimensional treatment that neglects the changes in the 
short dimension may suffice. However, a three dimensional treatment is necessary 
to establish the temperature distribution in the reactor vessel and other components 
contained in the pool. 
The modeling of the fuel element behavior under transient operating conditions, 
in particular during rapid increases in power resulting from a positive reactivity 
insertion, and a quantitative assessment of the transient swelling of the metal fuel 
may introduce an important negative feedback mechanism. The relative thermal 
expansion of the core and the control rods is another important feedback mechanism 
that needs to be considered. 
The inclusion of the secondary circuit in the transient simulation program is 
expected to result in more realistic and less severe accident sequences. Therefore, it 
is not expected to change the conclusions with respect to the safety of the reactor. 
However, such a modification is necessary if an optimal control strategy is to be 
investigated. A simulation program including the components of the secondary 
system, in particular the steam generators, does not seem very practical due to the 
long computation time, at least with the version of DSNP that has been used in 
this study. 
A final suggestion may seem contrary to the above suggestions. Development 
of simple models that can adequately describe the overall behavior of the reactor 
plant would be useful. The pool type LMFRs with metal fuel offer a potential 
with respect to being amenable to such analysis. The small time constant of the 
metal fuel, the small transport delay of sodium across the core, almost linear sodium 
temperature distribution along the core and the large time constant of the pool make 
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simple models sufficiently accurate to predict the overall tendencies. A prompt jump 
approximation for the fission power or semi-analytical methods, such as the one used 
in DSNP's NEUTSl module, can circumvent the numerical problems associated 
with the point kinetics equations. The quasistatic feedback reactivity equation 
Eq. (4.2) can be used to model the feedback mechanisms. Such models can be used 
in initial scoping calculations to investigate the effects of major design changes and 
help to increase understanding of the interdependencies of major reactor parameters. 
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9 APPENDIX 
9.1 Transient Model for Unprotected Accidents 
The transient simulations were performed by using DSNP which is a modular, 
general purpose simulation program. The input to DSNP consists of statements to 
define which component will be simulated by which module, necessary statements 
for establishing the relations of the components, an iteration loop to compute the 
steady state conditions and the integration loop. The precompiler of the DSNP 
reads the input statements, translates the input statements and writes a FORTRAN 
program. Most of the modules in the DSNP are contained in libraries in generic 
form. The modules can be simple FORTRAN programs or a set of instructions to 
generate a FORTRAN program, called macros. An example of a macro is given in 
the end of the DSNP input listed in Section 9.2. More information on DSNP can 
be found in reference [67]. 
In order to model the TR reactor certain modifications were necessary. The fol­
lowing discussion will describe the model used in the simulations. The modifications 
or additions made to the original DSNP libraries will also be described. Section 9.2 
lists the input to the precompiler and along with some explanatory remarks. 
158 
9.1.1 Active Core Model 
This is a lumped parameter core model. It can represent up to 5 boxes or 
subassemblies. Each box contains a fuel, cladding, coolant, and a structure node. 
The equations for average fuel (Ty), average cladding (%)), coolant core exit [Tex) 
and average structure temperature {Ts) for a particular box are 
= (crA)i(ry: - T,) - (t7A)2 (T, - (9.2) 
= (WC)jv„(r„. - Tex) + (£7.4)2 (r, - _ 
where the subscript indicating the particular box in consideration has been retained 
only in the fuel equation for the power term. In the above equations UA^ are 
the overall heat transfer coefficients in units of W/®C, is the coolant inlet 
temperature and Tp is the pool temperature. 
For each box modeled, this set of four equations is solved. The various heat 
transfer coefficients are evaluated in a different subroutine (subroutine CORTHO) for 
each time step. This routine also contains the various material property functions 
used. Apart from the values of the variables at a previous time step, this module 
r e q u i r e s  t h e  f l o w  r a t e  ( W ) ,  c o o l a n t  i n l e t  t e m p e r a t u r e  ( T ^ j ) ,  p o o l  t e m p e r a t u r e  { T p ) ,  
and power generated (Pj) to be known at the current integration step. 
Reactor averaged temperatures are obtained by mass weighting for fuel, cladding 
= P i - { U A ) i { T f - T i )  (9.1) 
Ts - {UA)^iTs - Tp) (9.4) 
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and structure nodes, and by flow rate weighting for coolant temperatures. 
The macros to define and generate the subroutine are included in the level 
zero library. This module requires the use of another level 0 library module for the 
computation of reactivity feedbacks. 
In order to obtain a uniform core exit temperature at steady state from all 
the boxes modeled another subroutine is used in order to determine the orificing 
required for each core box. This subroutine first adjusts the flow rates for each box 
so that the core exit temperatures are uniform, then by using the hydraulic pipe 
definitions for the active and the inactive core segments adjusts the loss coefficients 
in order to obtain a uniform pressure drop. 
9.1.2 Pool Model 
The pool model contains a fiuid node only. The thermal interaction between 
the pool and the vessel has been neglected. It is assumed that the pool is at a 
uniform temperature. The equation for the fluid temperature in the pool is 
pVCp^ = E ^ inCpTin -  E 'fexCpTp -Qr + QH (9-S) 
where 'in' and 'eœ' refers to inlet from the pool and exit from the pool. Qis the 
heat removed per unit time due to the vessel cooling by natural convection. It was 
assumed to be a linear function of the pool temperature. Qjj is the heat generated 
in the pool per unit time. This term was included in order to account for the heat 
generated due the pumps and the heat transfer between the structural components 
of the core and pool. 
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9.1.3 Inlet Plenum Model 
This model is the mixing plenum model of DSNP. It contains a fluid and a 
structure node. The governing equations are 
= ZWinCpTi,,--£We:,CpTp-UA{Tc-Ts) (9.6) 
= UA(T^-Ts)  (9.7) 
where 'in' and 'ea:' refer to the inlet and exit conditions to and from the plenum. 
Tc denotes the average sodium temperature in the inlet plenum and Ts refers to the 
average temperature of the structural materials in the plenum. The heat transfer 
coefficient UA was computed by assuming natural convection and was kept constant 
throughout the simulations. 
9.1.4 Pipe Thermodynamics 
The pipes to and from the intermediate heat exchangeres and the inactive core 
was modeled as fluid flowing in insulated pipes. The energy equation for the liquid 
flowing in the pipe and for the pipe wall can be expressed as 
= I 
where x is parallel to the direction of the flow and y is normal to the direction of 
the flow. These equations are cast into flnite difference form by dividing the length 
of the pipe into n segments and integrating over the pipe cross sectional area. A 
backward difference for the convective term is used. For a node j, this gives 
dTi 
(9.10) 
161 
(9.11) 
where W is the mass flow rate of the coolant and the { U A ) j  is the heat transfer 
coefficient for the segment. This results in 2n differential equations. Typically 
5 nodes were used. If the pipe cross sectional area is not circular the equivalent 
diameter concept is used. This module was named THPSN and added to DSNP's 
library 3 and the macro definition for this module was added to the level 1 library. 
It is considerably faster than DSNP's level 1 thermal pipe module. 
9.1.5 Intermediate Heat Exchanger Model 
The IHX conditions were computed by using DSNP's GIHX module. This 
module is based on the assumption that the heat flux distribution along the length 
of the IHX during a transient will remain the same as the steady state heat flux 
distribution. This approximation is referred as the Addington approximation. 
9.1.6 Neutronics Modules 
The modules consist of subroutines to compute the fission power, power gen­
erated due to decay of fission fragments, total reactor power, feedback and external 
reactivity. 
Fission Power; The power from fission is computed by using point kinetics 
equations with six group delayed neutron groups. The equations solved are 
(9.12) 
^ = ^Pf-XiCi i = l, . . . , 6  (9.13) 
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where /3^'s are the delayed neutron fractions, /3 is the total delayed neutron fraction, 
Cj's are the delayed neutron precursor concentrations with decay constants A^, £ is 
the prompt neutron lifetime, p is the net reactivity. These equations were solved by 
DSNP's NEUTRl module. This module is based on a pre-integrated form of the 
point-kinetics equations and is considerably faster than other numerical methods. 
For accidents during which the fission power decreases to very small values for 
example below 0.0001 of its initial value, this modules must either bypassed or the 
error criteria for the integration needs to be reduced in magnitude. Otherwise, either 
a large reduction in time step occurs increasing the computation time considerably 
or oscillatory results for fission power are obtained. 
Reactivity: The net reactivity is the sum of the feedback reactivity and the 
externally input reactivity. The external reactivity has to be specified. External 
reactivity can be specified through the CNTRLl module. It is also possible to 
specify the external reactivity in the DERIVI module. 
The feedback reactivity mechanisms considered are Doppler, fuel expansion, 
sodium expansion, and structure (grid plate and clad) expansion. The feedback 
reactivity for a particular box is computed by 
Fuel Expansion : 
Doppler : (9.14) 
(9.15) 
Structure Expansion : = ag^{Tca — Tca(O)) (9.16) 
Coolant Expansion ; PNa~ a!jy^(Tca - 2ca(0)) (9.17) 
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and net feedback reactivity for this box is given by 
P i =  P d p  +  P f e + P s t + P N a  ( 9 . 1 8 )  
In the above equations, the temperatures are the average temperatures in that box 
and a zero in parenthesis indicates the temperature at the steady state conditions. 
In order to obtain the net feedback reactivity for the whole reactor core the 
following equation is used [73]; 
p f d  = (9-19) 
where and the Vj represent the fraction of the power and the fraction of the 
volume contained in the region in consideration. 
Finedly, the net reactivity is computed by adding the net feedback and if there 
is any, the externally introduced reactivity. The final value computed is used in the 
calculation of the fission power in the point kinetics equation. 
Dceay Power: The decay heat is computed by using DSNP's GAMARl mod­
ule. This module solves 
dPdi 
=  î  =  1 , - - M 4  ( 9 . 2 0 )  
where f^ ^  is the fraction of the decay heat produced by the i'th group, 0^ ^ is 
fraction of the fission products produced by the i'th group, and ^ are the disin­
tegration constants, Pjyj is the normalized fission power. The total decay heat is 
computed by using 
4 
^DH = ^ DHO Z Pd,i (9-21) 
1=1 
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where Pd j j q  is the initial power produced due to decay heat. 
9.1.7 Fluid Flow Modeling 
The flow rates through various components were modeled within the framework 
of several DSNP modules with certain modifications. In general the rate of change 
of mass flow rate in units of (kg/s) is given by; 
^ (9,22) 
where and Pout the inlet and outlet pressures at the end points of the flow 
path, AP is the pressure drop along the flow path, and I is the inertia of the fluid 
contained in the flow path. The pressure unit is Pascals and the inertia is in units 
of inverse meters. 
The pressure drop along the flow path is computed by DSNP's DELPF function 
which uses 
' ^^t)Pav9 - (^ + ^ ) (^) 2^} . - (9-23) 
where and Z — out are the inlet and outlet elevations, pav is the average 
density in the flow segment, g is the acceleration of gravity, I is the length of 
the segment, ay is the flow area, / is the friction factor, K is the loss coefficient 
including acceleration,losses, W is the flow rate, and Afp is the pressure change 
across the pump. The first term is the driving force for the natural circulation 
flow. This term needs to be computed as an integral along the flow path in order 
to account for the shift in the thermal centers when a loss of flow accident occurs; 
however such a modification required extensive changes in the flow modules of DSNP 
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and was not attempted. Using the density obtained from the average temperature 
underestimates the driving force for the natural convection, particularly in the IHX 
during LOF accidents. 
The pump head was computed by using the pump model of reference 168]. 
Detailed description of the model and the flow chart of the subroutine written can 
be found in the same reference. The subroutine written was added to the level 
1 library under the name of HOMPUl. In most of the simulations performed, 
instead of solving the angular speed of the pump the angular speed of the pump 
was specified as a function of time. 
Figure 4.2 gives a schematic of the flow chart for the hydraulic part of the 
simulation. Only one of the loops is simulated and the other loop conditions are 
assumed to be the same as the simulated loop conditions. 
The core was modeled as parallel channels. The loss of coefficients of each 
individual channel was computed by assuming that the flow rates were such that 
the core exit temperatures and the pressure drop across each of the channels are 
uniform. This computation was performed by CORIF module and is in the level 0 
library, that is it needs to be included in the DSNP input program. 
The pool was modeled as an open cavity subject to an atmospheric cover pres­
sure at the top surface. DSNP's HCVTl module was used for this purpose. 
The core inlet plenum conditions were computed as a hydraulic junction. DSNP's 
hydraulic junction module can not handle multiple exit junctions; therefore it was 
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not used. The junction pressure was computed by 
(9.24) 
i=l 'IHX 
where 
/ N B O X  -1 
\ i=i Wc,z ^IHX, 
Iw • — i'^^ertia of fluid in i th core channel 
' c,I 
I\y = inertia of fluid in the IHX loop 
1 tl -»1 
Pw • — Pressure drop across the i th channel 
* c,I 
^WijjY ~ Preaawre drop in the IHX loop 
Pjj = hydrostatic pressure in the pool at the core exit 
Pj^ = hydrostatic pressure in the pool at the pump inlet (9.25) 
The pool pressures are assumed to be hydrostatic and are given by 
Pj (2m) X ^9.81-2^ Pi^pooÙ ^atmos 
s 
m 
Pu = (13m) X (^9.81^ j PiTpool)  + ^ atmos 
Note that this model does not force the IHX flow rate to be equal to half of 
the core flow rate since both flows are separated by the pool which is simulated as 
an open tank. This was done in order to be able to simulate pipe break accidents 
or asymmetric accidents during which the two loops behave differently. 
The initial condition computations require a convergence on the flow rates so 
that the right hand side of Eq. (9.22) is less than a specified error criterion. The 
iteration scheme of DSNP was very slow, so a different iteration scheme based on 
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quadratic interpolation for the last three iterations was programmed and added to 
level 3 library under the name of GUESS3 to be used with the flow modules. 
168 
9.2 Input Listing for DSNP 
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c -
C COMMON BLOCKS 
C MAINF5 : FUEL CONDUCTIVITY PARAMETERS 
C MAING5 : CORE BOX AND FUEL PIN GEOMETRIC PARAMETERS 
C C0RIF5 : LOSS COEFFICIENTS FOR HYDRAULIC PIPE SEGMENTS 
C VALVK(I) ARE COMPUTED IN SUBROUTINE CORORO 
C MAINP5 ; SOME DATA TO BE USED IN DERIVI AND OTHER ROUTINES 
C POMPAS : PRIMARY PUMP PARAMETERS ; COMPUTED IN THE INITIAL SEGMENTS 
C 
• COMON /MAINF5/A(10),B( 10),C(10),P(10),BECNS(10); 
• COMON /MAINGS/DEQ(10),AFLOW(10),XL,RCO,RCI,RF,POD,NPIN(10) ; 
.COMON /NIYAZ5/PAR(10); 
.COMON /C0RIF5/VALVK(10),VALVL.VALVU,VALVS,VALV6,VALV7,TPIP02; 
.COMON /MAINP5/TECXU1,TECXU2,PRESL,PRESU,ZINCOR,ZINIHX,ZINLPE,ZPLOWP; 
• COMON /POMPAS/ZHRPU(1),ZFLOR( 1),ZTORPR(1),ZREVR(1),ZREV(1),ZHEAD(1). 
PUMPTC; 
C 
C FOLLOWING SEGMENT INCLUDES THE PUMP SUBROUTINE 
C THIS SHOULD BE USED FOR CALCULATIONS WITH THE 
C PUMP SPEED SPECIFIED 
C - -
.INCLUDE H0MPU1; 
C---
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
C  T H E R M O D Y N A M I C S  
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
C--- THERMAL PIPE SEGMENTS 
C MACRO DEFTHPSN3 IS LISTED AT THE END OF THE LISTING OF THE INPUT 
C DEFINITON OF THE PARAMETERS ARE GIVEN THERE 
C N : UPPER PLENUM PIPE 
C S : LOWER PLENUM PIPE 
C A,B : TIME DELAY PIPES 
C 
.DEFTHPSN3(5. SO. SS,0. 400,0.OSDO,6.000,ZTPFU,TEAPI, FPAI ) ; 
.DEFTHPSS3(5,SO.SS,0.400,0.OSDO,19.0000,TEAPX,TPIP02,FPAI ) ; 
.DEFTHPSA3(5,SO.SS,0.400,0.OSDO. 6.ODO,ZTPFU.TEAPI,FPAI); 
.DEFTHPSB3(S,SO.SS,0.400,0.OSDO,19.ODOO.TEAPX,TPIP02,FPAI ); 
DESTROY; 
C 
C DEFINITION OF THE IHX 
C SEE DSNP USERS MANUAL FOR USAGE 
C 
. DFGIHXMA1(10,3500.1.4.SO,SO,SS,6.ODOO,7.5000,1.17D-02,1.270-02, 
O.ODO,1.00-01,1.00-03,15.15,1,1,1.1100,1.000,0.000,0.000); 
.DESTROY; 
C -
C POOL MODEL 
C AFTER THE FORTRAN PROGRAM IS OBTAINED THE FOLLOWING CHANGES 
C SHOULD BE MADE : 
C 1. THE ARGUMENTS OF THE 'CALL' STATEMENTS TO SS SPECIFIC 
C HEAT. DENSITY AND THE THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY INCLUDE 
C PRESSURE AS A PARAMETER. THIS SHOULD BE REMOVED. SINCE 
C IN THE LIBRARIES THIS SUBRUTINES DO NOT HAVE PRESSURE 
C AS AN ARGUMENT. 
C 2. INCLUDE THE HEAT REMOVED BY THE VESSEL COOLING SYSTEM 
C IN THE FORM 
C QVCS = AVCS * ZTPFU - BVCS 
C ALSO INCLUDE OTHER HEAT SOURCE OR SINKS IN A SIMILAR 
C MANNER TO THE DIFFRENTIAL EQUATION CORRESPONDING TO 
C ZTPFU (POOL TEMPERATURE). 
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c 3. SET THE RIGHT HAND SIDE OF THE DIFFERENTIAL EQUATION FOR 
C FOR THE TEMPERATURE OF THE METAL NODE TO ZERO 
C SO THAT THE METAL NODE TEMPERATURE IS NOT COMPUTED 
CM ! ! ! NOTE THAT THE IN THE USERS MANUAL ONE OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THIS 
C DEFINITION MACRO IS NOT INCLUDED. 
C THE CORRECT FORM SHOULD AS BE BELOW; SEE ALSO THE LISTING OF 
C LIBRARY 1 FOR YHIS MACRO. 
C 
.DFMXPLENU(SO,SS,1.2417003,7.9005,518.036D03, 
INFLO(WCOREN(1),TECXN(1),WCOREN(2),TECXNt 2)), 
EXFLO(FPAI,ZTPFU,FPAI,ZTPFU),PRESU, 
C0RCN5,IHXMA5,MAINP5); C 
C INLET PLENUM MODEL 
C MODIFICATION 1 OF THE POOL MODEL SHOULD ALSO BE DONE HERE 
C 
.DFMXPLENLCSO,SS,2.0475,877.500,1.335003, 
INFL0(FPAI,TPIP02,FPAI,TPIP02), 
EXFLO(WCOREN(11,TECIN(1),WC0REN(2),TECIN(2)), 
PRESL,C0RCN5,IHXMAS.MAINP5): 
.DESTROY; 
C 
C THE FOLLOWING TWO MACROS ARE LIBRARY ZERO MACROS; THAT IS 
C ARE NOT IN THE ORIGINAL DSNP LIBRARIES BUT SHOULD BE 
C INCLUDED WITH THE INPUT. 
C IT DEFINES THE CORE MODEL USED FOR MODELLING THE TRENCH REACTOR 
C SEE THE LISTING IN THE LIBRARY ZERO SEGMENT 
C DFCORBO(N) : DEFINES THAT TWO CORE BOXES ARE GOING TO USED 
C DFFDBKO(N) : DEFINES THE APPROIATE FEEDBACK REACTIVITY CALCULATION 
C 
.DFCORBO(2); 
.DFFDBK0(2); 
.DESTROY : 
C 
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
C  H Y D R O D Y N A M I C S  
C PIPE AND FLOW PATH DEFINITIONS 
= = = = = === = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
C 
C DEFHPIPH(ZW ,TIN ,TEX 
C ZXHI ,ZXHX ,ZXLP ,ZXLE 
C ZXDE ,ZAFL ,SO ,PRESRE,COMBLK,-1.0,VALV1); 
C 
C PIPE LOCATION 
C 1 ACTIVE CORE CENTERAL 3 BOXES 
C 2 ACTIVE CORE SIDE 2 BOXES 
C 3 INACTIVE CORE CENTER BOXES 
C 4 INACTIVE CORE SIDE BOXES 
C 5 POOL PIPE FROM PUMP TO IHX 
C 6 IHX TUBE SIDE 
C 7 PIPE FROM IHX TO LOWER PLENUM 
C 
CM!!!!! NOTE THAT THE ORDERING OF THE PIPE SEGMENTS REPRESENTING 
C THE CORE ARE IN THE ORDER REQUESTED BY THE ORIFICING ROUTINE 
C SUBROUTINE CORORO 
C 
. DEFHPIP01(WC0REN(1),TECIN(1) ,TECXN(1) , 
1.5D00 ,3.2D00 ,1.700 ,1.700 
3.120-03 ,0.45000 ,SO ,PAVR1 .CORCNS,-1.0,VALVK(1) ) ; 
. 0EFHPIP02(WC0REN(2),TECIN(2) ,TECXN(2) , 
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1.5000 ,3,2000 .1.7000 ,1.700 
3.1200-03 .0.3000 ,SO ,PAVR1 ,C0RIF5,-1.0,VALVK(2) 
DEFHPIP03(WCOREN(1),TECXN(1) ,TECXN(1), 
3.200 ,6.000 ,2.800 
3.120-03 ,0.45000 .SO ,PAVR1 
0EFHPIP04(WCORENC 2).TECXN(2) ,TECXN(2). 
, 2 . 8 0 0  
.MAINPS.-I.O.VALVU); 
3.200 ,6.000 .2.800 .2.800 
3.120-03 .0.30 .SO .PAVR1 .* .-1.0.VALVU): 
DEFHPIP05(FPAI ,ZTPFU .TEAPI , 
1.5001 ,1.5001 .6.000 .7.000 
0.800 ,0.502600 ,S0 .PAVRI ,MXPLUS,-1.0,VALV5): 
DEFHPIP06(FPAI ,TEAPI .TEAPX . 
1.5001 ,7.5000 ,7.5000 ,8.000 
2.340-02 ,1.161000 ,S0 ,PAVRI .IHXMA5.-1.0.VALV6); 
DEFHPIP07(FPAI ,TEAPX ,TP1P02. 
7.500 .1.500 ,19.000 .22.000 
0.800 .0.502600 .SO ,PAVRI ,THPSS5.-1.0,VALV7): 
C-
C 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
C - -
C OFPUMPOKZHRPU .ZHRZF .ZREVR .ZPPIN .ZTORPR ,ZFLO .ZFLOR. 
C ZIPUMP.ZPU1.ZPU2.ZREV,ZTEPIN. ZPUMAT.KITMX.COMBUCK) 
C 
c 
c 
c 
C -
.DFL0W01(WC0REN( 1)) = (2860.000.PL.PU,20.PIPES(01,03),PUMPS(*)) ; 
.DFL0W02(WCOREN(2))=(1590.000,PL.PU.20,PIPES(02.04),PUMPS(*)); 
.DFL0W03(FPAI) = (2200.000,PIA.PL,20,PIPES(05.06,07),PUMPS(*)) ; 
C 
C HYDRAULIC CAVITY MODEL: NO CHANGES 
C COMPUTED PARAMETRS ARE THE PRESSURES 
C PU=PUU; PIA=PIB=PI 
C 101.303 IS THE ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE IN PASCALS 
C 
.OFCAVTOK17.000,101.303.ZTPFU.73.000.INFLO(01.6.000.PU,02.6.000,PUU), 
EXFL0(O3.15.000.PIA,03.15.000.PIB). 
PIPES(01,02,03.04.05,06,07),1.496003,SO) : 
.DESTROY ; 
THE FOLLOWING DEFINITION MACRO SHOULD BE INCLUDED 
IF THE DYNAMIC EQUATION FOR THE PUMP IS TO BE SOLVED 
RATHER THAN SPECIFYING THE PUMP SPEED AS A FUNCTION OF TIME. 
IF THE FOLLOWING MACRO IS INCLUDED DELETE THE LINE ON THE 
BEGINING OF THIS FILE THAT SAYS " .INCLUDE H0MPU1". 
SEE DSNP MANUAL FOR DETAILS OF THIS MACRO. 
IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE PUMP DEFINITION PARAMETERS BE INCLUDED 
IN THE ITERATION LOOPS IN THE INITIAL SEGMENTS. 
FLOW DEFINITION 
IF THE PUMP DYNAMICS IS SOLVED CHANGE THE "PUMP(*)" PART OF THE 
THIRD DEFINTION TO "PUMP(X)" WHERE X IS THE NAME OF THE PUMP 
C THE FOLLOWING MEANS: PI=PIB 
C 
.CNCTUU(PI,PIB) : 
C c == = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
I N I T I A L  C O N D I T I O N  C A L C U L A T I O N  
MODULE PURPOSE 
EXTERNALLY INSETED REACTIVITY 
COMPUTES THE FEEDBACK REACTIVITY 
POINT KINETICS EQAUTIONS AND FISSION POWER 
DECAY HEAT EQUATIONS 
CNTRL1 
FED8K0 
NEUTS1 
GAMAR1 
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C TP0WR1 ; ; REACTOR TOTAL THERMAL POWER 
c CORORO : : ORIFICING ROUTINE 
c CAVTOI ; : POOL HYDRAULICS 
c FL0W01 ; ; CENTRAL BOXES FLOW (WCORENd)) 
c FL0W02 : : EDGE BOXES FLOW (WC0REN(2)) 
c FL0W03 : 1 IHX FLOW (FPAI) 
c 
c 
CTISUO ; : CORE 
BEGIN AT O.ODO 
PUMPTC=10.000 
ZPTRIP=1.000 
ZTPFU=485.0 
ZLATSA=420.0 
TEAPX=343.0DO 
1 CONTINUE 
.CNTRLI; FEDBKO; NEUTS1; GAMAR1; TP0WR1; 
TECXRF = ZTPFU 
CALL CQRORO(LOOP,TECXRF,TAMB,QAMB,VALVL.VALVK,VALVU) 
FPAI = (WCORENC1)+WC0REN(2))/2.0D0 
•CAVTOI; CNCTUU: 
C 
C ESTIMATE THE CORE PRESSURE DROP 
C 
K = 1 
COROLP= OPHPIK K ,WCOREN(K),TECAN(K),PAVR1,X,VALVK{K) ) + 
C OPHPI1((K+NOCNS),WCOREN(K),TECXN(K),PAVR1,X,VALVU) 
C 
C PRESSURE IN PIPES 5,6.7 
C 
OLPLOP= OPHPIK S ,FPAI,ZTPFU ,PAVR1,X,VALV5)+ 
C OPHPIK 6 ,FPAI,ZLATSA,PAVR1,X,VALV6)+ 
C OPHPIK 7 ,FPAI,TEAPX ,PAVR1,X,VALV7) 
C 
C LOWER PLENUM PRESSURE PU-COROLP=PL 
C PUMP HEAD (PA) PL=PI + OLPLOP + PUMP 
C PUMP = PL - PI - OLPLOP 
C = PU - COROLP - PI - OLPLOP 
C 
PL = PU - COROLP 
PUM= PL - PI - OLPLOP 
C 
C PUMP CHARACTERISTICS 
C 
CALL SOOENKZTPFU.ROPU.PRAVI ) 
HEAD = PUM/R0PU/ZZZ981 
PQPM = FPAI/ROPU 
PPNS = DSQRT(PQPM)/(OSQRT(DSQRT(HEAD)))* * 3 
PPNR = 3S.0/PPNS 
ZHRPUd) = HEAD 
ZREVRd) = PPNR * ZZZ314/30.000 
ZFLOR(I) = FPAI 
ZTORPR(I) = PQPM * PUM / ZREVRd) 
ZREVd) = ZREVRd) 
.FL0W01: FL0W02; FL0WO3; 
C 
C LOWER PLENUM CONDITIONS TO BE USED LATER 
C -
ZINCOR =1.000/(1.OOO/ZINERF d) +1.ODO/ZINERF(2)) 
ZINIHX =1.000/(1.ODO/ZINERF(31) 
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ZINLPE= 1.0D0/( 1.ODO/ZINERF(1) + 1.0D0/2INERF(2) + 
C 1.ODO/Z1NERF(3) + 1.ODO/ZINERF(3) ) 
ZPLOWP =ZINLPE«( (PU-ZDPFL(1))/ZINERF(1) + 
C (PU-ZDPFL(2))/ZINERF(2) + 
C (PI+ZDPFL(3))/ZINERF(3) + 
C (PI+ZDPFL(3))/ZINERF(3) ) 
PRESL = ZPLOWP 
PRESU = PU 
C 
ERROR = ( WCOREN(1)+WC0REN(2) - 2.0*FPAI ) / FPAI 
ERROR = DABS(ERROR) 
IF(ERROR.GT.1.00-3) GO T01 
C FLOW ITERATION END HERE 
•CTISUG: MXPLENU; ;THPSN3; IHXGA1; THPSS3: MXPLENL; 
.CONVERGR(TEAPX,1.OD-3.1,20.P); 
.CONVERGR(ZTPFU,1.00-3,1,20,P): 
C TEMPERATURE ITERATION ENDS HERE 
C INITIAL CONDITIONS END HERE C = = = = = === = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
C  S I M U L A T I O N  S T A R T S  H E R E  C = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = 
C THERE ARE FOUR LOOPS 
C THE FORMAT IS; SIMULATE LOOP# METHOD 
C NOINT MEANS DO NOT CALL AN INTEGRATOR; 
C NEUTS1 HAS ITS OWN INTEGRATOR. 
C 
SIMULATE L00P01 NOINT1 
.CNTRL1: FEDBKO: NEUTSI; 
SIMULATE L00PO2 STIFF 1 
.GAMAR1; 
.TP0WR1: 
.MXPLENL; 
DO 333 IC0RE=1,NOONS 
CALL CORTHO(DEQ(ICORE),AFLOW(ICORE),NPIN(ICORE),XL,RCO, 
C RCI.RF,POD.ICORE) 
333 CONTINUE 
.CTISUO: 
.MXPLENU; 
SIMULATE L0OPO3 SIMPS1; 
. THPSN3: 
. IHXGA1; 
. THPSS3; 
SIMULATE L00P04 ADAMS1 
. CAVT01; 
. CNCTUU; 
ZPLOWP =ZINLPE*( (PU-ZDPFL(1) )/ZINERF( 1 ) + 
C (PU-ZDPFL(2))/ZINERF(2) + 
C (PI+ZDPFL(3))/ZINERF(3) + 
C (PI+ZDPFL(3))/ZINERF(3) ) 
PL = ZPLOWP 
C 
C THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW TO INCLUDE THE TRANSIENTS 
C ANY LEGAL FORTRAN STATEMENT WILL WORK 
C THE EASIEST APPROACH IS TO CHANGE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS 
C ACCORDING TO THE TRANSIENT BEING SIMULATED 
C RATHER THAN GENERATE A DIFFERENT DSNP PROGRAM FOR 
C EACH CASE. 
C THIS WORKS AS LONG AS THE NUMBER OF DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS ARE 
C NOT CHANGED. 
C THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT STARTS A LOSS OF HEAT SINK ACCIDENT 
174 
c 
c 
FOR A LOSS OF FLOW: HAVE ZREV(1) = ZREVR{1)/(1+TIME/PUMTC) 
THESE STATEMENTS WILL APPEAR IN SUBROUTINE DERIV1 
IFITIME.GT.ZZZI) THEN 
FHAI = 0.18 
ENDIF 
FL0WO1 
FL0WO2 
FL0WO3 
END OF SIMULATION C C ====== ========= 
TERMINATE AT 1000.0 
PRINTING 
'LOSS OF HEAT SINK DEC-10 ' 
ZWTHMW,PWO,WGT, 
REAK,RKD.RKS.RKCE,RKFE. 
RKFBN(1-2).RKDN(1-2),RKSN{1-2),RKCEN(1-2),RKFEN(1-2), 
WCOREN(1).WCOREN(2),FPAI,FHAI,ZDPFLf1-3),ZREV{1),ZHEAO(1), 
ZDPH(1-7), 
ZEGXC,ZEGXCN(1-2), 
TECI,TECX,TECA,TELA.TEFA. 
TECXN(1-2),TEFAN(1-2),TELAN(1-2),TECAN(1-2), 
TECXU1,TECXU2, 
ZTPFU,ZTPMU,TEAPI,TEAPX,ZLATHA,TEAHI,TEAHX,ZLATSA, 
ZROPXA,ZROHXA,ZEGIIA,ZEGIXA, 
TEAH(1-10),TEAW(1-10),TEAP(1-10), 
ZTPFL.ZTPML.ZTMLA 
BY 0.25 TO 1.0 BY 0.5 TO 10.0 BY 2.5 TO 100.0 BY 5.0 TO 800.0 
TEST FOR CORE ORIFICING AND HEAT TRANSFER MODULES 
DATA STATEMENTS 
DATA(CORIF) = VALVL/1.000/,VALVU/O.500/, 
VALVS/1.ODO/,VALV6/1.5/,VALV7/2.5/; 
DATA(FDBEK) = RKDC/-4.0890-03/, 
RKFEC/-3.6D-06/, 
RKSC/6.400-06/, 
RKVC/O.ODO/, 
RKCEC/-10.40-06/; 
DATA(GAMAR) = BGM/2.7D-01,2.1D-01,1.60-01,3.60-01,0.000/, 
GAM/1.00-05,3.00-03,1.OD-02,4.00-02,0.000/. 
lGAM/4/, 
GA/5.00-01/, 
WGTO/56.0006/; 
DATA(TIMER) = LETM/2/, OTMAX/0.0500/, DTMIN/1.00-07/, OELT/5.00-03/, 
TICPU/43.20003/; 
DATA(TPOWR) = PWO/744.0006/ ; 
DATA(NEUTR) = BETA/0.1286000-4,0.9475800-4,0.7309900-4,0.1110020-3, 
0.3485740-4,0.1184480-4/, 
PNO/1.000/ , 
EPSN1/1.00-04/,EPSN2/1.00-03/, 
EL/0.10040020-6/, 
ELAMOA/ 0.0129,0.0311,0.1340,0.3310,1.2600,3.2100/; 
DATA(CORTP) = CF/144.8/, CL/502.4/,QNF/45.0003/,QML/7.885003/, 
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VC/2.5051900/, ULA/32.6619009/,UCA/98.1434006/, 
TECAO/343.3/, TECA/343.3/ZPCORA/1.5006/, 
2FLCOR/4400.000/ ; 
DATA(CORCN) = TECIN/2«343.300/, 
CFN/2*144.8/, 
QMFN/27.397003,18.2648003/, 
CLN/564.32,584.32/, 
QMLN/3.8098003,2.54003/, 
QMWLN/7.3328003,1.2221003/, 
CWN/564.32,564.32/, 
UCWN/5#0.0D0/, 
UWPN/5«0.000/, 
VCN/0.765,0.510/, 
ULAN/S*7.S006/, 
UCAN/S*20.0006/, 
FPWR/0.715,0.285/, 
VPWR/0.600,0.400/, 
WCOREN/3.1460003,1.2540003/, 
NOCNS/2/: 
DATA(NIYAZ)= PAR(1)/6.00-03/, 
PAR(2)/0.50-01/, 
PAR(3)/13.00-06/, 
PAR(4)/0.0D0/, 
PAR(5)/0.0D0/, 
PAR(6)/0.000/, 
PAR(7)/0.000/, 
PAR(8)/0.0/: 
DATA(MA:NF)= A/2*7.19570-00/, 
B/2»14.7110-03/, 
0/2*6.88540-03/, 
P/2*0.0D0/, 
BECNS/2»0.2500/; 
0ATA(MAING)= DEQ/2»3.120-3/, 
AFL0W/0.4S,0.30/. 
XL/1.700/, 
RCO/6.00-3/, 
RCI/5.430-3/, 
RF/4.840-3/, 
POO/1.08300/, 
NPIN/13860,9240/; 
OATAfIHXMA)= TEAHI/293.000/,FHAI/1800.000/,TEAHX/463.5/, 
TEAPI/485.000/,FPAI/2200.000/,ZLATHA/420.000/; 
OATA(MXPLU)= ZTPFU/485.000/: 
OATA(MXPLL)= ZTPFL/343.000/: 
G END 0 = = = = = = = = = =  = = = = = =  
FORTRAN 
SUBROUTINE CORORO(LOOP,TECXRF,TAMB,QAMB,VALVL,VALVN,VALVU) 
IMPLICIT REAL«8(A-H,0-Z) 
DIMENSION GW(3,10),FW(3,10),POROPS(10),IOKEY(10),INEW(10), 
C GV(10),FV(10).VALVN(10) 
COMIN CORTPS,C0RCN5,MAINF5,HPIPE5,MAING5; 
C FIND CORE FLOW RATES SO THAT TECX ARE SAME 
C ASSUMES THAT CORE CHANNELS ARE REPRESENTED BY 
C K AND K+NOCNS 'TH HYDRAULIC PIPES,AND K STARTS 
C FROM 1 
C MAINF5 CONTAINS FUEL CONDUCTIVITY EQAUTION PARS 
C MAING5 CONTAINS CHANNEL GEOMETRY PARS 
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C CORTHO(DEQ,AFLOW,NPIN,XL,RCO,RCI.RF,POD,N) 
C /MAINGS/DEQ(K),AFLOW(K),XL,RCO.RCI,RCF,POD,NPIN(K ) 
MAXIT=100 
DO 100 1=1.NOCNS 
lOKEYd )=0 
WCOREN(I)=ZFLCOR/NOCNS 
100 CONTINUE 
DO 110 1=1,NOCNS 
GW(1.I)=0.8*WC0REN(I) 
GW(2,I)=1.0*WC0REN(I) 
GW(3,I)=1.2*WC0REN(I) 
110 CONTINUE 
DO 140 1=1,3 
DO 120 K=1,NOCNS 
WCOREN(K)=GW{I,K) 
CALL CORTHO(DEQ(K),AFLOW(K),NPIN(K),XL,RCO,RCI,RF,POD,K) 
120 CONTINUE 
CALL CORFBO(LOOP,TAMB,QAMB) 
DO 130 K=1,NOCNS 
FW(I,K)=TECXRF-TECXN(K) 
130 CONTINUE 
140 CONTINUE 
DO 180 ITER=1,MAXIT 
DO 150 K=1,NOCNS 
IF(IOKEY(K).EQ.1) GO TO 150 
CALL CORTHO(DEQ(K),AFLOW(K).NPIN(K),XL,RCO,RCI,RF,POD,K) 
CALL GUESS3(FW(1.K),GW(1,K).GNEW,INEWtK),DERR.DERA) 
IFCDERR.LT.1.0D-S) THEN 
WCOREN(K)=GNEW 
I0KEY(K)=1 
ELSE 
GW(INEW(K),K)=GNEW 
WCOREN(K)=GNEW 
I0KEY(K)=O 
ENDIF 
150 CONTINUE 
CALL CORFBO(LOOP,TAMB,QAMB) 
00 160 K=1,NOCNS 
FW(INEW(K),K)=TECXRF-TECXN(K) 
160 CONTINUE 
MIN=1 
DO 170 K=1,NOCNS 
MIN=IOKEY(K)*MIN 
170 CONTINUE 
IF(MIN.EQ.I) GO TO 200 
180 CONTINUE 
200 CONTINUE 
PMAX=0.000 
DO 210 K=1,NOCNS 
PDR0PS(K)=DPHPI1( K ,WCOREN(K),TECAN(K),PAVR1,X,VALVL)+ 
C DPHPIK(K+NOCNS),WCOREN(K),TECXN(K),PAVR1,X,VALVU) 
IF(DABS(PDROPS(K)).GT.PMAX) THEN 
PMAX=DABS(PDROPS(K)) 
IMPD=K 
ENDIF 
210 CONTINUE 
VALVN(IMPD)=VALVL 
DO 250 K=1,NOCNS 
IF(K.EQ.IMPD) GO TO 250 
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GV(1)=0.8*VALVL 
GV(2)=1.0*VALVL 
GV(3)=1.2*VALVL 
DO 220 1=1,3 
FV(I)=PMAX-
C DABS(DPHPI1( K ,WCOREN(K),TECAN(K),PAVR1,X,GV(I)))-
C DABS(DPHPI1((K+NOCNS),WCOREN(K),TECXN(K),PAVR1,X,VALVU)) 
220 CONTINUE 
DO 230 ITER=1,MAXIT 
CALL GUESS3(FV.GV,GNEW,IV,DERR.DERA) 
IF(DERR.LT.1.0D-S) GO TO 240 
GV(IV)=GNEW 
FV(IV)=PMAX -
C DABS(DPHPI1( K ,WCOREN(K),TECAN(K),PAVR1.X,GV(IV)))-
C DABS(DPHPI1((K+NOCNS),WCOREN(K),TECXN(K),PAVR1,X,VALVU )) 
230 CONTINUE 
WRITE(».«) ' DID NOT CONVERGE IN VALV COMP ' 
240 CONTINUE 
VALVN(K)=GNEW 
250 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE CORTHO(DEQ.AFLOW.NPIN,XL,RCO,RCI,RF,POD,N) 
IMPLICIT REAL»8(A-H,0-2) 
.COMIN CORCNS.MAINFS; 
C 
C STATEMENT FUNCTIONS FOR SODIUM PROPS 
C 
S0DEN(T)=9S0.076+T*(-0.2297+T*(-1.46049D-S+T*5.6377880-9)) 
S0C0N(T)=92.948+T*(-5.809D-2+T*1.17270-5) 
S0VIS(T)=0.001*10.0D0**(0.S108+220.6S/T-0.4925»DL0G10(T)) 
SOCPH(T)=1436.OS+T*(-0.5802+T*4.62S06D-4) 
FUELK(A,B,C,P,BETA,T)=A+T*(B+C*T)»(1.ODO-P)/(1.0D0+BETA*P) 
CDC0N(T)=11.S+0.013*T 
W =WCOREN(N) 
TNA=TECAN(N) 
TCL=TELAN(N) 
TFL=TEFAN(N) 
TDT=TCBWN(N) 
R11 = 1.0/FUELK(A(N),B(N),C(N),P(N),BECNS(N), (TFL+273. 15)) 
R12=DL0G(RCI/RF)/SOCON( (TFL+TCL)/2.ODO ) 
R13=DL0G( (RCO+RCI)/(2.ODO«RCI) )/CDCON(TCL) 
R1 = R11+R12+R13 
VIS=S0VIS(TNA+273.IS) 
REY= (W/AFLOW )*DE<J/VIS 
PRN= VIS*SOCPH(TNA)/SOCON{TNA) 
PEC= REY»PRN 
IF(P0D.LE.1.15) GO TO 1 
XNU=4.0+0.33*P0D**3.8+(PEC/100.ODO)**0.88+0.16*P0D**S 
GO TO 2 
1 XNU=(-18.15+24.96*POD-8.S5*POD«POD) 
IF(PEC.LE.150.000) GO TO 3 
XNU=XNU»PEC*»0.3 
GO TO 2 
2 XNU=XNU*4.496 
3 CONTINUE 
H=XNU*SOCON(TNA) /DEQ 
R2=DL0G( 2.000*RC0/(RCO+RCI))/CDCON(TCL) + 1.0DO/H/RCO 
UFT0C=6.28318530800 * XL /R1 * NPIN 
UCT0C=6.283185308D0 « XL /R2 * NPIN 
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ULAN(N)=UCTOC 
UCAN(N)=UFTOC 
RETURN 
END C======= MACROS ================== 
M <DFCORBO(#)>=<%D CORFBO>; 
M <DFFDBKO(#)>=<%D FDBEKO>; 
C======= LIBRARY ZERO ============= 
L 
«CORFBO 
M <0FC0RB0(#)>=<%Z21 %X0 %M<CTISUO>=<%%B CALL CORFBO(LOOP,TAMB,QAMB)>%E 
SUBROUTINE CORFBO(LOOP,TAMB,QAMB); 
. TICIL; CHRTR; COMIN TIMERS,DERIVE,TP0WR5,C0RTP5,GAMAR5.C0RCN5; 
. COMON /CORTPS/ TECA, TECAO, TECI, TECX, TEFA, TEFAO, TELA, TELAO, CF. 
. CL, QMF. QML. VC. ULA. UCA, ROCA. ZFLCOR.ZROCX,ZPCORA,ZEGXC. 
. ZTECBL,ZVOLFC,ZHCX,ZFLCRO; 
. COMON /C0RCN5/ TECAN(#01). TECA0N(#01). TECIN(#01).TECXN(#01), 
. TEFAN(#01).TEFA0N(#01). TELAN(#01), TELAONI#01), CFN(#01),CWN(#01), 
. CLN(#01), QMFN(#01). QMLN(#01), VCN(#01), ULAN(#01). UCAN(/i'01). 
. ROCAN(#01),FPWR(#01),WCOREN(#01),ZROCXN(#01),ZEGXCN(#01).VPWR(#01) 
. ,TCBWN(#01),TC8WN0(#01).QMWLN(#01),UCWN(#01),UWPN(#01).NOCNS; 
. DIMENSION TECAK10),TECX1(10),DTEFAN(10),DTELAN(10).DTECXN(10), 
. CCN(10),DTWALL(10); 
. LOGICAL LT.LFIRST; DATA TECA1,TECX1/20*0.DO/; 
. DATA LFIRST/.FALSE./; 
TASNA('CORFBO'); NOCNS=#01 ; 
IF(LFIRST) GO TO 1; 
LFIRST=.TRÛE. T 
DO 56 ICNS=1,NOCNS: 
56 IF(TECXN(ICNS).LT.TECIN(ICNS)) TECXN(ICNS)=TECIN(ICNS)+150.DO; 
1 CONTINUE: 
00 5656 ICNS=1,NOCNS; 
TECAN(ICNS)=(TECIN(ICNS)+TECXN(ICNS))/ZZZ2: 
LT=DABS(TECAN(ICNS)-TECA1(ICNS)).LT.ZZZ1 : 
2 IF(LT) GOTO 3; 
TECA1(ÏCNS)=TECAN(ICNS): 
CALL SODCP1(TECAN(ICNS),CCN(ICNS),ZPCORA): 
CALL S0DEN1(TECAN(ICNS),ROCAN(ICNS),ZPCORA): 
3 IF(dTIM.GT.O) GOTO 10: 
TECXN(ICNS)=TECIN(ICNS)+ 
FPWR(ICNS)«(PWd+WGT)/(WCOREN(ICNS)*CCN(ICNS)); 
TECAN(ICNS)=(TECIN(ICNS)+TECXN(ICNS))/ZZZ2: 
TECAON(ICNS)=TECAN(ICNS ) : 
TELAN(ICNS)=TECAN(ICNS)+FPWR(ICNS)*(PWd+WGT*(ZZZ1-GA))/ULAN(ICNS): 
TELAON(ICNS)=TELANfICNS): 
TEFAN(ICNS)=TELAN(ICNS)+FPWR(ICNS)*(PWd+WGT*(ZZZ1-GA))/UCAN(ICNS); 
TEFAON(ICNS)=TEFAN(ICNS); 
TCBWNO(ICNS)=TECAN(ICNS); 
ZEGXCN(ICNS)= WCOREN(ICNS)* CCN(ICNS)*(T ECXN(ICNS)-T ECIN(ICNS)); 
GO TO 80; 
10 CFMN=CFN(ICNS)*QMFN(ICNS); 
CLMN=CLN(ICNS)*QMLN(ICNS); 
CVRN=CCN(ICNS)« VCN(ICNS)* ROCAN(ICNS); 
CCBN=CWN(ICNS)*QMWLN(ICNS): 
ZEGXCN(ICNS)=WCOREN( ICNS)*CCN(ICNS)*(TECXN(ICNS)-TECIN(ICNS)); 
QAMB= UWPN(ICNS) * ( TCBWN(ICNS)-TAMB ); 
QWAL= UCWN(ICNS) * ( TECAN(ICNS)-TCBWN(ICNS) ): 
QCLA= ULAN(ICNS) * ( TELAN(ICNS)-TECAN(ICNS) ): 
QFCL= UCAN(ICNS) « ( TEFAN(ICNS)-TELAN(ICNS) ); 
DTECXN(ICNS)=( WGT»GA*FPWR(ICNS)-ZEGXCN(ICNS)+QCLA-QWAL)/CVRN; 
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DTELAN(ICNS)=( QFCL -QCLA )/CLMN; 
DTEFAN(ICNS)=( FPWR(ICNS)* (PWJ+WGT*(ZZZ1-GA))-QFCL)/CFMN; 
DTWALL(ICNS)=( QWAL - QAMB )/CCBN; 
80 IF(DABS(TECX1(ICNS)-TECXN(ICNS) ) .LT.ZZZ1)_G0_T0_5656; 
CALL SODENKTECXNdCNS),ZROCXNdCNS),ZPCORA); 
TECXK ICNS ) =TECXNdCNS ) ; 
. 5656 CONTINUE; 
IF(OTIM.GT.O) GO TO 5629; 
TEFAO=ZZZO; 
TELAO=ZZZO: 
TECAO=ZZZO: 
ZFLCRO=ZZZO; 
00 5628 ICNS=1.NOCNS; 
TEFAO=TEFAO+FPWR( ICNS) *TEFAONdCNS ) ; 
TELAO=TELAO+FPWR(ICNS)*TELAON(ICNS); 
TECAO=TECAO+FPWR(ICNS)*TECAON(ICNS); 
ZFLCRO=ZFLCRO+WCOREN(ICNS) ; 
. 5628 CONTINUE; 
ZFLCOR=ZFLCRO; 
G0_ TO 999 ; 
. 5629 CONTINUE; 
. VNTGRL(TEFAN(I)) = (TEFANd),DTEFANd),#01,I = 1,#01): 
. VNTGRL(TELAN(I)) = (TELAN(I),DTELAN( I),#01,1 = 1,#01); 
. VNTGRL(TECXN(I))=(TECXN(I),DTECXN(I),#01,1=1,#01); 
. VNTGRL(TCBWN(I))=(TCBWN(I),DTWALL(I),#01,1=1,#01); 
. 999 TEFA=ZZZ0; 
TELA=ZZZO; 
TECA=ZZZO: 
TECX=ZZZO: 
TECI=ZZZO; 
ZEGXC=ZZZO; 
ZFLCOR=ZZZO; 
CPNA=ZZZO; 
00 5630 ICNS=1,NOCNS; 
~TEFA=fEFA+FPWR(ICNS)*TEFAN(ICNS); 
TELA=TELA+FPWR(ICNS)*TELAN(ICNS); 
TECA=TECA+FPWR(ICNS)*TECAN(ICNS): 
TECX=TECX+WCOREN(ICNS)*TECXN(ICNS )*CCN(ICNS); 
TECI=TECI+WCOREN(ICNS)*TECIN(ICNS)*CCNdCNS); 
ZEGXC=ZEGXC+ZEGXCN(ICNS); 
ZFLCOR=ZFLCOR+WCOREN(ICNS); 
CPNA=CPNA+CCN(ICNS); 
. 5630 CONTINUE ; 
TECX=TECX/ZFLCOR/CPNA*NOCNS; 
TECI=TECI/ZFLCOR/CPNA»NOCNS; 
. 99 KSUBST=KSUBST-1; RETURN; 
END; % 100 > 
END 
*FDBEKO 
M <DFFDBK0(#)>=<%Z21 %X0 %M<FEDBKO>=<%%B CALL FDBEKO>%E 
SUBROUTINE FDBEKO; 
. TICIL; CHRTR; 
. COMON /FDBEK5/ RKFB,RKS,RKSC,RKD,RKDC,RKFE,RKFEC,RKV,RKVC,RKCE,RKCEC, 
. RKSTE,RKSTC; 
. COMON /FDBE05/ RKFBN(#01),RKSN(#01),RKON(#01),RKFEN(#01),RKVN(#01), 
. RKCEN(#01),RKSTEN(#01); 
. COMIN.NEUTRS,TIMER5,FDBEKS,FDBE05,C0RTP5,CORCNS; TASNACFDBEKO'); 
IF(OTIM.GT.O) GO TO 10; 
DO 5656 1=1,NOCNS; 
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. 5656 RKFBN(I)=ZZZO; 
10 CONTINUE: 
DO 2929 I=1,N0CNS; 
RKSN(I)=RKSC#(TECAN(1)-TECA0N(1)); 
RKDN(I)=RKDC*DLOG((TEFAN(I)+ZZZ273)/(TEFAON(I)+ZZZ273)) ; 
RKFEN(I)=RKFEC*(TEFAN(1)-TEFA0N(I)); 
RKCEN(I)=RKCEC*(TELAN(I)-TELAON(I)); 
RKSTEN(I)=RKSTC*(TCBWN(I)-TCBWNOCI)) ; 
RKV=RKVC*ZVOLFC; 
RKFBN(I)=RKSN(I)+RKDN(I)+RKFEN(I)+RKV+RKCEN(I)+RKSTEN(I); 
. 2929 CONTINUE; 
RKFB=ZZZO: 
RKS=ZZZO; 
RKD=ZZZO: 
RKFE=ZZZO: 
RKCE=ZZZO; 
RKSTE=ZZZO; 
WEIG=ZZZO; 
D0_ 5629 I-1,N0CNS; 
FACTOR =~FPWR(I)**2/VPWR(I): 
RKS = RKS + FACTOR * RKSNd); 
RKD = RKD + FACTOR * RKONd); 
RKFE = RKFE + FACTOR * RKFEN(I); 
RKCE = RKCE + FACTOR * RKCEN(I): 
RKSTE= RKSTE+ FACTOR « RKSTEN(I); 
WEIG= WEIG + FACTOR; 
. 5629 CONTINUE; 
RKS=RKS/WEIG; RKD=RKO/WEIG; RKFE=RKFE/WEIG; RKCE=RKCE/WEIG; 
RKSTE=RKSTE/WEIG: 
RKFB = (RKS + RKO + RKFE + RKCE); 
. 99 KSUBST=KSUBST-1: RETURN; 
END; % 100 > 
END 
